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Introductory Note 
 
In a globalized world, where people; goods and services are continuously flowing from side to 
side, banks have become the natural connector, being able to support and provide the required 
resources to corporate clients and private citizens as well. Of course, such a fundamental role 
presents numerous advantages in terms of profitability and prestige. Unfortunately, 
advantages do not come alone. Though the bright side seems to prevail over the negative one, 
as the banking sector is growing at a constant pace, we cannot neglect the fact that carrying 
out this kind of business implies unavoidably assuming many and different risks, which may 
grow as the banking activity itself swells. The first part of this work focuses just on this 
relationship. In particular, we describe how risk and profitability are intrinsically related one 
to the other and to what extent the risk management function has increased its importance as 
value management tool. Especially for the banking industry, risk management policies are 
revealing themselves as a value-adding activity that, on the one hand, may shelter from 
potential adverse impacts and, on the other, it can provide a concrete support to any other 
profitable, value-creating action. Specifically, the modern financial risk management attempts 
to handle all the possible threats that the financial institutions may face: from the typical 
financial risks to more operational and business-centered ones. Although we acknowledge the 
significance of the latter, herein we concentrate on the classic financial risks, given that they 
are still the most important ones for any financial entity. Chapter II provides a brief overview 
of the main financial risks, describing in general terms the key features and some of the most 
widespread measurement techniques. The main body of the project is represented by the final 
two chapters. Chapter III details the stress-testing framework. Namely, we detail all the 
peculiarities of stress test exercises: from possible categorizations to the current regulatory 
architecture. This chapter paves the way for the empirical analysis, which is included in 
chapter IV. The latter aims at underlining how crucial stress tests have become for regulatory 
authorities. In fact, the recent Financial Crisis has pointed out all the fragilities that 
characterize the financial system. Therefore, national and international supervisors have been 
constantly looking for methods, models, tools, such as stress tests, to cope with this increasing 
urge of restoring financial stability and providing right information to the market. 
Notwithstanding the enormous progresses that have been made in the last couple of years, 
there is still a long way to go. For this reason, the upcoming stress test will probably serve as 
a useful means through which regulatory authorities may figure out whether they are moving 
to the right direction or not.  
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1. Introduction to Financial Risk Management  
1.1. Risk, Uncertainty and Risk Exposure 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, risk may be defined as “A situation involving exposure 
to danger”. The word risk derives from the Latin Risico and has always had a prominent 
negative acceptation, being constantly employed as synonym of danger; harm, in other words, 
something to avoid. Notwithstanding, risk may be regarded an essential part of any business: 
from the very beginning, each action that companies undertake is characterized by risk and 
uncertainty. The latter concept is strictly related to the former and although sometimes they 
are used to express the same idea, failing to distinguish the actual difference might turn out to 
be misleading. Uncertainty might be defined as a condition that derives from the fact that 
companies are not the sole players in the environment they operate in. They cannot not 
control for all the factors that they require to carry out their business: both the external and 
internal worlds have their own functioning rules and mechanisms which are somehow 
independent and uncontrollable by companies themselves. Risk, on the other hand, refers 
more to an operational, managerial and manageable dimension. It may be what companies 
reasonably expect to face given the actions they strategically decide to implement. In this 
sense, risk depends directly on companies’ intentions, or with an appropriate word, on their 
risk appetite.  
All businesses act trying to make profits, some of them succeed whereas other fail, but in any 
case, all of them take on risk, as, profit and loss themselves might be considered as outcomes 
of risk. In fact, for any business strategy, risk is the possible distortion from managers’ 
ideally-expected results in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and profitability given the 
uncertainty. If there were no uncertainty, risk would disappear in that all possible outcomes 
would be easily forecastable. Thus, we may regard uncertainty as a necessary condition of 
risk; the latter exists only as a consequence of the former. Managers and entrepreneurs may 
know exactly the importance of coping with uncertainty. At the same time, they recognize 
that without uncertainty there would be no room for risk and therefore no possibility to make 
any profit. Once all sources of uncertainty are identified, mangers’ decisions must concentrate 
on how much risk to take on, the so-called risk appetite of the company. This might be 
persuasively summarized as the managerial decision regarding what and how much is worth 
for the company to craft. As a general rule, risk appetite should be set to the point where 
marginal benefits of taking additional risk are exactly compensated by marginal costs (Stulz, 
1996). The appetite, furthermore, shall be developed on the company’s business strategy, not 
neglecting the actual competitive environment and stakeholders’ concerns.  
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Similarly, risk tolerance may represent the imaginary boundaries outside which no positive 
outcome is valuable enough for companies to justify the amount of risk that they intend to 
assume. From a very operational point of view, risk tolerance is the level above which the 
company may not be able to carry on its core business, since potential incremental losses 
would trigger irreversible damages: deciding to overstep this limit would stray into a pure 
hazard dimension. 
The managerial act of deciding, selecting what specific risks to take on, and hence choosing to 
subject the company to risks, may be regarded as risk exposure. Horcher (2004) suggests an 
interesting clarification between risk and risk exposure. Accordingly, the former is deemed as 
the probability of loss, whereas the latter is the possibility of loss. Therefore, in the definition 
of risk exposure the subjective feature; the controllability and the key decisional role of the 
management are implicitly emphasized.  
A conception of risk as exclusively negative would be without any doubt incompatible with 
the modern economy. Each individual business, from the smallest family-run bakery to the 
most sophisticated investment bank should firmly bear in mind that risk is an essential 
element not only from a profitability point of view but also for the simple existence and 
survival of the business itself. Therefore, the restricted definition of risk as a possible negative 
outcome, intended either as financial or reputational damage by Sharma (2003), among 
others, is necessarily overcome.  
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 1.1. The interaction between uncertainty, exposure and risk. (Author’selaboration) 
  
UNCERTAINTY  EXPOSURE RISK 
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1.2 Financial Risk Management: A Value Management Tool 
Risk Management has acquired a key role not only in the financial sector but in all companies 
in general. Though risk is intrinsically neither negative nor positive, by definition, what 
characterizes risk management’s basic priority is the downside part of risk, as, generally, the 
favorable side is already dealt with in the daily operative business activities. Even though a 
company might not adopt directly any risk-avoidance policy, it may not fade away the chance 
of losing customers to a new competitor or the possibility to face an increase in the cost of 
credit lines. This is what risk management is all about; hedging the company from 
hypothetical and rational adverse changes, that may undermine the core performance as well 
as the entire value of the company. 
The general literature defines risk management as a standardized process, a step-by-step 
procedure, which may be universally applicable to both financial and non-financial 
companies. Of course, there is still no wholly-accepted methodology for assessing enterprise 
risk management procedures but independently from the field or from the number of steps, the 
main goal remains one: value management. The choice of using management instead of 
preservation, as one would normally expect, is voluntary. In fact, value management has a 
wider, more profound insight compared to the sole preservation. When we preserve 
something, such as a company, we attempt just to protect it from any eventual adverse change 
that may negatively impact on its value. On the other hand, when we manage something, we 
are trying to find solutions to contemporaneously maximize the upside and minimize the 
downside of it. Differently from the mere preservation, value management deals with a set of 
actions, programs, systems that clearly aim at taking advantage of possible positive effects of 
taking on risks, thus considering value as dynamically, actively adjustable and not as 
externally given and to be solely conserved as it is. Following the teachings of Koller et al. 
(2015), the market value of a company may be estimated as the sum of non-operating assets 
and the present value of all future cash flows deriving from core activities, discounted for an 
appropriate weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which should reflect individual capital 
structures. Thus, value mainly depends on the operating cash flows that the company may be 
able to reasonably produce during its own existence: actions that augment core inflows will 
also increase the enterprise value; conversely, anything that absorbs cash will erode it. Risk 
management practitioners seem to be well-aware of this fundamental concept. When it comes 
to value, any decision may have a relevant impact on it, and so are the risk management ones. 
In first instance, risk management shall focus on protecting cash flows from any inimical 
change, understanding and mitigating all possible threats that the enterprise might encounter 
throughout its business life. But a fully successful risk management may allow companies 
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also to significantly boost their current market value, by acting principally on three main areas 
(Stulz, 1996): financial distress and bankruptcy costs; payments and other outflows to 
shareholders and stakeholders and reduction of taxes. Financial distress costs may affect 
companies’ value in a multitude of ways. In first instance, they may create difficulties from a 
funding, or more precisely, a debt capacity point of view, since companies in financial trouble 
may likely pay higher expenses for receiving endowments, shrinking therefore resources for 
core activities. Further, this situation may lead to reputational damages which may impact 
negatively on the operative performance and the utter value of the company. Strictly related to 
financial distress costs are payments to shareholders and other stakeholders. From a 
shareholder’s perspective, when a firm reaches a distress phase, in their eyes, it is as if they 
implicitly assumed a covered position, consisting of a long call option for what concerns 
returns and long put option as regards their effective risk exposure: so long as the company 
will create profitable returns, they will be keen to risk as much as they can. But as soon as a 
critical, watershed point is reached they will be better off exercising their embedded put 
option, permitting creditors to take over. Hence, until this stage is reached, shareholders may 
have nothing to lose and for this reason they may be the first ones to pressure the board into 
high-risk and value-destroying opportunities. Naturally, this eventuality may persuade many 
stakeholders to react promptly. Let us consider employees for instance. Their choice to work 
for a specific company depends on various factors, among which reputation and salary surely 
play significant roles. In case of distress and reputational damages, it becomes extremely hard 
for any company to attract or even to merely retain employees, as they might likely demand 
consistent incremental monetary guarantees and other kind of benefits, thus contributing to 
add fuel to the fire. The same reasoning holds for suppliers, who, in a nutshell, may not be 
eager to carry on business with a company that faces financial and operative turbulence. Also 
in this case, supplementary warranty obligations might be needed and particularly, in the form 
of advance payments. This may ultimately affect adversely the company’s working capital 
and liquidity necessities and hence, as a matter of fact, its actual survival. All the 
aforementioned cases might gradually and eventually lead the company to file for bankruptcy, 
which, needless to say, represents the worst outcome.  
The final major benefit of risk management concerns corporate taxation. Differently from the 
previous two, the linkage between taxation and risk management is not intuitive at all. Smith 
and Stulz (1985) point out that an effective risk management may diminish the volatility of 
taxable income and, as a consequence, allow corporations to benefit from the tax function’s 
convex shape, typical of most worldwide tax codes. The convexity of the tax function implies 
that companies may proactively manage their taxable income so that to make it fall within a 
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target and efficient taxation range. And any reduction in volatility would definitely permit 
them to achieve this outcome.  
The conception of risk management as a value management tool has gained an increasing 
acceptance throughout the last few decades, since the role of the risk officers and risk 
management departments in general have been adopted increasingly by large companies. But 
with the last statement we do not regard risk management as a practice relegated to big 
corporations only, on the contrary, it is fundamental for all kind of businesses to have at least 
a minimum of risk management policy and a person, who is directly responsible of it. The 
overall complexity and number of people involved changes according to the size of the 
organization: an international investment bank may have an entire department dedicated, as 
strongly recommended by Basel II; whereas a small grocery shop is likely to rely on its 
owners to accomplish this task.  
After portraying a general view of risk management, it is important to spend a couple of 
words also for a particular subcategory: the financial risk management. When dealing with 
financial risk management, all general principles of the risk management are concretely 
applied to financial institutions, paying due attention to their peculiarities and specific needs. 
What essentially distinguishes the banking risk management from others is not the procedure 
itself, which, as already stated, is quite standardized but rather the importance that risk 
managers and officers give to the upside part of risk. In financial risk management, negative 
outcomes and upside benefits are even more interconnected, since the risks of core activities 
and risk management coincide. Financially speaking, we might say that risk management for a 
financial intermediary corresponds to the purchase of a “well-out-of-money put option” 
(Stulz, 1996) with the clear scope of eliminating the downside and preserving the upside at 
the same time. Hence, risk management practices in this field weighs the negative and 
positive sides of risk even more, stressing once again, how they both are faces of the same 
coin and for this reason interdependent and equally important when drawing any business 
strategy.  
 
1.3 Financial Risk Management: Step-by-Step Procedure 
Any company may have its own risk management procedure, modelled on its business 
necessities and financial means. Hence, as already stated previously, there may not be any 
commonly-accepted procedure, as well as some persistent and remarkable inconsistencies 
regarding steps definition. But nevertheless, we may still trace a simple and effective six-step 
procedure, which may serve to figure out how companies and especially financial institutions, 
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accomplish risk management practices. Nowadays, what stands out modern risk management 
processes is their circular (Williams, 2004) and dynamically-adjustable nature: new threats; 
system inefficiencies may be promptly individualized and solved, thanks to a horizontally and 
well-integrated flow of information.  
  
Figure 1.2. Risk Management step-by-step procedure. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
Risk identification basically consists of understanding what the possible threats that the 
company may face when accomplishing its business. A primary and general division of risks 
may suggest the distinction between generic or systemic and business-specific risks. The 
former characterize all companies, independently from the sector they operate in and hence, 
are extremely difficult to deal with. To such category belong, for instance political and 
macroeconomic risks. For this reason, what usually businesses, and in particular small-
medium enterprises, tend to focus on are business-specific risks which relate more to an 
operative and manageable dimension. Within the latter side, business risks may be classified 
in a variety of ways, such as: strategical; operational; technological; financial; compliance-
related and so on. Therefore, this first stage significantly differs depending on core 
businesses: a bank, for instance, is supposed to shelter itself primarily from credit and interest 
risk, which in a consumer staple firm would have only a marginal relevance. In general, it is 
the top management that performs this kind of analysis, by virtue of their deeper company 
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knowledge and should be reviewed periodically, particularly in case the company’s portfolio 
is directly or indirectly subject to any significant changes, such as the entry in a completely 
new, disruptive sector or an unexpected poor performance. Identifying risks may not be as 
easy as it seems at the first sight, as companies are inclined to focus just on the main and 
obvious ones instead of carrying out a broader and more comprehensive analysis. In the 
previous section, it was strongly underlined that, basically, all corporate actions, required to 
deliver value to the final customer, are impregnated by uncertainty and risk and hence any 
management team should keep this in mind when taking decisions regarding what and how 
the organizational hedging programs are carried out.  
This may not be the case of the banking and financial sector where, as detailed later, 
internationally-approved regulations require banks to specifically target and handle a 
significant number of potential risks that characterize their day-to-day activities. Nowadays 
banks play a key role world-widely and are directly connected with almost all types of 
business firms, so that greater regulatory obligations are not surprising at all. Let us consider, 
for instance, the bankruptcy of a grocery chain. This may rarely have any major relevant 
impact, whilst, as the recent Financial Crisis has proved, the failure of a large bank may 
endanger the entire economic and financial system. 
Once risks are identified, the following stage requires their description, which basically 
means pointing out the peculiarities of each single risk and why it should be important to 
hedge it. Usually, to simplify the process, this phase may be included straightly in the first 
one, as the identification itself implies some descriptive analysis.  
Risk measurement represents the next step. This phase may be extremely troublesome and 
quite subjective, in the sense that it varies a lot according to different factors which, most of 
the times, are not under direct control of the companies. Think for instance of the experience 
that risk managers may have: some could be more experienced and thus able to perform a 
more reliable and precise computation, whereas others may feel not at ease when measuring 
risks. Generally speaking, we may use either or both qualitative and quantitative assessments 
but given the need for straightforward and reliable indications, only the latter are employed in 
practice. Also, different methodologies may have relevant impact on the reported 
measurements themselves, hence posing a big challenge for what concerns precision and 
alignment of the results. A useful and plain measure, which may be utilized by all kind of 
companies, is suggested by Boehm (1989):  
                                                 Risk Exposure (RE) = P x C                                        (1.1) 
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Where P is the probability of occurrence for a specific risk and C is the expected loss deriving 
from that risk. Let us suppose that the probability for a risk, for instance the failure of a new 
production facility is 25% and the related expected loss is 100.000 euro. The risk exposure in 
this case is 25.000 euro. As risks are many and different, each of them should be evaluated 
separately, hence who is in charge of risk management should in first instance assess a 
likelihood of occurrence scale, deciding the range and meaningful intervals: from 0 % for 
unrealistic threats to 100% for certain losses. In between, the management shall decide how to 
properly distribute the percentage scale based on the level of details aimed and information 
possessed. Afterwards, realistic loss forecasts are required for each risk. Also these 
predictions, like the probabilities, are completely arbitrary and subjective values but 
nevertheless they are indeed helpful to obtain at least a raw estimate of the impact of risks.  
In the financial sector, the aforementioned problem is partially mitigated by the adoption of 
common rules which encourage the implementation of specific, alternative techniques. 
Additionally, the presence of many practices to evaluate the same thing might be considered 
as an inestimable resource as well, incentivizing and accenting the debate within the top 
management. 
One comprehensive and widespread measure is the Value at Risk (VaR). Although a deeper 
insight will be provided later, we believe that it is inevitable to spend a few introductory 
words regarding this methodology. What is value at risk and why it is so important? Value at 
Risk, or VaR, is a risk measurement introduced by JP Morgan during the late 1980s which has 
gained increasing popularity among practitioners due to its simplicity and extreme versatility: 
from portfolio analysis to firm-wide risk evaluation, this technique applies indistinctly to a 
multitude of concrete cases. The VaR measure has positively impacted on the financial world 
thanks to the striking and concise significance that it can convey with just one single value. 
Originally presented to the JP Morgan senior management on a daily basis, the VaR 
summarizes, using statistical principles, the entire risk exposure of the company within a 
precise timespan and confidence interval. Along with VaR, other methods have recently 
gained unprecedented attention. Tools such as stress testing; Cash Flow at Risk (CFaR) and 
Monte Carlo simulations may be indicated as compelling successors of VaR. As all of them 
focus primarily on total exposure, a comparative and integrated usage might be immensely 
beneficial, on the one hand; while on the other, specific risk indicators and individual 
estimates shall be still required, in order to obtain a meaningful and comprehensive enterprise 
risk exposure.  
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After measuring each risk, a set of potential losses is obtained. The next stage is simply 
ranking them from the riskiest to the least one. Once reached an acceptable standing order, the 
management should decide which exposure to prioritize and treat. Obviously, with the help of 
a classification, it becomes way easier to decide which risks need to be picked up first and 
treated, but nevertheless, many times it is not as easy as it sounds. For instance, it may happen 
that the highest-ranked risk for a company derives from a possible change in the accounting 
rules, in which case any specific risk avoidance measure would have no impact at all. 
Although this is an extreme case, it appears clear what the main task of the management in 
this phase is: deciding whether to accept (Risk acceptance) or to treat (Risk treatment). Either 
circumstance depends directly on the company’s risk tolerance and appetite, besides, of 
course, on the controllability of the risk by the management team. Risk acceptance might be 
improperly addressed as risk ignorance, which indeed on surface may look quite similar but 
nonetheless, the acceptance assumes an initial acknowledgement and a following careful 
judgement by the responsible team, whilst the ignorance does not. Additionally, the latter 
would pose many concerns regarding the actual competence and adequateness of the risk 
management group. In case of treatment, conversely, all efforts will necessarily focus on how 
to efficiently and effectively manage the risk. The objectives may be fundamentally two: risk 
avoidance, on the one side, risk protection, on the other. Albeit substitutable in many other 
contexts, the former may be referred to as the situation whereby the management may face the 
concrete chance to avert the risk, whereas, in the latter case, little can be done to avoid it and 
therefore mitigating responses may be required. The final ambition is to reach a solution 
which balances benefits, in terms of reduction of risk exposure, and costs, conceived as 
monetary expenses as well as opportunity costs. An insightful and straightforward formula is 
represented by Pfleeger’s Risk Leverage (1998): 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
                                                                                                                                     (1.2) 
This ratio is a very helpful measure for the entire management team: each member in fact, 
with a trivial calculation, could achieve an immediate understanding of the efficacy and 
convenience of any risk treatment proposals, providing also the opportunity for an objective 
comparison between different measures that aim at judging the same risk. Needless to say, it 
is up to the management to decide what level of threshold should be acceptable. Moreover, 
since this is a general and approximate measure or, in other words, a mere starting point, other 
more specialized techniques and measures will be required to evaluate single risks. Risk 
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treatment for a financial intermediary is unarguably more challenging. For a bank, in 
particular, risk treatment concerns, three dimensions 1 : policy decisions, cash market 
transactions and derivatives. The order in which they have been enunciated is not casual but 
should be considered as a sort of three-leveled and cascade-shaped tank from which to pick 
solutions anytime the previous ones are exhausted or ineffective.  
Policy decisions relate to the pure core business of financial institutions, they contribute to 
define the corporate positioning in terms of profitability and corporate strategies. Belonging to 
this category are decision such as the spread to apply on mortgage interest, as well as the 
banking fees for accounts and credit lines. As the financial market has become increasingly 
competitive, decisions related to this first set of activities may have a circumscribed utility.  
More useful to this purpose are the cash market transactions. These are substantially all those 
standardized operations utilized to manage the bank’s balance sheet, such as fixed-income and 
mortgage-backed transactions. Though strongly regulated by the competent authorities, this 
category guarantees more space to move in and more instruments to choose between, giving 
therefore more discretionary decision power to the responsible team. 
When it comes to treating banking and financial risks, derivatives are surely a key part to be 
considered in order to understand how risk management policies function in this sector. But 
notwithstanding, they should be used as residual protecting means and not as primary vehicles 
upon which to plan a structural hedging policy. Derivatives are financial instruments that 
derive their value from an underlying asset’s actual performance, such as bonds; stocks and 
commodities. Throughout the last decades, their application has tremendously surged thanks 
to the usefulness of their ultimate scope, that is, risk transfer. As the topic is extremely 
articulated, for simplicity’s sake it may be more practical to spend just few introductory words 
regarding classification and main typologies. Generally speaking, derivatives may be divided 
into two main categories: Exchange-Traded Derivatives (ETDs) and Over-The-Counter 
(OTCs), with the former characterized by high degree of liquidity and standardization and the 
latter employed as bespoke agreements, ideal to satisfy specific needs of the counterparties. 
The most commonly-used instruments are: options; futures; forwards; swaps and swaptions. 
But independently from the individual preference, it shall be borne in mind that their usage 
ought to be circumscribed to the residual risk only and not utilized as primary strategical 
tools, as stated earlier, since the overall complexity and volatility of these instruments may 
remain excessively soaring, even for the most experienced professionals.Following risk 
treatment are results reporting and monitoring. They should be accomplished diligently on 
                                                             
1 Strategies and Tactics, 2006.  Risk Management Programs & The Use of Derivatives. 
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regular basis so as to allow all responsible members to be well-informed about the 
performance and efficacy of the selected treatment techniques. This will eventually allow 
companies to identify other sophisticated solutions or even new emerging threats: with the 
reporting and monitoring stage, risk management procedure may start to realize its 
intrinsically-circular nature. As shown in exhibit 1.2, two additional horizontally-integrated 
elements are necessary for a fruitful risk management practice: communication and risk 
culture. Communication within a company includes all information inflows and outflows. 
Culture, on the other hand, may be defined in a variety of ways. Schien (1990) delineates it as 
a dynamic learning process, whereby organization members acquire the knowledge to solve 
internal and external problems: in other words, they learn how to survive. Regarding risk 
culture, that is to say a particular subcategory of organizational culture, there is no point 
against which the previous definition might not be extended also to the latter, as it concerns 
company survival as well. As a consequence, risk culture should guide employees in their 
daily decision-making habits, helping to reckon tradeoffs between risk benefits and harms. 
Concerning risk management, communication and risk culture are somehow heavily 
interrelated and interdependent one with the other: thanks to a meaningful and explicit 
communication, a strong and shared risk culture may be built, at the same time; this can be 
used to encourage and improve communication and risk reporting. It is crucial to highlight 
once more that communication and risk culture must flow horizontally in any organization 
and not vertically. Why? As one would imagine, simply giving instructions and receiving 
feedbacks might be much easier to manage but nevertheless, in the long run, it may turn out to 
be unproductive and somewhat superficial, as it would alienate the individual, personal 
commitment towards the organization’s values and goals. In fact, culture may be considered 
as a control mechanism for companies and self-regulation tool for individual members. As far 
as risk management is concerned, individuals shall comprehend the importance of their roles 
and tasks so that to be incentivized to point out anomalies as soon as they come to know and 
to express proactively their opinions and suggestions, allowing in turn the organization to 
enhance dynamically and continuously its risk management practices. This, as time goes by, 
will eventually build up a solid risk management culture. Without a horizontal flow across the 
organization, this would be clearly very tough, if not impossible. 
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2. Introduction to Banking Financial Risks 
Nowadays financial institutions have become an essential part of everyone’s life. In a 
dynamic and globalized environment, banks have been playing a key adhesive role, being able 
to connect successfully people and businesses and contributing to develop and modernize the 
economy. But nevertheless, just because of their roles as all-around entities, they have been 
subject to many threats which in some cases may turn out to be extremely harmful. Therefore, 
Banking risk management has always been one of the most complicated yet fascinating topic 
for scholars and risk managers, who throughout the years have been constantly looking for 
models and answers to address such a crucial matter. Risks that banks face on a daily basis are 
many and various but for simplicity’s sake what are introduced in this section are the sole 
financial risks, i.e. the risks that relate primarily to the core banking activities. Specifically, 
the table below: 
  
 
Figure 2.1. Banking Financial Risks. (Author’s elaboration) 
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2.1 Introduction Interest rate risk 
Many financial risk management handbooks and scientific papers do not deal directly with 
interest rate risk. What is usually done is including the latter in the broader market risk, as, 
correctly, interest risk may also be deemed as a consistent component of the market risk, in 
the sense that large amount of interest rate changes may be triggered by market operations 
that banks carry out in their daily activities. Despite the validity of this conception, a relevant 
part of interest risk may be still not covered. In fact, what has been introduced so far is the 
interest component related to the sole trading book, that is, associated with the current trading 
transactions, which basically constitute the short-term capital gains and liquidity management. 
Interest rate risk does not involve only the trading book but concerns the entire banking book: 
all assets and liabilities are somehow affected by possible changes in the market interest rate. 
Moreover, an additional indirect effect concerns the volumes negotiated by the bank (Resti, 
Sironi 2007). Generally speaking, this implicit effect may follow the universal law of supply-
demand. In fact, an increase in market interest rates may not only trigger higher interests 
expensed and earned by the bank but it may also lead to additional volume-related impacts. 
For instance, a decline in credit line demand: since it becomes more expensive, many 
customers may reduce the demand for that service, affecting, as a consequence, the overall 
profitability of the bank. Taking into account all the aforementioned characteristics of the 
interest rate risk, we may broadly define it as the risk that unexpected movements in market 
interest rates may affect both the profitability and value of a bank. The profit dimension 
relates primarily to the bank’s income statement and describes the short-term effect. 
Conversely, the value, or better, the economic value component represents more a balance 
sheet or assets and liabilities perspective, which is, needless to say, a long-term view. 
Practitioners and financial experts are keen to divide interest rate risk into four main 
subcategories, each of them accenting a specific interest component: the repricing risk (1), 
which focuses on potential maturity mismatches; the yield curve risk (2), which deals with 
adverse movements of interest rates of fixed income instruments; the basis risk (3), which 
basically is the risk associated with imperfect hedging policies and the optionality risk (4), 
that refers to price movements deriving from automated or behavioral changes in interest. In 
details: 
(1) The repricing risk represents the main type of interest rate risk, since, most of the times, 
when outsiders of the banking sector are asked to describe, in general terms, the interest rate 
risk, they uniquely refer to the repricing and not to any of the remaining risks. Interest rate 
risk may derive from the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. During the 
accomplishment of core activities, it may happen that assets have longer maturity than 
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liabilities. In this case, from the moment in between the end of the former and the end of the 
latter a “gap” is formed, whereby the bank is not covered from possible fluctuations in the 
market interest rates. Therefore, if, for some reasons, the market rate varies, a refinancing risk 
arises, that is, the financial institution shall require to find further funds to balance the longer 
asset maturity. Practically, it is the risk that derives from an upsurge of costs associated with 
financing an interest-gaining position of the bank. Conversely, when liabilities have longer 
maturity, banks may incur in reinvestment risk: new investing opportunities shall be 
identified, but this may be costly, particularly if market interests fell: a bank, in that case, 
would have to reinvest at lower rate and report lower income.  
(2) The yield curve risk, or non-parallel gap risk affects primarily investments in fixed 
maturities, such as bonds. Let us consider the simplest case, whereby the bank holds just a 
single bond with maturity of one year. If the yield curve shifts, movements are 
straightforwardly reflected in the yield curve. In a more realistic scenario, though, a bank 
holds different instruments with different maturities and any of them may shift the yield curve 
unevenly. For instance, assuming for simplicity’s sake, that a bank possesses only a 15-years-
mortgage with interest earnings at 5% financed through a one-year-deposit at 2%. The gap is 
a plus 3% in the first year. But if we expect a sharper rise in the second year of the short-term 
rate, this would unsymmetrically reduce the positive gap, affecting the net income of the 
bank: for example, the long-term rate rises by 1% but the short-term rate increases of 2%, the 
gap would be just one percent. This may also be the result anytime, in a floating interest 
scenario, banks use different benchmarks, i.e., call market rates, treasury bills’ yields etc., to 
price assets and liabilities: any non-parallel movements in the yield curves, which is rather 
frequent, might alter the net interest income.  
(3) The basis risk is a particular threat which derives basically from the ineffectiveness of 
hedging policies. It may happen that two investments may have an imperfect negative 
correlation and thus, price changes of one of them are not fully compensated by the other 
position. This may increase the possibility of unexpected gains as well as the chance of 
unforeseen losses, incrementing, as a result, the total volatility of the bank’s portfolio. Let us 
suppose that a bank possesses only two instruments: a 6-month treasury-based loan and a 6-
month LIBOR-based borrowing. If the 6-month treasury increases by 2% but the LIBOR 
surges of 3%, the net interest spread reduces, resulting in a lower income for the bank. Many 
variants may be included in the basis risk such as: locational basis risk; product or quality 
basis risk and calendar basis risk. But regardless of the subcategory, the underlying 
functioning mechanism remains the same. 
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(4) The optionality risk is the last component of interest rate risk. It is the risk embedded in 
many assets and liabilities. In general, an option provides the right but not the obligation to 
buy, sell or, in some cases, to alter the cash flows of a financial instrument. Options may be 
stand-alone instruments, such as exchange-traded options and Over-The-Counter contracts, or 
they may be implicitly embedded within other instruments. In the former case, they can be 
used both in the trading and non-trading account, while the latter are more properly 
implemented in the non-trading account. Classical examples are customer loans with the right 
to prepay or refinance or the many different forms of non-maturity deposit instruments which 
give depositors the right to withdraw funds at any time without any penalties. Let us consider 
a simple case, for clarity’s sake, of a bank holding only two instruments: a 20-year mortgage 
and a 5-year time deposit. Assuming a decrease of 2% in the mortgage interest rate and that 
the customer decides consequently to refinance his mortgage, this would lead to a drop in the 
interest spread earned by the bank.  
 
2.1.1 Gap Models and the Earnings-Based Approach 
Interest rate risk models divide themselves into two macro-categories: the earnings-based 
models and the equity-based methods. Among the earnings-based approach, certainly 
repricing gap models play the starring role. Three main variants have been conceived: the 
repricing gap, which focuses just on net interest income changes; the maturity-adjusted gap, 
that poses the accent on equity value changes but ignores cash flow timing and the duration 
gap on equity value, which, differently from the previous one, includes cash flow timing as 
well. 
When dealing with the interest rate risk, regardless of the particular risk or the specific 
repricing model adopted, it is crucial to point out the importance of the concept of gap. Banks 
may have many assets and liabilities with different maturities. For a determined period, i.e. 
the gapping period t, interest rate risk may be regarded as the risk that assets and liabilities 
that mature or are subject to repricing during that period, namely, sensitive assets and 
liabilities, may be affected by unexpected changes in market interest rates and thus, resulting 
in a negative effect on the net interest income. 
                                       𝐺𝑡 =  𝑆𝐴𝑡 −  𝑆𝐿𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑗𝑗 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑙𝑡,𝑗𝑗                  (2.1) 
Assuming, for simplicity’s sake, that banks earn a net profit computed as the difference 
between interest-earning financial assets (FA), intended as both sensitive and non-sensitive 
assets, and interest-bearing financial liabilities (FL), comprehending sensitive and non-
sensitive liabilities, we may state that the net income for a gapping period t is: 
 𝑁𝐼𝐼 = 𝐼𝐼 − 𝐼𝐸 =  𝑟𝐴 × 𝐹𝐴 − 𝑟𝐿 × 𝐹𝐿 =  𝑟𝐴  × (𝑆𝐴 + 𝑁𝑆𝐴) − 𝑟𝐿 × (𝑆𝐿 + 𝑁𝑆𝐿)     (2.2) 
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As non-sensitive assets and liabilities are not, by definition, affected by unexpected changes 
in market interest rates, they do not lead to potentially adverse impacts on the net interest 
income. Therefore, the latter may depend only on unforeseen fluctuations of sensitive assets 
and liabilities.  
                                  𝑁𝐼𝐼 = 𝑟𝐴 ×  𝑆𝐴 −  𝑟𝐿 ×  𝑆𝐿                                         (2.3)           
To further simplify, ΔrA = ΔrL = Δr, which leads to the following conclusion 
                  ∆𝑁𝐼𝐼 = ∆𝑟 × (𝑆𝐴 − 𝑆𝐿) = ∆𝑟  ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑡,𝑗𝑗 −  ∑ 𝑠𝑙𝑡,𝑗𝑗 =  ∆𝑟 × 𝐺            (2.4) 
The gap G is the essential element that connects the changes in market interest rates to the 
corresponding variation in net interest income. If the gap is positive, that is, sensitive assets 
exceed sensitive liabilities; a rise in market rates generates a positive flow. Conversely, if 
rates shrink, a negative impact is recorded. Obviously, the other way around holds 
analogously: in case of a negative gap, a rise in interest rate produces a decline in income 
while a decrease a favorable inflow.  
The previous framework represents the basic repricing gap model, which, needless to say, has 
many limitations. But nonetheless, it may be use as an introduction to pave the way towards 
more sophisticated gap models, such as the maturity-adjusted gap and the duration gap. The 
former represents a huge step forward in terms of realism compared to the simple repricing 
gap model, whereas the latter surely is the most advanced of the three. 
The maturity-adjusted model follows the same mechanism and considerations of its 
predecessor but completely eliminates a non-realistic assumption, which is though critical for 
the validity of the repricing gap model: the instantaneous interest change of sensitive assets 
and liabilities following a variation in market interest rate. The reasoning behind is quite 
trivial: when market rates changes, its effects are not immediately propagated to the bank’s 
assets and liabilities but only restricted to the period from maturity (or repricing) of the 
instrument to the end of the established gapping period. Let us consider a 5- month customer 
credit and a gapping period of one year. According to the repricing gap model, we would 
require to pool this asset in its entirety along with other sensitive assets. Conversely, the 
maturity-adjusted gap suggests, correctly, that only those non-covered months, that is, from 
the sixth to the end, expose the bank to interest rate risk, as in the prior five months, the asset, 
and therefore, its funds are fully employed.  
In general, in case we may consider a rate-sensitive asset j and its yield rj, the interest income 
deriving may be calculated as:  
                              𝑖𝑖𝑗 =  𝑠𝑎𝑗 × 𝑟𝑗  ×  𝑝𝑗 +  𝑠𝑎𝑗 × (𝑟𝑗 +  ∆𝑟𝑗) × (1 − 𝑝𝑗)                (2.5) 
whereby p stands for the fraction of year from today until the maturity or repricing date of the 
aforementioned asset j. The interest income is therefore a sum of two components: a known 
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one, represented by the first addendum of the previous equation and an unknown element 
represented by the remaining part. The change in interest income depends solely on the 
unknown part and thus:  
                                             ∆𝑖𝑖𝑗 =  𝑠𝑎𝑗 × (1 − 𝑝𝑗) ×  ∆𝑟𝑗                                               (2.6) 
The overall change in interest income may be defined as the sum of all n rate sensitive assets 
of the bank: 
                              𝛥𝐼𝐼 = ∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 × ∆𝑟𝑗 × (1 − 𝑝𝑗)                                            (2.7) 
Assuming in first instance that the same logic may be applied to compute the interest 
expenses, and additionally that changes in in interest rates of assets and liabilities are uniform, 
we may derive the change in total interest income as: 
      𝛥𝑁𝐼 = 𝛥𝐼𝐼 − 𝛥𝐼𝐸 = (∑ 𝑠𝑎𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 (1 − 𝑝𝑗) − ∑ 𝑠𝑙𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 (1 − 𝑝𝑗)) ∆𝑟𝑗 ≡ 𝐺
𝑀𝐴 × ∆𝑖   (2.8)  
Where GMA is the maturity gap, calculated as the difference between a firms’s weighted 
average asset maturity (MA) and weighted average liability maturity (ML). 
                                                  𝐺𝑀𝐴 = (𝑀𝐴 − 𝑀𝐿)                                            (2.9) 
With:  
MA = WA1MA1 + WA2MA2 + WA3MA3 + … + WAnMAn 
ML = WL1ML1 + WL2ML2 + WL3ML3 + … + WLnMLn 
   WAi = (market value of asset i)/(market value of total assets). 
WLi = (market value of liability j)/(market value of total liab.) 
MAi is the maturity of asset i. 
MLi is the maturity of liability j. 
 
When (MA - ML) > 0 then an increase (decrease) in interest rates is expected to decrease 
(increase) a financial firm’s equity. The other way around also holds. 
Both the models presented so far may fare quite well on paper but they do present challenging 
limitations when performed concretely (Sironi, Resti, 2007). Firstly, changes in interest rates 
of assets and liabilities may not be uniform for different maturities. This, in particular, is 
exacerbated if the sensitivity of assets and liabilities to interest rates varies consistently. 
Secondly, demand loans and deposits and in general all instruments without a fixed maturity 
do not reflect immediately, for various reasons, the change in market interest rates. Another 
major problem is represented by the fact that repricing models, as presented so far, deals only 
with flows, i.e. interest expenses and income therefore, neglecting potential impacts on assets 
and liabilities. Lastly, effects deriving from changes in market values of assets and liabilities 
are completely ignored.  
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2.1.2 The Duration Gap Model  
To the aforementioned problems, practitioners and experts have designated the standardized 
gap model as one possible solution or at least, to the first three points. In a nutshell, this 
further evolution introduces the concept of adjusted gap, which basically, is a repricing gap 
that considers also the difference in sensitivity of assets and liabilities and the price-quantity 
interactions. Despite the big step forward, still, the effects deriving from changes in market 
value of assets liabilities are not taken into account. As a result, another more comprehensive 
measure has gained increasing acceptance: the duration gap model. The main difference is 
represented by the variable of interest: in the former two cases, a flow variable, the net 
interest income whereas in the latter, a stock, equity-based variable is adopted.  
The duration of an instrument may be calculated as the average of cash-flow maturities 
associated with the instrument itself, whereby every maturity is weighted according to the 
ratio between the present value of cash-flow for a given maturity and the market price of the 
instrument. 
                                          𝐷 = ∑ 𝑡𝑇𝑖=1  ×  
𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝑃
                               (2.10) 
where: 
D = duration 
t = maturity of individual cash flows expressed in years 
CFt = t-th cash flow 
r = effective yield to maturity requested by the market for maturity T 
P = price or market value of the instrument concerned 
T = maturity of the asset, namely, of the final cash flow 
 
In practice, the duration is a measure that considers both the instrument’s residual life and the 
amount of intermediate flows, in addition to considering the sensitiveness of the instrument’s 
after a change in the market interest rates. For the interest rate risk purpose, duration as it is 
may not be useful. Thus, a variant is required, that is, the modified duration: −
𝐷
1+𝑟
. The 
modified duration gives the possibility to quantify percentage change in prices deriving from 
extremely small change in market yield.  
                                                       
∆𝑃
𝑃
≅  − 
𝐷
1+𝑟
∗  ∆ 𝑟                                                (2.11) 
As stated earlier, the duration may allow us to estimate the sensitivity of market value to 
changes in market interest rate:  
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∆𝑀𝑉
𝑀𝑉
 ≅  −
𝐷
(1+𝑟)
× ∆𝑟 =  −𝑀𝐷 × ∆𝑟                                  (2.12) 
From which: 
                                               ∆𝑀𝑉 ≅  −𝑀𝑉 × 𝑀𝐷 ×  ∆𝑟                                        (2.13) 
The latter equations may refer indistinctly to either assets or liabilities. In case of assets, we 
would have MVA and rA instead of MV and r. The same holds for liabilities. Following the 
calculations of Sironi and Resti (2007), we may arrive to the following point:  
               ∆𝑀𝐵𝐵 ≅  −(𝑀𝐷𝐴 − 𝑀𝐷𝐿) × ∆𝑀𝑉𝐴 × ∆𝑟 = −𝐷𝐺 × ∆𝑀𝑉𝐴 × ∆𝑟        (2.14) 
With L representing the bank’s financial leverage (MVL/MVA) and DG as the duration gap. 
The equation points out that the change in the market value of a bank’s equity following a 
change in interest rate is a direct function of three factors: the intermediation activity 
undertaken by the bank (MVA); the size of the interest rate change and the difference between 
the modified duration of assets and liabilities adjusted by the bank’s financial leverage. 
Interest rate changes are neutralized in case MDA = MDL, that is, sensitivity of assets and 
liabilities are identical. But in reality, what happens is that assets have larger value than 
liabilities. In that case, we would require a DG equal to zero for the immunization to work 
efficiently and, as a consequence, the modified duration for assets must be lower than 
liabilities’ one. Conversely, when DG is not zero the former equation allows us to calculate 
the impact of changes in equity value due to a change in market interest rates. 
Although the duration gap model represents a milestone when it comes to interest rate risk, it 
still far from being unbiased and blindly-adopted. Four main problems are stressed out (Sironi 
& Resti, 2007). The first issue regards the dynamic nature of immunization policies which 
leads to short-lasting hedging effects. A second problem concerns costs of immunization 
policies: in practice, many strategies may turn out to be extremely expensive for banks. 
Thirdly, the duration gap is a linear approximation model, and as such, it may lead to larger 
error estimate, the greater the change in interest rates. Finally, the duration gap suffers the 
same unrealistic limitation of its predecessors, i.e. uniform interest changes. Similarly, the 
threat is resolved with the concept of modified duration gap, which takes into account also 
different degree of sensitivity of assets and liabilities. 
 
2.1.3 The Basel Committee Model for Interest rate risk 
Uniform changes in interest rate may be deemed as the greatest limitation of all gap models. 
And though concrete solutions, such as modified duration, have been introduced, they are still 
far from being flawless. For this reason, other cash-flow based techniques have gained 
extraordinary success: it is no coincidence that even the Basel Committee opted for a cash 
21 
 
flow model instead of the repricing ones. These models are generally referred to as Cash-flow 
Mapping and may be applied to manage many different risks other than the interest rate one. 
The underlying functioning concept is quite trivial: single bank positions, typical of gap 
models, are transformed into value at risk, that is, in other words, from the yield curve the 
focus now shifts towards zero-coupon or term-structure rate curves. Banks’ exposures are 
basically decomposed into unitary cash flows and grouped, for simplicity’s sake, into a 
limited number of buckets. Obviously, the number of buckets may vary consistently from 
institution to institution. On the one hand, a reduced number, i.e. three or lower, would not 
capture significant changes, conversely, a large number, i.e. more than fifteen, would cause 
too much of a noise in the curve. As a result, an optimal number may be around twelve, which 
may permit to carefully capture relevant shifts while properly neglecting uninfluential 
movements. Consequently, in a general mapping procedure, cash flows whose maturity does 
not match a precise bucket may be either accurately divided into two distinct flows and 
assigned to the closest couple buckets, trying to preserve the characteristics of the original 
flow, or assigned to one single node, as in the Basel Committee model.  
A proper way to “map” banks assets and liabilities into a fixed number of buckets or nodes is 
represented by residual life of single exposures: all the assets and liabilities with similar 
repricing maturity are grouped together into discrete intervals and the central midpoint 
amount of the flows is designated as the value of the bucket in the term structure.  
The Basel Committee identifies additional criteria to properly manage interest rate risk. In 
particular, financial institutions are required to reveal a terse indicator, which shall represent 
straightforwardly the overall exposure to interest rate risk. These include the division of 
bank’s assets and liabilities into thirteen layers, each of them with a specific duration interval. 
The cash flow mapping, in this case, does not explicitly consider intermediate flows, such as 
coupons, in the sense that their presence may only influence the assignation to one interval 
rather than another: the higher the intermediate coupons, the greater the likelihood to be 
grouped with positions with lower residual life. Every bracket shall be reported at its net 
position, taking as such the difference between assets and liabilities for all the intervals. 
Further, to compute the overall risk exposure, each of the thirteen brackets is then weighted 
for the relative average modified duration and for a possible range change Δri, which naturally 
is greater for short-term maturities, as volatility in the long run tends to decrease. The result is 
a simple value similar to the previous duration gap computation of changes in market value of 
assets and liabilities. The sole difference is that in the latter case, we are dealing with market 
values of balance sheet while in the former with book values.  
                                                  ∆𝑁𝑃𝑖 ≅  𝑁𝑃𝑖 × 𝑀𝐷𝑖  ×  ∆𝑟𝑖                                                             (2.15) 
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Needless to say, interest impacts may have different effects depending on the net position NP: 
in case of a positive (negative) NP, an increase in interest may trigger a loss (profit). The 
other way around works symmetrically for interest rate drops. One pivotal remark of the Basel 
Committee’s methodology is the fact that it does not allow to completely compensate positive 
and negative net positions, as, correctly, this would implicitly imply the existence of sole 
parallel shifts of the yield curve, which of course is far distant from reality.  
The scope of the entire process is to obtain a sound and easily-comparable estimate. Thus, 
following the indications of the Committee, summing up the absolute values of the thirteen 
intervals and dividing for the regulatory capital, we may come up to a ratio which concisely 
represents the bank total exposure to interest rate risk and might be easily evaluated in relation 
to the average of the sector.  
                                               
∑ | ∑ ∆𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑗|13𝑖=1
𝑛+1
𝑗=1
𝑅𝐶
                                                  (2.16) 
As presented so far, the Basel Committee model would find in the simplicity its greatest 
advantage. But simplicity more than a sole advantage may be regarded as a double-edged 
sword: it is no coincidence that one of the main criticism of the model is that it tends to 
improperly oversimplify the banking reality. Moreover, the usage of book values instead of 
market values may also be deemed as a relevant limitation, as, the former ones are in general 
much farther from fundamental values than the latter. The criticism has clearly underlined the 
evident limits of the model, nonetheless, the Basel Committee model does not aim at 
becoming the internal technique of excellence, which, given the low rate of adoption, might 
be almost impossible, but rather to give a simple and straightforward comparison opportunity 
for the sole regulatory purpose. 
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2.2 Introduction to Banking Market Risk 
Market risk arises from fluctuations of assets and liabilities’ market values, which may result, 
at least in the short-term, in potential losses for banks. When accomplishing daily activities, in 
fact, banks are exposed to a lot of volatility, which in some cases may not be directly 
governable, posing consequently, hard times to banks’ risk management policies. For 
instance, let us assume, realistically, that a bank holds equity investments as assets. In 
general, banks may control for some business-related issues, such as remuneration policies or 
business plan approvals but may encounter more challenges when stock prices widely 
fluctuate due to uncontrollable factors. And differently from the interest rate risk, market 
risk’s components are various and different. According to the classical division, in fact, five 
main risks may be identified within the market risk:  
1) Interest rate risk. In the banking language, management of interest rate risk may be also 
deemed as asset-liability management (ALM). In the section related to the interest risk, it was 
stated that the many practitioners tend to deem the interest risk just as a part of market risk. 
But as already explained earlier, this specific risk relates to the only trading book of the bank 
and not to the entire balance sheet as the broader understanding would suggest. This implies 
that the interest risk component belonging to the market risk has a specific short-term and 
investment-related feature. 
2) Exchange rate risk. The exchange rate risk may be defined as the adverse impact that 
exchange rate movements may have on the banks’ cash flows, assets and liabilities, resulting 
in a loss. Madura (1989) more broadly defines it as the effects that negative unexpected 
changes in exchange rate may have on the value of firms. Three main risks may be grouped 
into the category (Papaioannou, 2006): the transaction risk, which arises for account 
payables, receivables and repatriation of dividends; the translation risk, that may be normally 
faced during the consolidation of foreign subsidiaries, that is, typical of parent-subsidiary 
relationship, and finally, the economic risk, which basically is the threat of changes in present 
value of future operating cash flows due to moves in the exchange rate. Essentially, the 
economic risk mirrors the changes in revenues and operating expenses. 
3) Equity risk. The equity risk represents the threat deriving from unexpected stock price 
movements. A bank may carry out equity investments as part of its non-operating activities or 
as main core business as for investment banks. But the equity risk may also derive in case the 
bank accepts stocks as collateral thus, not necessarily linked to any direct investment.  
4) Commodity risk. It is the risk associated to market values of positions, which may be 
sensitive to changes in commodity prices, such as commodity futures or commodity swaps.  
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5) Volatility risk. The volatility risk simply derives from sensitivity changes from one or 
more precedent risks’ volatility. 
 
2.2.1 Market Risk Measurement: The Value at Risk Approach 
Among the different models to calculate VaR and SVaR the Variance-Covariance is surely 
one of the most well-known. This technique, which sometimes is called delta-normal method, 
assumes that all bank’s portfolio exposures are linear and that risk factors are both normally 
and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d. hypothesis). As a result, portfolio returns 
are linear combinations of normal variables and thus normally distributed as well. The 
greatest benefit of the Variance-Covariance approach is its simplicity. But this may also be 
regarded as its biggest drawback as, for instance, it may not be able to capture the effects of 
embedded options or in general of instruments with no linear patterns. Additionally, empirical 
researches (Huisman et al., 1998) have clearly pointed out that the normal distribution 
assumption does not fare well in reality, as tails, and specifically the left tail, may be in 
general fatter (leptokurtosis). 
Practically, assuming for simplicity’s sake that the bank’s portfolio is composed by one 
instrument, the value at risk may be conceived as the difference between the expected value 
of the portfolio in the chosen time horizon t with a certain likelihood p and the lowest value of 
the portfolio, at the same time horizon and with the same probability: 
 
          VaR = MVm -MVL = V0 (1+ Rm) -MV0 (1+ RL) = V0 (Rm – RL)             (2.17) 
where: 
MV0 = the current market value of portfolio; 
MVm = expected value of the portfolio on the time horizon t 
 MVL = the lowest value that a portfolio can record (level) on the chosen time horizon,              
corresponding with the confidence interval; 
Rm = the portfolio’s average yield on the time h 
RL = yield corresponding level 
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Figure 2.2. An example of VaR Probability Distribution. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
The lowest value MVL is determined as a distribution function depending on the time span t 
and on the likelihood of occurrence, that is, the confidence interval α: 
                                    1 − 𝛼 = 𝑃(𝑥 < 𝑅𝐿) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑅𝐿
−∞
                            (2.18) 
Moreover, as the VaR is based on the cumulative normal distribution assumption, the variable 
we are looking for RL may be determined as follows: 
                                                      RL = α × σ + Rm                                           (2.19) 
With α being the confidence interval and σ the market volatility of the portfolio. Therefore the 
value at risk may be rearranged as: 
               VaR = MVm -MVL = MV0 × [(Rm – (α × σ+Rm)] = -MV0 × α × σ               (2.20) 
As the value at risk represents a potential loss for the institution, the minus symbol might be 
omitted, as it would somehow be redundant or confusing. 
                                                VaR = MV × α × σ                                           (2.21) 
To implement the variance covariance approach to a position, we need first to define three 
elements. First the market value, which is easily obtainable. Secondly, a scaling factor α 
which ponders the risk measure into a determined interval of confidence, which is an arbitrary 
factor, and lastly the market volatility of the returns. The α represents the confidence 
probability or percentage of risk tolerance (1 - α) of the VaR. Of course, a higher value of 
αwould imply higher level of protection against unexpected losses and is typical of banks with 
high risk aversion. A simple way to choose the adequate confidence interval is suggested by 
Zaik et al. (1996). They noticed that customers and shareholders in particular are worried 
about banks’ creditworthiness and credit ratings and thus banks try as much as they can, in 
terms of equity capital, in order to preserve a high, investment-grade rating. Notably, rating 
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agencies associate to each rating a specific probability to default. For instance, Moody’s for 
an investment grade company Aa3, predicts a probability to default of 0.03%. According to 
Zaik et al., starting from that probability of default we may derive a confidence interval as a 
simple subtraction of the former from the unit, in this case as 1 - 0.03% = 99.97%.  
 
Table 2.1. Rating Classes and Confidence Levels (Resti, Sironi, 2007) 
 
Another crucial point is to decide the time span over which to forecast potential losses. To 
this purpose, three main considerations need to be addressed (Resti & Sironi, 2007). First, the 
degree of liquidity of single positions. The easier the winding up of a position, the lower the 
time horizon should be and the lesser the further losses. Secondly, another relevant factor is 
size of the positions, as intuitively, larger investments may require more time to be liquidated. 
Last but not least, the intention of the financial institution is also deemed as equally 
important. Accordingly, we may distinguish a position whether it is held as investment and 
thus for longer periods or whether it is speculative one and as such, to be divested soon. 
Strictly related to the issue of time horizon is the assumption about volatility. In fact, the latter 
is directly proportional to the time horizon: the volatility of single position or of an entire 
portfolio may augment unpredictably as time horizon increases. But to circumvent this 
problem we may rely on the normality assumption of the Variance Covariance approach and, 
in particular, on the i.i.d. hypothesis which guarantees the possibility to calculate any time-
span volatility using the daily volatility: 
                                                           𝜎𝑇 = 𝜎𝐷√𝑇                                                       (2.22) 
Despite the help in terms of simplification, the validity is not empirically confirmed, as 
returns and price changes in general seem to be serially correlated (among others, Ball, 1989), 
that is, influenced by the movements in T -1 and not completely independent. 
Moody’s Rating Class 1-Year Probability of Insolvency Confidence Level 
Aaa 0.001% 99.999% 
Aa1 0.01% 99.99% 
Aa2 0.02% 99.98% 
Aa3 0.03% 99.97% 
A1 0.05% 99.95% 
A2 0.06% 99.94% 
A3 0.09% 99.91% 
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In a more realistic world, changes in market values may not have unitary effects as assumed 
so far. To deal with this matter, we may include a new factor δ, which should capture the 
effects of changes in market factor on the position.  
                                        𝑉𝑎𝑅 = 𝑀𝑉 ×  𝛿 ×  𝛼 ×  𝜎                                   (2.23) 
Additionally, to be consistent with the interest rate risk, we may further simplify δ by 
considering it as the modified duration, which leads to: 
                                                      VaR = MV × MD × α × σ                                     (2.24) 
Unfortunately, what has been presented so far does not allow to understand why it is called 
variance covariance approach, since the sole variance has been used. The full name derives 
from the further extension towards a more realistic market portfolio, which takes into 
consideration the covariance among all positions. As just explained, α is the key element that 
represents the sensitivity of the position to market factor changes, thus also changes in its 
volatility are weighted for α:  
                                                           𝜎∆𝑀𝑉𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖  ×  𝜎𝑖                                             (2.25) 
For a market portfolio consisting of N positions, a change in value, ΔMV, is determined as 
follows:  
                                       Δ𝑀𝑉𝑃 = ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  ×  Δ𝑀𝑉𝑖                                     (2.26) 
The overall change in a market portfolio is the product of the individual market value and the 
single variation. From the latter, we may derive the variance of the portfolio as the sum 
product of any couple of market values and their covariance: 
                     σΔMVp
2 =  ∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ×  𝑀𝑉𝑗  ×  σΔMV𝑖 Δ𝑀𝑉𝑗
2                       (2.27) 
Which ultimately gives2:  
                           𝜎ΔMVp = √∑ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 ×  𝑀𝑉𝑗  ×  𝜌𝑖,𝑗𝛿𝑖𝜎𝑖𝛿𝑗𝜎𝑗                      (2.28) 
The portfolio value at risk is calculated as:  
                                 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑃 = 𝛼 × 𝜎ΔMVp = √∑ ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗  ×  𝜌𝑖,𝑗                   (2.29) 
 
Where α depends on the selected confidence interval and is brought inside the root square, 
may allow us to simplify the formula, considering that α×MVi× δi×σi is nothing but the 
VaR’s formula introduced previously. If additionally we assume that all risk factors are 
perfectly correlated (ρi,j=1), the portfolio VaR is simply the sum of the single VaR composing 
                                                             
2 Using Pearson’s correlation coefficient 𝜌𝑋𝑌 =  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋,𝑌)
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑌
 we may derive 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗) = √σΔMVi ∆MVj
2  =
√𝜌𝑖,𝑗 × 𝛿𝑖 × 𝜎𝑖 × 𝛿𝑗 × 𝜎𝑗 
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the portfolio, though, in general the portfolio VaR, according to the universally-known 
portfolio diversification theory, is lower than the sum of the single VaRs.  
                                                      𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑃 =  ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1                                              (2.30) 
This subadditivity feature is typical of parametric approaches: when multiple positions are 
pooled together, the total risk exposure, computed in terms of VaR, diminishes compared to 
the sum of standalone positions’ risks. However, this trait belongs to the sole restricted 
parametric approaches and, as a consequence, the regulatory authorities have been searching 
for more complete and efficient measures other than VaR, such as Expected Shortfall. The 
market risk for regulatory purpose will be covered in the last dedicated paragraph.   
 
2.2.2 The Basel Committee’s approach to market risk 
Throughout the last couple of decades and till the last major revision in 2016, the Basel 
Committee has been continuously adjusting its capital requirements for market risk as well as 
the actual method to compute such values. In the last review and in particular regarding the 
market risk, the Basel Committee has fundamentally modified the banking trading book, 
promoting a more adequate trading book capital requirement than “Basel II.5”. To this extent, 
the Committee allows the financial institutions to deal with the market risk by implementing 
two methodologies: a standardized approach and the internal model. Albeit both are 
admissible, the Committee imposes to calculate the minimum capital requirements using the 
sole standardized method, in order to favor an easier comparison among banks across 
different jurisdictions.  
 
Figure 2.3. Market risk treatment according to the Basel Committee (Seal, 2016) 
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The standardized approach to compute di minimum capital requirements is the sum of three 
components: the sensitivity-based risk charge; the default risk charge (DCR); and the residual 
add-on. 
The sensitivity-based method involves three risks: delta risk; vega risk and curvature risk. The 
first threat derives from sensitivity of bank’s trading book to regulatory specific delta risk 
factors. Basically, it is the expected change in price deriving from a small price or rate shock 
to the value of each relevant risk factor. The vega factor characterizes only options and may 
be defined as the risk arising from sensitivity to regulatory vega risk factors: in other words, it 
is the threat arising from variations of volatility, calculated as the product of an option’s vega 
and its implied volatility, i.e. in the volatility expected by market participants. In general, vega 
is positive for both call options and put options: increases in the expected volatility induce 
gains in the value of both types of options. Note that this risk cannot be hedged by purchasing 
or selling the underlying asset, but only by purchasing/selling other options. Both delta and 
gamma capture the linear component of market risk. Conversely, the curvature risk is 
indicated to deal with the non-linear part. In fact, the latter is an incremental risk, which 
catches the option price changes not covered by the delta factor.  
The sensitivity model works basically as follows: firstly, we need estimate of sensitivity (delta 
and vega) based on bank’s pricing model for each risk factor, for instance a 10-year USD 
bond. Then, multiply with corresponding risk weights and add up with correlations within the 
same bucket. The aggregation uses regulator-prescribed correlations factors, applied within a 
regulator-provided grouping formula. The resulting “bucket-level” capital charges are 
afterward summed to obtain the “risk class level” capital requirement and conclusively, the 
aggregate capital charge is nothing else but the sum of the seven single risk classes3 capital 
charges. To this figure a default risk charge, (DCR) and a residual add-on shall be added. 
Starting from the former, we must estimate, in first instance, the Jump to Default (JTD) for 
each instrument. The JTD is a function of notional amount, market value and prescribed LGD. 
Then, long and short positions to the same obligor shall be offset to derive net JTD which, in 
turn, are allocated to buckets and multiplied by approved risk weights. Importantly, risk 
weights for non-securitization positions are set by credit quality rating. The DRC is just sum 
of bucket-level default risks. The final component, that is, the residual add-on is conceived to 
eliminate or more properly, to mitigate the residual market risk, not captured by the 
standardized approach. Such may be for instance, the correlation risk and the behavioral risk. 
This additional charge shall be computed as percentage of the instrument: for derivatives and 
                                                             
3 According to the Basel Committee, the seven market risk classes are: General Interest Rate Risk (GIRR); Credit Spread Risk: non-
Securitization, Credit Spread Risk: Securitization (non-correlation TP) Credit Spread Risk: Securitization (correlation TP);Equity Risk; 
Commodity Risk; Foreign Exchange. 
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exotic instruments, it must be 1%, whereas, for other instruments it is 0.1%. Finally, the 
calculation of three risk charge figures based on three different scenarios on the specified 
values for the correlation parameter. 
The internal model on three main components: the Expected Shortfall; the default risk charge 
(DCR); and the Non-Modellable Risk Factors (NMRF) or stressed capital add-on. The last 
two components are quite similar to the standardized approach, with the latter feature trying to 
capture the residual risk and the former to cope with the default risk of trading of credit and 
equity risk trading book exposure. In particular, a remarkable difference between the types of 
default risks lays in the computational process. Differently from the standardized approach, 
the internal model’s method is based on the credit VaR computed on a 99.9% of confidence 
interval over a one-year time horizon and utilizes the same LGD of the internal rating-based 
approach. A different consideration must be carried out for the (Global) Expected Shortfall 
(ES)4. When we introduced the Value at Risk, it was clearly pointed out that one of the main 
limitation of this method is that it does not tell anything about what may happen in the far-left 
tail, i.e. in the region where negative outcomes can exceed the maximum expected loss (tail 
risk). In effect, whether the excess loss is ten billion or just one million cannot be determined. 
For this reason, along with the aforementioned lack of subadditivity, the Basel Committee 
substituted the stressed Value at Risk with an Expected Shortfall technique, which considers 
both the size and likelihood of losses above a certain confidence level, i.e. captures the tail 
risk. Nonetheless, similarly to the VaR, the Expected Shortfall has a confidence level and is 
valid for a determined time horizon. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. The Expected Shortfall as a solution to the tail risk (Hull, 2006) 
 
The Expected Shortfall may therefore may be deemed as the expected value of all losses in 
excess of VaR (Resti, Sironi, 2007). As such, we may analytically describe this relation as 
follows: 
                                                             
4 There are many names for the Expected Shortfall: average shortfall (AS), conditional VaR (CVaR), or extreme value at 
   risk (EVaR) (Resti, Sironi, 2007) 
The tail risk 
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                                       ES = E[−(ΔMV−E(ΔMV)]                                       (2.31) 
Such that:  
                                       − (ΔMV−E(ΔMV)) > VaR                                         (2.32) 
Where the Δ symbol may also be omitted, since we may consider future market values instead 
of its variation. From an exquisitely economic point of view, it is interesting to notice the 
possible relationship between the VaR and ES. The former may represent the capital which is 
required to be paid in so that to limit the probability of bankruptcy to 1-c (where c is the 
chosen confidence level). Conversely, the difference between ES and VaR may be regarded as 
the expected cost that the regulatory authorities might incur to bail out a bank if its capital (i.e. 
its VaR) were not enough. Moreover, the expected payment that a risk neutral insurer would 
have to face, if the bank had insured itself against the risk of excess losses (Resti, Sironi, 
2007). 
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2.3 Introduction to Credit Risk 
The Basel Committee defines credit risk as the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty 
will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms. To put it in another way, the 
credit risk is the threat of loss that arises as a result of the non-performance by customers and 
other counterparties of their payment obligations to the financial institution. Managing credit 
risk is extremely difficult, since it is a multidimensional issue and consequently there are 
many different approaches in use, some of which are quantitative whereas others comprehend 
qualitative, subjective judgements. Whatever the technique employed, the key point is to 
figure out the behavior and predict the realistic probability of individual credits defaulting on 
their obligations.  
Broadly speaking, credit risk may be divided into six main categories. The most well-known 
are the default risk, which is, in a nutshell, the risk of loss deriving from the concrete 
insolvency of the borrower and the migration risk, that represents the damage triggered by a 
deterioration of the counterparty’s creditworthiness. Thus, the credit risk may not be restricted 
to the sole default event, as the devaluation of the clients’ rating can also provoke serious 
consequences in terms of profitability and overall economic value. In other words, the default 
risk represents the extreme case of the migration risk: they both may belong to the same 
continuous variable, which reflects both small changes in the creditworthiness, on the one 
hand, and the default event, on the other. Another risk included in the credit risk is the spread 
risk. The latter may be regarded as the risk of an unexpected increase in the spreads required 
by the market to borrow money. The recovery risk is strictly related to the default risk. 
Basically, this threat arises when the recovery of the expected liquidation value is lower than 
the initially-expected forecast; or in case the time of recovery is longer than estimated, which 
may indeed be relevant from a cost-opportunity point of view. Lastly, the substitution risk and 
the country risk. The former characterizes specific OTC transactions, namely, it is the threat 
that the counterparty of a OTC position becomes insolvent before the actual maturity of the 
obligation, hence obliging the bank to substitute it at new and potentially less profitable 
market conditions. The remaining country risk may turn out to be rather challenging to deal 
with, since it depends on macroeconomic and legislative policies, which are, at least directly, 
uncontrollable by the bank. Thus, this kind of risk is a typical example of systemic risk and as 
such it cannot be diversified away (Schwarcz, 2008). 
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2.3.1 Credit Risk: Regulatory Framework and Structural Approaches 
Differently from the previous paragraphs concerning other banking risks, it would make no 
sense to separate internal credit risk modelling practices from regulatory purposes, as they are 
strictly correlated. In order to deal properly with the credit risk, we first have to introduce 
some fundamental concepts: 
- Probability of Default (PD): Probability that the obligor will default within a selected 
time horizon  
- Exposure at Default (EAD): the sum outstanding at time of default. Most of the times, 
banks calculate the exposure on single loans and an overall EAD as well. 
- Loss given default (LGD): the percentage loss deriving from the EAD 
- Maturity: effective maturity of the considered exposure. 
 
As for other risks, the Basel Committee envisages different measurement methodologies to 
calculate capital adequacy requirements. Note that, the regulatory focus is not providing a 
universally-accepted method to compute credit risk, since financial institutions, under this 
point of view, have a lot of discretion. Rather, the ultimate goal is to ensure that banks hold 
sufficient capital to cover potential unexpected losses that may derive either from default 
events or from mere deteriorations of credits and loans. Under Basel II in particular, banks 
may adopt either of the two typologies to measure credit risk: the standardized approach and 
the internal rating-based approach (IRB). The main difference is represented by the utilization 
of either external ratings, as in the standardized method, or internal ones, as in the IRB 
approach. Specifically, the internal rating system is just allowed for banks that meet specific 
criteria5 and may be divided into two techniques: Foundation-IRB, which allows banks to 
compute independently the probability of default (PD) for each asset; while the regulatory 
authority will determine both the Loss Given Default (LGD) and the Exposure at Default 
(EAD). The maturity (M) can be either assigned by the regulator or decided by the bank. 
Conversely, in the Advanced-IRB banks are permitted to use their internal models to calculate 
all the four key elements PD, LGD, EAD, and M. A summarising graph may be useful to 
dispel any confusing doubts.  
                                                             
5 The authorization is not given to all financial institutions. In fact, banks that aim at obtaining the go-ahead 
shall construct estimation models that must meet strict qualitative and quantitative criteria: 
1)Internal models must to be risk-sensitive to the portfolio of the bank  
2)The internal model shall distinguish obligor characteristics and have sufficient data to estimate the key risk 
factors within          determined statistical confidence levels  
3)There should be proper corporate governance and internal controls  
4)The modeling and capital estimation framework should be linked to the day-to-day operations of the bank  
5)There should be an appropriate validation and testing process, ensuring the estimation of the precise PD, 
LGD, EAD, and capital estimates for credit risk  
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Figure 2.5. Summary of Regulatory Credit Risk. (Source: Author’s elaboration) 
 
Broadly speaking, banks may find it more advantageous to adopt an IRB mechanism, since 
the capital requirements calculated with an internal approach are lower than computed with 
the standardized method. Additionally, IRB models may better reflect specific peculiarities 
and risks of the banking credit portfolio. Although the international authorities are 
encouraging financial institutions to adopt the Advanced IRB approach, i.e. to develop 
internal models to calculate credit risk, they also acknowledge that internal models may 
generate distortion or by the way, make comparison across banks more challenging. Under the 
IRB approach, banks are required to categorize their banking book exposures into the 
following asset classes: corporate; sovereign; bank; retail and equity. To each of them, then, 
will be assigned a different risk weight and multiplied for the exposure at default. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 The Regulatory Compliance Process for Credit Risk (Source: CRISIL, 2017) 
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The Basel Committee provides the risk-weight formulas to calculate the capital requirements.  
                                  RWA = RW × Exposure At Default                               (2.33) 
Where RWA denotes risk weighted amount and RW the risk weight. The formula varies 
depending on the exposure category and utilizes PD, LGD, and M as inputs. In particular, it 
strongly depends on the internal estimates of the probability of default. In effect, when the 
latter is zero, so is the risk weight and no capital requirement is needed. Let us focus on the 
cases where 0 < PD < 1 and when PD = 1. In the former case, risk weight is calculated as: 
𝑅𝑊 = [𝐿𝐺𝐷 × 𝑁 (
𝑅
√1 − 𝑅
 𝐺(𝑃𝐷) + √
𝑅
1 − 𝑅
×  𝐺(0.999) ) − 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ×  𝑃𝐷]
1 + (𝑀 − 2.5) × 𝑏
1 − 1.5 × 𝑏
× 12.5 ×  1.06 
                                                                                                                                  (2.34) 
Where: 
 N(x) = the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable  
 G(Z) = the inverse cumulative distribution functions for a standard normal random 
variable (i.e. the value of x such that N(x) = z). 
   R = the coefficient of correlation computed as: 
                            𝑅 = 0.12 ×
1−𝑒−50 ×𝑃𝐷
1−𝑒−50
+ 0.24 × (1 −
1−𝑒−50 ×𝑃𝐷
1−𝑒−50
)                 (2.35) 
 b = the maturity adjustment factor, calculated as b = [0.11852 – 0.05478 × Ln (PD)]2 
 
For defaulted exposures for which banks apply internal LGD estimates, the capital 
requirement (RW)  
                                          RW = max{0,12.5 × (LGD − ELBE)}                                 (2.36) 
where ELBE is expected loss best estimate, that is, the institution’s best estimate of the 
expected loss for the defaulted exposure. 
One important remark is that the risk weight formulas are meant to cope with the only 
unexpected loss and do not include expected loss provisions6, as the former tend to occur less 
frequently but consist of way larger amounts. 
Once again, it is worth recalling that under the Foundation IRB approach, the formula 
assumes prescribed values for LGD and M, while under the Advanced method, all parameters 
are estimated using internal models. A complete analysis would be beyond the scope of this 
work. Consequently, we focus on the structural approaches, and in particular on the Merton 
model, as it might be regarded as the most comprehensive. 
                                                             
6 Expected loss is usually defined as the average loss that the bank may expect to incur in from an exposure over a 
determined time span, while an unexpected loss is the loss that the bank may suffer over and above the average loss 
expected from an exposure over the same period of time. Moreover, expected loss may cannot be eliminated by 
diversification, whereas unexpected loss may at least be mitigated by portfolio diversification policies (Resti, Sironi, 
2007). 
36 
 
Since credit risk has become an increasing concern in recent years, especially after the 
Financial Crisis, various advanced methods have been developed extensively to measure 
credit risk exposures. Specifically, credit risk modelling may be divided into two macro 
branches: reduced forms and the aforementioned structural models. The main difference 
between the two may be grasped already in their names: the structural approaches try to trace 
an explicit connection between the credit default risk and the company’s capital structure. To 
this extent, Brennan and Schwartz (1978) provide various numerical techniques. Sundaresan 
(2013) as well provides a deep analytical insight concerning structural and in particular 
Merton-derived models. Such models, in effect, are unsurprisingly widespread for distressed 
firm valuations. Conversely, the reduced form techniques treat credit defaults as something 
exogenous and are simpler to implement, for this reason more employed in the credit risk 
management framework.  
The Merton model is the prince of the structural models: the first to ever employ the modern 
option pricing theory to the corporate debt valuation and as such, the undisputable milestone 
from which many other sophisticated structural approaches were originated. The most famous 
remark about the Merton model is the consideration of the firm’s equity as a call option on its 
assets: as long as the company is performing well, its overall corporate value (i.e. the assets) 
is increasing and so is the equity stock price. Thanks to this analogy, we may apply the 
option-pricing findings of Black and Scholes (1973) to the valuation of the enterprise’s debt. 
To analyze the Black, Scholes and Merton model, let us start from the simple accounting 
equation that characterizes all firms:  
                                                              At = Et + Dt                                                                             (2.37) 
 
Figure 2.7. Equity as a Call Option: boundless positive payoff (Berk and DeMarzo, 2017) 
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This former equation states that the assets of a firm at time t are equal to the sum of the equity 
and the firm’s debt at time t. The debt, in particular, is simplified to a zero-coupon bond, 
which of course may be unrealistic but nonetheless, still enough for exemplifying purposes. 
Assuming further that the face amount of the debt is K, if the bank at time of maturity T 
possesses assets whose value is greater value than K (AT >K), the bank will be able to entirely 
repay its debt and the equity will be worth AT -K. Conversely, in case at maturity T AT <K, the 
firm is insolvent and debtholders will receive the residual value, AT, while shareholders will 
be empty-handed. Thus, we may conclude that the equity value at time T can be represented 
as: 
                                             ET = max (AT – K; 0)                                              (2.38) 
This is exactly the payoff of a European call option contracted on the underlying asset At with 
strike price K maturing at T. Hence, the Black and Scholes formulas can be applied. But 
before entering into details, let us consider the position of the debtholder (Breccia, 2012). 
Assuming that the absolute priority rule (APR) holds7, at time of maturity T the debtholder’s 
payoff is: 
                   DT = min {K, AT } = L + min (AT;- L, 0) = K – max(K − AT , 0)              (2.39) 
The creditor’s payoff is therefore a sum of two components: a safe one, K, and a short 
position of a put option on the company’s assets. To apply Black and Scholes, an additional 
assumption is required: the asset’s value shall follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) 
process, with risk-neutral dynamics given by the stochastic differential equation:  
                                                     
𝑑𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑡
= 𝑟𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝑑𝑊𝑡                                                (2.40) 
where Wt is a standard Brownian motion under risk-neutral measure, r stands for the 
continuously compounded risk-free interest rate, and σA is the asset’s return volatility. Next, 
applying the Black and Scholes formula for an European call option to the equity we arrive to: 
                                 𝐸𝑡 =  𝐴𝑡Φ(𝑑+) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)Φ(𝑑−)                                 (2.41) 
where Φ(· ) denotes the N(0,1) cumulative distribution function, with the quantities d+ and d- 
given by: 
                                           𝑑+ =  
𝑙𝑛(
𝐴𝑡
𝐾
)+(𝑟+ 
1
2
 𝜎𝐴
2)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝜎𝐴√𝑇−𝑡
                                        (2.42) 
                                                    𝑑− =  
𝑙𝑛(
𝐴𝑡
𝐾
)+(𝑟− 
1
2
 𝜎𝐴
2)(𝑇−𝑡)
𝜎𝐴√𝑇−𝑡
                                       (2.43) 
 
                                                             
7 The absolute priority rule is a concept that applies across different countries, especially during the winding-up of a firm. 
Accordingly, senior claims (debt and debt equivalents) shall be satisfied before junior claims (usually equity and equity 
equivalents) 
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The main focal point of interest is to understand how the option pricing techniques may relate 
to the credit default. In particular, the default event is triggered as soon as the company is not 
able to completely repay the amount K at time to maturity T. Using an exquisitely option-
specific language, the default happens when the shareholders’ call option matures out-of-
money, analytically:  
                                                   𝑃( 𝐴𝑡 − 𝐾) = 𝛷(−𝑑−)                                           (2.44) 
In a realistic framework, no debtholder would carry such an enormous risk without trying to 
hedge his position. To accomplish this task, they may write a European put option on the 
same underlying asset At and with identical maturity and strike price K. In this circumstance, 
the put option will allow to reach a fully-hedged position, since, in case AT <K it will be 
worth K- AT and zero otherwise. Thus, if we combine the debt and the put option we can 
arrive to a risk-free position with a payoff equal to the strike price K: 
                                                       𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡 = 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)                                            (2.45) 
Where Pt is the price of a put option at time t. This can be easily determined by applying the 
Black and Scholes formula for a European put option: 
                                         𝑃𝑡 =  𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)Φ(−𝑑−) − 𝐴𝑡Φ(−𝑑+)                         (2.46) 
Further, a typical corporate bond is quite risky and assuming a mere risk-free rate would of 
course defy credibility. As a consequence, a risk premium s is necessary in order to evaluate 
the corporate debt: 
                                                         𝐷𝑡 = 𝐾𝑒
−(𝑟+𝑠)(𝑇−𝑡)                                             (2.47) 
Specifically, comibing the last three equations together (2.48); (2.49) and (2.50) we may 
derive directly a formula to calculate the risk premium, or credit spread, s: 
                                  𝑠 = − 
1
𝑇−𝑡
ln [Φ(𝑑−) −
𝐴𝑡
𝐾
𝑒𝑟(𝑇−𝑡)Φ(−𝑑+)]                             (2.48) 
The component 
𝐴𝑡
𝐾
𝑒𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) is called “quasi-debt ratio” and is a form of leverage ratio (Breccia, 
2012). Note that the model estimates the spread for a given At and σA. A trivial way to 
compute those two values is to assume the Brownian motion model for the equity price and 
using Ito’s Lemma (Wang, 2009) to show that instantanous volatility satisfies8: 
                                                            𝐴𝑡𝜎𝐴
𝜕𝐸𝑡
𝜕𝐴𝑡
= 𝐸𝑡𝜎𝐸                                              (2.49) 
Note that ∂Et/∂At is nothing else but the Black and Scholes call option delta, Φ(d+), which 
substituted in the previous equation leads to: 
                                                             
8 This is the underlying intuition of the KMV method. This model has the greatest feature of considering a 
company’s debt to be realistically composed by a short-term account and a long-term one. Consequently, a 
company is defaulting when it is not able to repay its short-term obligations and a part of long term debt 
(Default Point), namely: DP= ST DEBT + ½ LT DEBT. From this value, a Distance to Default is computed 
following the following formula: 𝐷𝐷 =
𝑉0−𝐷𝑃
𝑉0𝜎𝐴
. Finally, to each DD a default probability is attributed, based 
on the historical default frequency of a wide sample. 
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                                                 𝐴𝑡𝜎𝐴Φ(𝑑+) = 𝐸𝑡𝜎𝐸                                          (2.53) 
Both Et and σE , that is, the equity price and its volatility, may be directly obtained from the 
equity market. Consequently, by solving simoltaneously (2.44) and (2.53) we may arrive to 
reasonable estimates of At and σA,which are critical to compute the credit spread s. 
Interestigly, Breccia (2012) proves that, differently from the bank’s equity, an increase in 
volatitlity may impact negatively on the debt’s value. 
Wang (2009) purposes an interesting analysis of credit spreads under the Merton model. As 
shown in the figure 2.9, credit spreads vary significantly according to the financial stabililty 
of the firm. Specifically, Wang utilizes a debt-to-assets ratio to represent the financial 
soundness, identifying three main typologies of company: highly-leverage; medium-leverage 
and low-leverage.  
 
Figure 2.8. Term Structure of Credit Spread under the Merton Model (Wang, 2009) 
 
An important peculiarity concerns highly-leveraged firms9. Looking at the dotted line of the 
previous picture, it is crystal clear that credit spread tend shrink as time goes by. This is due to 
the fact that when a company is insolvent, everybody expects its default to occur immediately 
or very soon anyway. But if the company survives the initial turbolence, its probability to 
default starts to decrease and market partecipants regain confidence about the firm, resulting 
thus in a lower spread demanded. This implicit fall of the leverage over time is strongly 
debated10.  
                                                             
9 A firm may be regarded as highly leverage when the augmenting cost of capital deriving from the rising 
default probability start to exceed the tax benefits deriving from the tax deductibility of interest rates, 
compromising as a consequence, the own existence of the entity. Conversely, a low leverage firm is not 
able to take advantage of further corporate debt, which would indeed create economic value. 
10 Breccia (2012) states that as T-t tends to infinity, the credit spread tends to zero and thus the default 
probability is basically nil. This is the case of a perpetual bond. 
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Despite its consistency, the Merton model suffers yet of serious drawbacks, many of which 
deriving from its simplistic assumptions11. Crucially relevant is the absence of transaction 
costs and the presence of a single bond: the non-stationary structure of the debt that leads to 
the termination of all operations on a fixed maturity date, and default can only happen on that 
date. To overcome this issue Black and Cox (1976) introduced safety covenants and asset sale 
restrictions. Moreover, they allowed for default before maturity by providing a way to 
endogenize the default boundary (Sundaresan, 2013). Also Geske (1977) modified the Merton 
model to the case of multiple bonds of different maturities (Compound Option Model). Leland 
(1994) explicitly hypothesized the presence of taxation and bankruptcy costs, permitting the 
model to take part in the optimal capital structure and traditional debt-equity trade-off 
management. But regardless of any extension, structural models remain disproportionately 
difficult to implement besides computationally intensive and analytically complex. Surely, 
reduced models may fare better from this point of view but their heavy reliance on historical 
data may be rather limitative, in particular when it comes to out-of-sample predictive power. 
  
                                                             
11 See Resti and Sironi (2007) for a complete analysis. 
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2.4 Introduction to Liquidity Risk  
Liquidity has a paramount importance for both financial and non-financial institutions, since 
without appropriate levels of cash available it would be almost impossible to survive. As a 
consequence, liquidity risk is a crucial issue for internal risk management and as well as for 
regulatory policies. In some cases, in fact, liquidity shortfalls of one company may have 
implications that go well beyond the internal walls. Liquidity risk may be in general terms 
defined as the lack of marketability of an investment, that is, the impossibility to sell or buy it 
in time so that to prevent or minimize losses. Specifically, liquidity risk for financial 
institutions may have a deeper meaning than the mere cash and investment management: for a 
bank, liquidity risk reflects its intrinsic ability of being able to fund increases of assets in 
order to meet obligations as they come to due, without facing unexpected losses. The Basel 
Committee (BCBS, 2008) links explicitly liquidity risk and banks’ core business: their 
fundamental activity of maturity transformation, i.e. to convert short-term deposits into long-
term loans makes banks unavoidably vulnerable to liquidity risk at firms-specific level and at 
market-as-a-whole level as well.  
Banking liquidity may be decomposed into different types, all of them relevant for risk 
management purposes: central bank liquidity; market liquidity and funding liquidity. The 
central bank liquidity refers to the ability of central banks to supply liquidity to the market 
through open market transactions. Technically, what is provided by central banks is called 
base money, which through individual banking intermediation operations may be propagated 
consistently, increasing as such the overall money supply. All central banks, from the Federal 
Reserve to the European Central Bank, may implement specific monetary policies that 
represent a determined level of operational target, usually in terms of key policy rate. The 
main goal still remains the control of inflation but as the recent Financial Crisis has proven, 
another fundamental objective should be to guarantee and oversee the stability of the entire 
financial sector by reaffirming unconditionally its position as lender of last resort (De 
Grauwe, 2011).  
To define the funding liquidity, we may adopt the Basel Committee’s definition to avoid any 
misunderstanding. The Basel Committee of Banking supervision defines funding liquidity as 
the ability of banks to meet their liabilities, unwind or settle their positions as they come due 
(BCBS, 2008). But nonetheless, this definition may be widened to include market 
participants12, either as investors or as simple traders and precisely, by referring to their 
ability to raise funding in a short lapse of time. From a strictly banking perspective, though, 
the focus is on the banks’ ability to raise funds to meet business duties. To accomplish so, 
                                                             
12 Brunnemeier and Pedersen (2007) and Strahan (2008) 
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banks carry out transactions with four main counterparties (Nikolaou, 2009): depositors; the 
market, intended as the virtual place where banks may sell assets or obtain liquidity through 
securitization processes; the interbank market, which is the most important and immediate 
source of liquidity13 and the central bank. Thus, funding liquidity risk may be regarded as the 
impossibility, over a specific horizon, to obtain the required liquidity from one of the previous 
sources. In particular, the funding risk may take on three different forms (Fontaine et al., 
2009): the margin funding risk, which basically is the risk that margins will change; the 
rollover risk, that is, the risk that it will be more costly or impossible to roll over short-term 
borrowings and the redemption risk, which arises as soon as demand depositors or say equity 
holders of hedge funds withdraw funds. As a result, the bank will become unable to settle 
obligations with immediacy and this may concern two components: the future (random) 
inflows and outflows of settlement assets, such as money and the future (random) prices of 
obtaining funding liquidity from different sources. 
Market liquidity is regarded as the ability to trade an asset at short notice, at low cost and with 
little impact on its price. A market is utterly liquid when agents can sell any quantity of assets 
anytime and at competitive price. Thus, three main features define a liquid market 
(Fernandez, 1999): volume; time and transaction costs. It follows that liquidity is measured by 
three dimensions: depth, breadth and resiliency (Harris, 2003), with the first property 
measuring the number of large transactions that occur without influencing huge price changes, 
the second, breadth or tightness, reflecting the variability of the price at which transactions are 
concluded. Finally, the resiliency indicates how fast market price fluctuations dissipate. 
Liquidity market risk, consequently, emerges whenever one of the three dimensions does not 
comply with the notion of liquid market, for instance, when price varies heavily after one 
transaction or when traders may execute transactions at exorbitant price solely. In a 
completely illiquid market, agents cannot trade at a fair price with immediacy (Nikolaou, 
2009).  
 
2.4.1 Liquidity Risk: Stress Testing and Regulatory Perspective. 
An interesting way to manage liquidity risk is stress testing and scenario analysis. First and 
foremost, stress tests and scenarios are far more important for liquidity risk than for credit, 
interest or operational risks. In effect, the need for liquidity arises in many different situations 
and as such, the range of possible adverse and risky scenarios is ampler: both the size and 
nature of a liquidity-related event may vary intensively from scenario to scenario. A stress 
                                                             
13 In the interbank market in fact banks may carry out over-night transactions (i.e. in a short time period) which means, 
receiving funds that they require to cover their positions.  
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test, as defined by the Basel Committee can either be a stress test scenario or a sensitivity 
stress test. The former is basically a multi-variant test based on historical or hypothetical 
scenarios. Scenario liquidity scenarios and stress testing tend to modify essential liquidity 
parameters while holding constant credit risk and other risks, such as interest risk. The key 
point is to figure out whether banks hold enough liquidity to purchase enough time to either 
outlive the negative event or implement recovery measures. Thus, through the usage of stress 
test scenarios, risk managers can understand how to properly deal with liquidity shortages, 
identifying in advance possible responses that may unwind the adverse effects. Scenario stress 
testing may also have the great advantage of honing future forecasts, by for instance, 
correcting assumption oversights and potential correlation misunderstandings between risk 
factors (Matz, 2007). More specifically, macro stress testing, i.e. testing the financial system 
as a whole, is an instrument of central banks and supervisory authorities to evaluate the 
impact of market-wide scenarios and possible second round effects. Such tests with regard to 
liquidity risk can enhance the insight in the systemic dimensions of liquidity risk and make 
market participants more aware about systemic risk (van den End, 2009). On the other hand, 
sensitivity analysis allows risk managers to figure out how much a single dependent or 
independent variable may influence the risk exposure in a specific scenario. Generally 
speaking, sensitivity analysis may be performed both at systemic level and at company 
specific level. Concerning the former, risk analysists focus usually on the following risk 
parameters: interest rates; credit spread and market access and time necessary to liquidate 
individual assets holdings. From a bank-specific level, financial institutions tend to perform 
deep analysis with regards to the following factors of interest: deposit loss assumptions, 
funding requirements for off-balance sheet items; new capital funding availability and 
rollover of expiring capital market funding hypotheses. 
Returning to scenario stress testing, the Basel Committee recommends the use of a wide range 
of “what-if” analysis. In particular, approaches to scenario testing may be divided into two 
main groups: the top-down approaches and bottom-ups and, as we will see in section two, this 
distinction does not apply solely to liquidity scenario testing but may be regarded as a general 
division. The bottom-up approach is based either on internal assumptions or on common 
scenarios designed by the banking authorities for a determined time horizon. Conversely, top-
down stress tests are conducted by the authorities themselves or by the IMF, usually based on 
in-house models and common assumptions across firms and supervisory and/or publicly 
available data (BCBS, 2013). By the way, as a universally-accepted measure has yet to be 
found, what happens concretely is that banks and supervisory authorities perform both top-
down and bottom-up stress tests. 
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Herein, the model presented is the van den End’s Liquidity Stress-Tester (2009)14. The reason 
behind this choice is easy to be explained. Firstly, it is an all-encompassing model, in the 
sense that it considers both idiosyncratic and systemic effects deriving from liquidity 
scarceness. In addition to that, it may help banks to adequate their capital buffer for liquidity 
risk while permitting senior managers to realize how to effectively and efficiently handle 
adverse situations. A final benefit of this approach is given by the fact that differently from 
other stress tests, this model addresses directly liquidity risk and its multiple dimensions, 
notably the funding and market risks and their interaction.  
The Liquidity Stress-Tester is a three-step model, which tests the capital buffer at two levels. 
In particular, banks are subject to two consequent adverse liquidity-related events: after the 
first shock, financial institutions are supposed to mitigate the initial negative effects, before 
undergoing a second wider round.  
 
Figure 2.9. Flow chart of Liquidity Stress-Tester (van den End, 2009) 
 
In the first stage, the focus is on banks’ market and funding risks effects (STAGE 1 in the 
figure above). Practically, this is accomplished by multiplying liquid assets and liabilities that 
are affected in the first round of the adverse scenario by the stress weight (wi). The weights 
(wi) denote the haircuts in case of liquid assets (i.e. shrunk liquidity values or mark-to-market 
losses) and run-off rates in case of liabilities. Obviously, the amount of (wi) is not uniform, 
since it varies as the sensitivity of assets and liabilities to liquidity stress changes. During the 
second phase, the bank is subject to both idiosyncratic and systemic risks. Notably, the former 
takes the form of reputational risk, since the bank may be perceived as unstable and thus 
untrustworthy. The systemic risk on the other hand describes how peer banks are jointly 
                                                             
14 Another interesting model is Bank of England’s RAMSI model. RAMSI is based on internal data and 
market prices and uses stochastic simulation to derive stress scenario outcomes Alessandrini et al. (2009) 
implement that model to calculate banking resiliency. 
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affected and how the financial market as a whole may be harmed: in other words, it depicts 
how powerful the contagion risk among banks may turn out to be. Both risks are considered 
when forming the capital buffer in the third stage (see LIQUIDITY BUFFER (3) in the figure). 
In each step, the model generates distributions of liquidity buffers by bank, including tail 
outcomes and probabilities of liquidity deficit. The simulation is made possible thanks to the 
adoption of the Monte Carlo simulation of univariate shocks to market and funding risk 
elements which are combined into a multifactor scenario15.  
Let us proceed analytically through all stages of the Liquidity Stress Tester model. In normal 
conditions, that is, when the bank is not subject to any shock, the capital buffer B0 is described 
as follows: 
                                             𝐵0
𝑏 = ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖
𝑏𝑛𝑐
𝑖=1                                           (2.54) 
b being the individual bank and Inon-cal, i the number of available assets of non-calendar items 
(the stock items of liquid assets 1... nc). The buffer, at this stage, is made up by deposits at the 
central bank, securities that can be turned into cash at short notice, ECB eligible collateral, in 
other terms, all assets that are available on demand. The first-round effect is then described 
by:  
                                        𝐸1
𝑏 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑏  ×  𝑤_𝑠𝑖𝑚1,𝑖𝑖                                           (2.55) 
Ii denoting the amount of all liquid (non-calendar and calendar) asset and liability items of the 
individual bank. The other component, w_sim1,i, represents the impact of the scenario on the i-
th item. In particular, it derives from simulated weights generated by a Monte Carlo 
Simulation16. This negative shock leads to a liquidity buffer decrease: 
                                                         𝐵1
𝑏 = 𝐵0
𝑏 − 𝐸1
𝑏                                                     (2.56) 
Banks affected by the initial shock are supposed to restore their liquidity buffer to B0. This, 
naturally, is a duty imposed by the supervisory authorities, who explicitly oblige banks to 
hold some minimum capital for liquidity risk. In the Stress Tester model, the ultimate cause, 
q, for a bank’s reaction is a drop of its original liquidity buffer that exceeds a threshold θ, 
which is either regulatory-required or internally self-imposed. The trigger q is based on a 
probability condition (probit), namely: 
                                             𝑞 = {1        𝑖𝑓 
𝐸1
𝑏
𝐵0
𝑏 > 𝜃
0       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
}                                           (2.57) 
                                                             
15  This means that the scenario already includes different adverse events. For instance, the credit market 
scenario can be thought to comprehend credit spread rising, reduced funding liquidity and falling of market 
prices (i.e. market liquidity decreases) 
16  The Monte Carlo Simulation in this case is scaled by (wi/3). The scaled normal distribution is then 
transformed into a log-normal distribution so that to take into account extreme events that a normal 
distribution would not be able to capture. 
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As stated earlier, what a bank concretely actualizes after the first round is trying to restore its 
liquidity buffer. In practice, this means creating immediate funds from available instruments, 
for instance, by selling highly-liquid securities such as government bonds or asking for 
liquidity lines from other banks. Note that, banks may obtain liquidity only from instruments 
that are somehow available to be divested, i.e. recovery instruments and not from all items on 
the balance sheet. The size of the transactions that a bank conducts with instrument i is 
expressed by 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏and in particular: 
                                                    𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏 = (𝐵0
𝑏 − 𝐵1
𝑏) × (𝐼𝑖
𝑏/ ∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑏)𝑖                                   (2.58) 
And as 𝐵1
𝑏 < 𝐵0
𝑏 , due to the shock, 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏must be positive although it does not tell anything 
about the type of transaction carried out (buy or sell). In effect, the term indicates an absolute 
value and specifically a size value that has to be reached so that to obtain liquidity. Thus, the 
mitigating actions lead to: 
                                          𝐵2
𝑏 = 𝐵1
𝑏 + ∑ 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏
𝑖 × (100 − 𝑤_𝑠𝑖𝑚1,𝑖)                          (2.59) 
With 𝐵2
𝑏 > 𝐵1
𝑏 but 𝐵2
𝑏 <  𝐵0
𝑏, because of the market disturbance that does not allow a fully 
recovery of the liquidity capital. In the worst situation 𝑤_𝑠𝑖𝑚1,𝑖= 100 and consequently no 
recovery is admissible. Fortunately, it rarely happens in reality, as it would signify that the 
bank has no access to any of the liquidity markets or, even worse, that all of its assets, e.g. 
collaterals, are worthless.  
The second-round effect is described by the following equation: 
 
                                𝐸2
𝑏 = ∑ ((𝐼1
𝑏 + 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏
𝑖 ) × (𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑚2,𝑖 − 𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑚1,𝑖))                      (2.60) 
In particular, w_sim2,i is a function of w_sim1,i: 
  𝑤_𝑠𝑖𝑚2,𝑖 = 𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑚1,𝑖 × (∑ 𝑞^𝑏 (1 + ∑ 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏
𝑏 / ∑ ∑ 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏
𝑏𝑖 ) × 𝑠)/ ∑ 𝑞𝑏             (2.61) 
From the latter, we may clearly affirm that large values 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏, i.e. higher demand of liquidity 
may affect negatively the liquidity in the market where the bank operates, in other words, the 
larger transactions or the larger financial institutions the greater the impact of the second-
round effect. Specifically, the number of banks ∑ 𝑞𝑏  and the similarity of their effects 
(∑ 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏
𝑏 / ∑ ∑ 𝑅𝐼𝑖
𝑏
𝑏𝑖 ) are the crucial factors that determine the ultimate outcome of the second 
turn shock. The factor s denotes, instead, the level of market stress, or in other terms, the level 
of contagion risk and usually ranges between -1 and +1. Nonetheless, for stress test purpose, 
it can indeed exceed +1, representing as such an extremely negatively-shaped scenario.  
Eventually, the liquidity buffer after the second-round effects (B3) is, 
 
                                               𝐵3
𝑏 = 𝐵2
𝑏 − 𝐸2
𝑏                                                  (2.62) 
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In a concrete stress testing procedure, each scenario attempt has its specific effect on the 
distribution of the various buffers. More specifically, different scenarios allow banking 
authorities to grasp how liquidity needs may change according to more or less severe shocks, 
in first instance, and also, as a straight consequence, to dictate the level of regulatory capital 
requirement and in particular of contingency funding plans. In this regard, Nikolaou (2009) 
provides a complete theoretical overview of the functioning mechanism while van den End 
(2009) analyzes the model from an empirical point of view. 
To conclude the regulatory framework for liquidity risk, two more ratios need to be 
introduced. Basel III, in fact, adds two fundamental capital constraints that banks must fulfil 
constantly: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). 
The former may be useful to guarantee a short-term survival, notably, whether the bank 
possesses enough high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to resist an intensive one-month stress 
scenario. Practically, this ratio is calculated as follows: 
                                           𝐿𝐶𝑅 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑄𝐿𝐴
𝐶𝑂30
𝑆  ≥ 100%                                (2.63) 
With high-quality liquid assets comprehending all those items that are basically very easily-
divestible in case of liquidity crisis. More precisely, to be regarded as a high-quality liquid 
asset it must satisfy two types of features: fundamental and market-related. From a 
fundamental point of view, the asset must have low risk, be easily and straightforwardly 
priced; listed on a developed and recognized exchange and lastly, to have a low correlation 
with risky assets. From a market-related perspective, the asset shall belong to an active and 
sizable market where prices and trading counterparties can be found at any time. Additionally, 
the asset’s volatility must be low and stable: a high liquid asset, in other words, is an asset that 
bank can turn to during liquidity crisis, as its value does not change significantly (flight to 
quality). 
In general, the HQLA assets may be divided into two levels according to the degree to which 
they may satisfy the previous conditions: the level I comprises all those extremely liquefiable 
items, such as currencies or central bank reserves and can be included into account at full 
value to determine the final value of HQLA. The level II assets apply a haircut of 15% for 
marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks or 
multilateral development banks that satisfy some conditions; as well as corporate debt 
securities and covered bonds under some conditions (level II A). To the other remaining 
liquid assets (level II B) different levels of haircut are applied. Such are for instance: 
residential mortgage backed securities (RNBS) that satisfy some conditions (25% haircut); 
corporate debt securities (including commercial paper) that satisfy some conditions (50% 
haircut); common equity shares that satisfy some requirements (50% haircut). 
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The 𝐶𝑂30
𝑆  is the difference between the total expected cash outflows and the total expected 
cash inflows in the specified stress scenario for the subsequent 30 calendar days. Particularly, 
the total expected cash outflows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of the 
regulatory-provided categories or types of liabilities and off-balance sheet obligations by the 
rates at which they are expected to run off or can be drawn down. Conversely, the total 
expected cash inflows are calculated by multiplying the outstanding balances of various 
categories of contractual receivables by the rates at which they are expected to flow in under 
the scenario up to an aggregate limiting cap of 75% of total expected cash outflows. In 
practice, 𝐶𝑂30
𝑆 is equal to:  
                    𝐶𝑂30
𝑆 = 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑂𝑢𝑡30
𝐸 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐼𝑛30
𝐸 , 75% 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑂𝑢𝑡30
𝐸 }                    (2.64) 
 
Where 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑂𝑢𝑡30
𝐸 is the total expected cash outflows and 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐼𝑛30
𝐸  is the total expected cash 
inflows, both computed over the following 30 calendar days17. 
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) conversely shall guarantee a long-term resilience. In a 
nutshell, it is the ratio between amount of available stable funding relative to the amount of 
required stable funding and should be equal to at least 100% on an ongoing basis. Namely: 
 
                               
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
≥ 100%                       (2.65) 
 
The available amount of stable funding is computed based on the features of the bank’s 
liabilities, namely on the quality of its funding sources. As a rule of thumb, the more reliable 
the funding source, the higher the percentage18 allowed by the regulatory authorities to be 
included in the numerator. On the other hand, the amount of required stable funding depends 
on the liquidity risk profile of the bank’s assets and off-the-balance sheet exposures and is 
divided into different percentages as well. Since in this case we are dealing with a 
denominator, the greater the quality of assets, the smaller the percentage taken into account19. 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 For more details BCBS (2013), Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk monitoring 
tools, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm 
18 The Basel Committee foresees five Available Stable Funding percentages: 100%; 95%, 90%; 50% and 0%. 
For more details BCBS (2015), Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d324.pdf 
19 According to the Basel Committee, the required stable funding assets shall be divided into eight categories, 
with eight different percentages: 0%; 5%; 10%; 15%; 50%; 65%; 85%; 100%. For more details:  BCBS 
(2015), Net Stable Funding Ratio disclosure standards, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d324.pdf 
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3. Overview of Banking Stress Testing Framework 
3.1 Stress Test as a Fundamental Regulatory Toolkit 
The Financial Crisis has evidently pointed out once again all the fragilities of the financial 
sector and how, individual entities’ troubles can generate uncontrollable damages to the entire 
global economy. For this reason, amongst others, the usage of stress tests has consistently 
increased throughout the last couple of years, turning out into a crucial toolkit for the 
regulatory authorities. A stress test, as the name suggests, is a instrument employed by 
various industries, from health care to real estate construction. But when it comes to the 
banking world, it measures the resilience of banks to hypothetical adverse scenarios, whereby 
banks are subject to extremely harmful events and conditions, such as economic recessions. 
The scope, needless to say, is to figure out, especially from central banks and regulators’ 
perspectives, how to quantify risk impacts and act consequently, in terms of prudential 
policies, intended both on a micro and macro level, as well as with regards to banking capital 
requirements. Nevertheless, bank stress testing may be still regarded as a relatively new field 
and for this reason it is quite likely to enhance further over time, so as to better suit 
policymakers’ needs, particularly concerning setting effective policies to promote resilience 
of the entire financial sector. To sum up, the inner principle in the application of stress test 
exercises is that these must help to evaluate and formulate regulatory and supervisory policies 
with the goal of increasing the soundness of the banking industry and the efficiency of the 
financial intermediation (Montes, Artigas, 2013). This, as the economic theory teaches, would 
enhance the overall allocation of scarce resources in the economy, with the resulting positive 
impact on social welfare. To this extent, stress tests are considered to be improving preventive 
policies, which are at the core of macroprudential objectives. The tests, moreover, can also 
support a credible disclosure of supervisory information to financial markets (Gick and 
Pausch, 2012). Generally speaking, a stress test may be defined as a set of techniques, tools 
or, procedures used by either individual institutions or regulatory authorities to gauge, as 
precisely as possible, the financial condition of the system under examination. In particular, 
stress tests are normally concentrated on the evaluation of the solvency and liquidity of the 
banking system, intended this time from an individual institution and as well as a sector-wide 
point of view. Stress testing aims not only at identifying possible vulnerabilities, expressed as 
adverse shocks that can affect the financial condition of a certain institution or financial 
system, but also to estimate and judge as accurately as possible, the quantitative and 
qualitative consequences of those shocks. In other terms, the objective is to probe the stability 
and resilience of the system or institution being assessed and reviewed. It is commonly 
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accepted that completing a stress test normally takes the following steps (Montes, Artigas, 
2013):  
1. Delimitation of the scope of application of the test. In practice in this stage, the main 
question to be answered is “What is the ultimate aim of the exercise?” 
2. Definition, design and calibration of the shocks with which the system under 
examination is to be stressed. Here, the priority is to figure out the model and data. 
3. Estimation of the effects of the shocks chosen and determination of the impact in terms 
of shifts in systemically-relevant variables  
4. Identification of the possible considerations and policy amendments deriving from the 
results achieved in the point above. 
 
The following figure explains the four stages in details:  
 
Figure 3.1. Stress test implementation (Montes, Artigas, 2013) 
  
 
The scope of the application is based on the final purpose of the results of the stress exercise, 
which basically is a matter of choosing between a general, system-wide analysis and a review 
of smaller portions or specific entities. System-level tests (broadly speaking, macroprudential 
tests) encompass the analysis of the entire financial system, or at least that of its most 
significant players. Therefore, the intention is to assess the resilience and stability of the 
financial system as a whole and consequently, the adopted model is allowed, in first instance, 
to analyze single entities from an aggregate level, so that to successively descend to an 
individual-institution level. As such, the outcomes obtained are applied to each separate 
51 
 
representative of the system (top-down approach, see later). Implementing stress testing for 
macroprudential scopes has implications concerning the kinds of models needed for effective 
and efficient outcomes. In particular, the scenarios that supervisors impose on banks are 
relegated to a set of hypothesized paths for a relatively small number of macroeconomic 
variables. From this incipit, banks need to forecast losses across various categories of their 
loan and trading books. Analysts and experts have sought greater consistency by combining 
macro models with financial sector models. Specifically, this approach can consist of three or 
more layers of models, namely macro; sectorial and asset class, until detailed projections can 
be made at the level of the banks’ own disaggregated data. Detailed loss projections can then 
be aggregated up to achieve implications for losses and capital at the bank level, at the 
holding company level, at the level of the pool of banks being tested, and finally for the entire 
banking system. It is clear that this combination top down and bottom up approach involves a 
lot of time, effort and resources, though it is still not clear whether the resulting system-level 
projection outcomes are necessarily superior to those obtained using less fine-grained 
approach (Anderson, 2016). 
Alternatively, if models and information at individual level are used, then this exercise is 
deemed as a bottom-up model (see later). Furthermore, the time interval considered is another 
key parameter to be taken into consideration. Typically, stress tests cover more than one 
business year (two or three years). However, this implies an arduous trade-off. On the one 
hand, the choice of incorporating more years can be justified, since sufficient time must be 
given for the consequences of the programmed shocks to fully manifest. On the other hand, a 
long time horizon may signify an excessive loss of reliability in the estimations: in other 
words, there would be too many effects affecting the exercise, which may not relate with the 
stress test and the eventual results might be biased.  
The second stage in a general stress-testing framework is represented by the definition of 
those unlikely yet plausible adverse shocks that may adversely destabilize the system being 
tested and with respect to which the system’s soundness and resilience is to be reviewed. 
Borio (2012) correctly noted that the literature does not make any precise distinction between 
“shocks” and “scenarios”. Accordingly, some authors employ the term “scenario” to describe 
a pool of exogenous shocks, while for others, the same word labels both the set of exogenous 
shocks and their estimated, model-specific, impact on the macroeconomic and financial 
environment. Herein, we use “scenario” and “shock” as synonyms. The process of identifying 
and selecting the shocks has various sub-steps. First and foremost, the type of shock to be 
included must be determined, that is, identified and well-defined. Subsequently, the shock 
needs to be calibrated and then implemented, i.e. to be introduced into the system and the 
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effect quantified. Naturally, the stress test is not a forecast exercise. As a consequence, shocks 
do not need to satisfy any criterion of realism and in effect, most of the adverse scenarios 
employed are highly improbable though still plausible. Additionally, the probability of 
occurrence is another factor to be addressed in the model. In fact, the credibility and utility of 
the outcomes obtained depend not only on the selection of acceptable scenarios in terms of 
macroeconomic variables affected, but also on the probability assigned to each of them. Once 
the shock is chosen on the basis of the risks to be measured and fine-tuned according to the 
typology of review to be conducted, the latter is concretely implemented utilizing the main 
variables that, due to their nature, have the greatest direct or indirect effect on those risks. To 
this extent, the determination of the shock calibration is another delicate issue. Namely, it may 
depend on the nature of the analysis to be performed: in sensitivity analysis, the common 
practice is to use a historical calibration, in which the size of the shock is selected according 
to the largest variation that a specific variable of interest has undergone during a selected time 
interval. Of course, the choice of this time period is closely connected with the specific risk 
being analyzed and to the market conditions prevailing over that time horizon. The periods are 
generally between 20 and 30 years, even though in case of lacking historical depth, the 
interval may be confined to 10 or 15 years. Nonetheless, the most accurate and widespread 
approach to gauge the size of the shock is employing complete scenario analysis. Specifically, 
it contemplates the variations of a wide set of macroeconomic variables, which may permit to 
grasp how these may affect the resilience of the financial system. Similarly to the single 
variable case, to the scenario chosen is assigned a certain likelihood of occurrence. Needless 
to say, also in this case, the ultimate credibility and utility of the stress exercise depends, 
amongst others, on the calibration of the probability of occurrence. 
In the third stage, the spotlights move to the estimation of the reactions to the hypothetical 
adverse scenario. In this step, it must be declared how the shocks defined and calibrated in the 
preceding stage are to be amalgamated into the system: in other terms, at this point, we need a 
quantitative assessment of the impact on the system’s financial condition, so that its resilience 
to the shocks can be estimated. This stage defines in concrete the relationships established 
between macro-variables and the main factors of the banking system, usually under the guise 
of economic and financial features. Notably, it consists of choosing certain key variables that 
directly affect the financial health of the system under analysis, and estimating how they can 
change in response to the designated shock. In other words, we are expressing how changes in 
macroeconomic variables are reflected into the financial system in terms of profitability and 
solvency. Finally, as a corollary to the previous stages, policy decisions must be carefully 
considered once the impact on the financial stability and the estimated resilience of the system 
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have been derived from the stress test attempt. There is a need to consider what measures will 
be beneficial to the smooth-working, efficient and continued stability of the system under 
examination. This is usually regarded as the policy-oriented phase. If critical inconsistencies 
have been detected, remedial actions must be a priority for all the banking authorities 
involved. Should that be the case, it will be necessary to focus on revising, adjusting and 
reinforcing the existing prudential framework currently in place. In general, the insolvency of 
one or more banks can generate costs that may expand well-beyond those directly faced by 
depositors and clients and which are not absorbed by bank shareholders too. These, namely, 
derive from contagion of other intermediaries throughout the banking sector and the overall 
economy. For this reason, the policy-oriented phase is fundamental to be included in a stress 
test procedure. Authorities have the power and duty to reduce the likelihood of these potential 
social costs: by imposing determined thresholds of capital requirements, they may limit the 
effects of banks’ default. Capital requirements should be set at the socially optimal level: 
balancing the social value of permitting banks to “create liquidity” with the expected social 
costs associated with the concrete possibility, that banks default (Bologna, Segura, 2016). 
 
3.2 Stress Test Classification 
A first taste of stress tests has been already given earlier, when dealing with liquidity risk20. 
However, liquidity stress testing is just a small part of a far larger and more complex picture. 
This field, additionally, has been less advanced and quite circumscribed (van den End, 2011). 
Moreover, a survey conducted by the ECB has pointed out that several banks carry out 
liquidity stress tests just to quantify their liquidity risk tolerance as expressed in survival 
periods or limit systems (ECB, 2008). Nevertheless, liquidity risk is indeed extremely 
relevant for a stress scenario perspective: according to van den End (2011), it may be 
regarded as the essential means through which contagion risks are transmitted cross-border. 
One first possible categorization of stress testing may be between liquidity stress-testing and 
solvency stress tests. The main difference simply lays in the fact that in the first case, as stated 
before, the focus is on the sole banking liquidity and the related stress test serves to assess 
liquidity requirements in the event of cash shortages. On the contrary, the solvency stress tests 
provide a more comprehensive overview of the banking situation, in particular regarding 
banks’ capital positions towards different risks. Moreover, international regulatory authorities 
tend to concentrate on specific adverse scenarios, applied to several banks simultaneously in 
order to capture any joint effect. The so-called concurrent stress tests have indeed the huge 
advantage of being easily comparable across financial institutions. This, in turn, may lead, on 
                                                             
20 Cfr paragraph 2.4 
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the one hand, to the development of better microprudential policies and, on the other, to 
understand whether shocks may affect only few banks or have wider effects, that is, to 
quantify the impact that amplification channels may have within the banking sector; between 
banks, the broader financial system and the overall economy. The amplification channels 
inclusion can help macroprudential regulators to determine the amount of the system-wide 
effect of negative events and may also support them in outlining policies with the ultimate 
aim of promoting and improving financial stability.  
Stress testing models can be identified along two dimensions (van den End, 2011): macro vs 
micro and top-down vs bottom-up. Starting from the first feature, the main difference between 
micro and macro stress testing is that in the former case, individual banks themselves conduct 
stress tests as a part of their risk management policy. On the contrary, macro stress testing are 
performed directly by supervisory authorities and central banks to reckon the resilience of the 
entire financial sector. In a nutshell, the micro-macro characteristic specifies the ultimate 
scope of conducting a stress test. For instance, micro stress testing has evidently increased its 
importance as a risk management tool for financial institutions. In fact, it can be implemented 
to determine portfolio risks, set risk thresholds and lead the planning of capital resources 
within a financial entity.  
The other interesting and well-known way to classify stress tests is between top-down and 
bottom-up. This distinction indicates the level at which the stress test is actually performed. 
The top-down approaches treat institutions as a pool of homogeneous features, which on the 
one hand may guarantee a lot of agility and computational easiness but on the other hand, it 
could oversimplify the reality, leading, as such, to unreliable outcomes. Still, the 
advantageous feature seems to prevail, as many national and international supervisors 
regularly implement the top-down way to stress testing. For instance, the United States 
(Covas et al., 2013) and the European Central Bank (2013), among others, appear indeed 
quite confident about relying on their internal models to carry out stress tests.  
The top-down approach can be described as follows. The initial point is, needless to say, the 
hypothetical stress scenario. Typically, this includes adverse shocks to crucial economic 
variables, such as economic growth; unemployment rate; short and long term interest rate 
spread; real estate and housing prices; inflation and so on. The utilized scenario, in other 
words, consider the main risks for the financial and economic sector on a multi-year horizon, 
since several effects do not manifest immediately21. The scenario elements will impact first 
and foremost the credit risk exposure of banks. Let us consider a sharp increase in 
                                                             
21 This is for example the case of social security provisions. Including more years is also beneficial if we 
consider that banks have many assets and liabilities with very long maturity, although this would increase 
the number of assumptions required (Daniëls et at., 2017). 
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unemployment. The economic theory would suggest that many employees would lose their 
jobs and face a consistent salary reduction. As a straight consequence, many households may 
no longer be able to pay their mortgage obligations22. Thus, banks will incur losses on these 
positions. A similar reasoning holds for commercial loans. In the end, the overall credit 
quality and risk exposure of bank lending portfolios deteriorates tremendously, obliging the 
supervisory authorities to increase the amount of capital buffer requirements23. Moreover, the 
scenario variables will also affect market risk exposure: declining equity investments and 
government bonds can both lead to consistent impairments and value adjustments, which 
ultimately may condition the riskiness of the banking market portfolio and cause further 
capital requirements. The scenario usually also covers funding liquidity risk as it 
comprehends interest rate shocks and assumptions about funding conditions. These shocks 
will affect the interest expenses, which may translate into higher costs for the final customers, 
creating a lot of uncertainty around the interest margin earned by the bank. All the mentioned 
risks24, i.e. credit, funding and market risk have an effect on bank’s capital level: losses may 
radically reduce the equity capital, posing many challenges as far as the minimum regulatory 
capital is concerned. In particular, regulators specifically regard core capital (Tier 1) as the 
primary means to absorb eventual losses, since it is readily available. Strictly connected with 
the increase in capital is the higher risk-weighted assets imposed. Namely, the core capital is 
nothing else but the ratio between the capital (the numerator) and the risk-weighted assets (the 
denominator). In order to determine whether a bank does still have enough capital available 
after being stressed, the former ratio can be compared against a pre-defined threshold value or 
hurdle rate. This is also the explicit caveat adopted by the EBA for the 2014 stress test, which 
required a core capital ratio of 5.5%. Banks that overpass the specified amount were 
compelled to enhance their capital position. Additionally, the size of capital reduction may 
provide significant information about the bank’s risk-sensitivity as well. It is important to 
underline that during the assessment of a stress test, and in particular, of a top-down type of 
stress test, the outcome strongly depends on both the scenario and the modelling hypothesis 
on which the test is crafted: different scenarios, different modelling assumptions may 
unsurprisingly lead to disparate outcomes. As a result, stress test outputs should always be 
considered in context rather than in isolation (Daniëls et at., 2017). 
 
                                                             
22 This is exhaustively described by Yaw Owusu-Ansa (2012) employs a Structural Vector Autoregression 
(SVaR) model to study the dynamics of the impact of unemployment and home price index shocks on 
mortgage default rates from 1979 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2010. 
23 Technically, the supervisors would require an increase in RWA (risk-weighted assets). 
24 Note that the operational risk was excluded for simplicity’s sake. For more details on the mentioned risks, 
see chapter II. 
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Figure 3.2. Anatomy of a top-down stress test (Daniëls et at., 2017) 
 
In particular, the top-down approach may help supervisors and risk managers to understand 
potential sources of vulnerabilities in the financial system arising from economic changes. 
The top-down approach, moreover, delivers the crucial scope of capturing the “latent risk” 
deriving from structural breaks that might have remained undetected if just historical data 
were used (Enoch, 2006). In top-down stress testing, either the central bank or the supervisory 
authority simulate the impact of adverse shocks to financial institutions or sector by using in-
house models. Compared to bottom-up stress tests, the use of internal modelling significantly 
enhances the comparability of outcomes between financial entities and guarantees a wider 
flexibility in terms of different scenario applicability. Some methods also allow to quantify 
the second-round effects in the overall economy and financial markets, what, as we will see, 
the bottom-up stress tests do not provide directly. Furthermore, another interesting peculiarity 
of most of the top-down approaches it the fact that they tend to focus mainly on credit risk as 
the main driver of crisis scenarios (van den End, 2011).  
Top-down stress test may be divided into two principal categories, according to the pivotal 
focus of the test: macro-micro link models and integrated models. Foglia (2009) describes the 
former approach in details. Namely, these models describe, primarily for credit risk 
exposures, the interaction of macroeconomic variables with micro risk drivers. Many 
macroeconomic approaches do not foresee any financial sector variable and thus, satellite 
models, or better, reduced-form satellites, are used as good proxies for credit risk. In such 
cases, exogenous macro shocks are directly transformed into measures of banks’ assets 
quality. The models, naturally, may differ with regard to the measures of credit quality, level 
of aggregation and estimation method. On the micro side, credit risk measures are basically 
two: indicators of loan performance, such as non-performing loans, and default rates of 
household or corporate clients. The choice of the measure may depend on both subjective 
factors, like personal preferences, and as well as on objective constraints, such as data 
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availability. Düllmann and Erdelmeier (2009) compute credit losses on a system level, 
considering the inter-sector correlations. These correlations are represented by macro 
variables that embody the systemic risk component and capture the contagion implications 
between banks, although hidden risks deriving from unobserved correlation between banks 
across sectors might still be an open issue (van den End, 2011). Nonetheless, credit risk 
models use non-linear assumptions, such as logit or probit transformations, so as to take into 
account the nonlinearity feature when shocks are vast (Foglia, 2009). One relevant drawback 
of these models is represented by the fact that normally, feedback effects from credit risk to 
the macro economy are not considered. This can be partially solved with the adoption of VaR 
models25 (De Graeve et al., 2008) though it still represents a trivial approximation.  
Many integrated models, on the other hand, provide a more structural approach, being more 
agile to capture the feedback effects within the financial sector. For this reason, they are more 
adequate in the field of systemic financial crises, which would unsurprisingly justify the wide 
adoption. One particular remark of these models is that they do not recommend any specific 
banking risk to be included. Consequently, related approaches may vary consistently, making 
comparison almost impossible. A valuable integrated framework is represented by the 
RAMSI model adopted by the Bank of England (Alessandrini et al., 2009). The RAMSI 
approach comprehends a Bayesian VaR model to simulate macroeconomic scenarios, satellite 
models for credit risk, market risk, as well as interest rate risk. Further, it relies on an 
interbank network model and an asset price function to replicate market liquidity risk. Despite 
its potentiality, the model has been criticized since it does not allow for feedback effects from 
the banks to the real economy. A clarifying and, to some extent, superior example may be 
represented by the Liquidity Stress-Tester introduced in chapter II of this volume. In this 
specific case, we considered the iteration between market and funding liquidity risks as well 
as the liquidity position of bank for different scenarios. 
The complexity of the model structures makes causal interlinkages and final results less 
transparent. Thereby, the integrated models may violate the fundamental cornerstone of 
“simple understanding”, which should characterize all stress test procedures, since they may 
be somehow too sophisticated and difficult for policymakers and the public (Kwast et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, these models do provide a clear picture of the possible repercussions of 
tail events, as they tend to consider multiple transmission channels and feedback effects. Most 
of the top-down approaches are calibrated to consider heterogeneous portfolios as aggregated 
and comparable, although in reality they can differ from a methodological and computational 
point of view. This may be a huge limitation since individual peculiarities need to be 
                                                             
25 For more details on VaR models see paragraph 2.2.1 of this work. 
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considered, so as to carry out a reliable analysis. An additional, strictly related problem is that 
financial institutions are increasing their usage of off-balance sheet items, which may 
ultimately pose many challenges concerning data homogeneity. Lastly, there may be an 
intrinsic difficulty of modelling and catching the interaction between changes in 
macroeconomic conditions and variations in risk factors. Notably, the models may not capture 
the real relevant effect and wrongly attribute to it a considerable weight although it may have 
just a marginal impact.  
On the contrary, bottom-up approaches have the advantage of addressing the right, narrower 
and better-defined problem. Most bottom-up stress tests focus on credit risk as the greatest 
threat for banks and use multi-year scenarios to capture downturns in the business cycle. 
Conversely, market risk is usually considered over a much shorter time horizon, which may 
create a lot of challenges in terms of simultaneous treatment of credit and market risk (Boss et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, stress tests scenarios pay less attention to liquidity risk as noted by 
Čihák (2007), in fact, the latter is basically introduced as mechanical run-off scenarios that 
assume unexpected withdrawals of banking funds. 
In many countries, authorities apply bottom-up stress tests to check regularly the health of the 
financial sector as a whole. In such cases, usually, the competent supervisor or the central 
bank defines specific scenarios that financial institutions subsequently run in their internal 
models. To guide the computation of stress test outcomes by institutions, the authority in 
charge translates the simulated macro shocks in default and loss ratios via reduced form 
satellite models. As a result, macroeconomic factors are connected to the banking portfolio 
drivers. This macro-micro interaction is a key issue of stress test models (Van Lalyveld, 
2009). From an exquisitely bottom-up perspective, the macro-micro issue is handled by 
aligning stress tests to individual banks’ risk profiles. Of course, it is facilitated by greater 
access to the information from the institutions: single financial entities may have access to 
complete proprietary databases, which can tremendously improve both the reliability and the 
precision of the outcomes (Daniëls et at., 2017). As the last step in the process, the stress test 
results of individual financial institutions are pooled into system level, in order to evaluate 
whether the banking sector in its entirety is able to resist adverse shocks, or whether there 
may be weak individual situations that could threat the equilibrium of the financial sector. 
Neither the quantification of such contagion risks nor the feedback effects from the banking 
sector to the real economy are usually part of the bottom-up stress tests (van den End, 2011). 
This is partly due to the unpredictability of banks’ behavior during stress or crisis situations. 
Nonetheless, the coordinating authority could indeed gather qualitative information on 
potential management actions and second round effects from bottom-up stress test outcomes.  
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Since 2008, bottom-up stress tests have evolved from a mere re-active to a more pro-active 
tool, fundamental for crisis management. The Financial Crisis, moreover, has underlined how 
much of a diversified stress test taste international supervisory authorities can have. In 
particular, bottom-up stress test can either be vertical, i.e. aimed to treat specific risk 
exposures or business models and applied, for instance, by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) in UK, or horizontal, that is, as a system-wide exercise based on uniform scenarios, 
preferred by US authorities. In 2009, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) launched a third variant of the former two methodologies. Specifically, they 
coordinated a regional stress test with the objective to capture possible cross-border effects. 
But regardless of the specific bottom-up test, all of them should satisfy at least the following 
three criteria (van den End, 2011): clear and synchronized communication of the results; high 
level of disclosure and complementarities with other policy actions for institutions that fail to 
pass the stress test. From a drawback side, bottom-up models and in particular vertical stress 
tests, seem not to always rely on a precise economic scenario, mainly due to the great 
admissible discretion. In addition, many bottom-up stress-testing models employ historical 
data as initial input. As a result, the usage of historical data may have the gargantuan 
disadvantage of being unable to forecast out-of-sample events that may realize in the future. 
Lastly, using sophisticated internally-developed techniques can create a false sense of security 
and complacency and consequently this may discourage a thoughtful analysis of the current 
and future economic and financial situation. Nevertheless, bottom-up modelling for stress 
testing seem to be the preferred methodology yet to Basel III, at least in the long term (Krayn, 
Day, 2013).  
To conclude, both top-down and bottom-up stress testing models have advantages and 
drawbacks as well. For this reason, it is important to bear in mind that the best way to carry 
out stress tests is to cleverly integrate multiple approaches in order to end up with more 
reliable outcomes and precious crosschecks. Individual financial institutions and supervisors 
may indeed adopt different approaches, top-down; bottom-up or a hybrid one, nevertheless, 
the ultimate outcomes should be quite similar and easily comparable. Thus, the results could 
be aggregated and examined to test any convergence between the methods. Ideally, the 
exercise carried out by the authority should replicate the results reported by the individual 
institutions using their own methodology (Montes, Artigas, 2013). 
 
3.3 Stress Tests: Criticalities and Cross-border Propagation 
This specific section contains details about carrying out a macro-stress test exercise, 
considering, as the scope of application the entire banking sector and the resilience of the 
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system as primary objective.  Note that herein we will recall the concepts explained in the 
chapter II of this volume. 
As stated earlier, a stress exercise generally may include two main types of analysis: a very 
trivial sensitivity analysis and other, way more sophisticated scenario analysis. The former 
seeks to evaluate how the main determinants of the financial condition of credit institutions 
are affected by particular one-off shocks to specific banking risk factors. Unlike sensitivity 
analysis, scenario analysis employs econometric models to investigate how the 
macroeconomic and financial aggregates of the system would be affected under a certain 
scenario. In a complete scenario analysis, also balance sheet and the profit and loss account 
are taken into consideration in order to model the transmission of the macroeconomic shock. 
Notably, the shock will make an impact on the entire business of the bank, which is reflected 
on both balance sheet items and certain elements of the profit and loss account. Moreover, 
credit risk may affect the profit and loss statement via credit provisions of expected losses. 
Depending on the approach, these financial statements would be either those of the system as 
a whole, or those of individual banks. A scenario model should not be limited to estimating a 
single equation, such as the bottom line of the profit and loss account. Rather, the analysis 
should be developed further in order to provide a more comprehensive insight that 
distinguishes different balance sheet items and their contribution to the profit and loss 
account. This approach considerably enriches the exercise and it enables step-by-step 
monitoring of the various items comprising a bank’s main activities and operations. Thus, any 
concealed effect that influences and alters the interpretation of the banks’ risk profile and 
sensitivity to certain risks is correctly taken into account. In addition, distinct balance sheet 
items may show varying sensitivities to certain shocks and may also respond by different 
amount to changes in the value of macroeconomic variables. Let us consider for instance 
equity instruments. They may vary more consistently to a fall in stock market prices than to 
domestic credit contraction. The items of the profit and loss account that are usually 
considered in a stress exercise include: interest income; fees and commissions; operating 
expenses and provisioning charges, such as impairment losses. In particular, net interest 
income is one of the main items that a stress test exercise should comprehend. To model this 
specific item of the income statement, many components of the balance sheet are utilized. In 
effect, these elements are introduced in the stress context with equations that relate interest 
rates and exposures to macro-variables. A particular example could be the mortgage credit 
portfolio, which is one of the components on the asset side generating income. In this respect, 
the stress exercise models, on the one hand, the average rate charged to the loans in this 
portfolio, on the other, the average mortgage exposure. Their interaction provides the 
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contribution of this asset item to the net interest income. Similarly, the remaining items on the 
asset side are treated analogously. Modelling financial costs, i.e. rates and amount of the 
financing obtained, from the liability part gives its contribution to interest expenses. Summing 
up the cost of all financing sources leads to the total cost of liabilities. Eventually, net interest 
income is achieved by subtracting from the asset value the liability cost.  
Regarding the impact on credit risk, stress tests for this type of risk should necessarily 
distinguish between banking portfolios (different asset types), e.g. a differentiation between 
risk exposures to corporate clients and individuals. Moreover, within the latter mortgage loans 
should be specifically separated from consumer credit. This division enables the specific 
design, calibration and adequate determination of the consequences of the shock in question 
on every differentiated exposure. A particular shock, for instance, may have a different 
depending on the portfolio considered. Given the different levels in the values of the risk 
parameters that delineate each portfolio, it is categorically necessary to distinguish between 
them so that the amount of shock can be accurately determined for calibration purposes. In 
chapter II we introduced some key concepts to define credit risk and its components. 
Specifically, the key parameters employed in credit risk analysis are basically: probability of 
default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) and maturity (M). 
Determining the amount of the shock to which they are to be subjected is the next step in the 
stress exercise for this particular risk. One convincing solution to measure more precisely the 
credit quality of the bank’s borrowers is using the obligor’s probability of default. The 
underlying reason is quite easy to be explained. This parameter is the measure generally used 
by banks in their internal models to estimate and handle credit risk. In addition, since Basel II, 
it is also the basic standard parameter for the supervisory authorities in determining this 
particular risk. Therefore, the estimated change in credit loss provisions under each stress 
scenario may be driven and triggered by change in the expected loss deriving from shifts in 
the PD, due to shocks to the economic and financial variables used in the specific stress 
scenario. The probability of default is calculated using statistical model, wherein different 
factors are taken into account. Specifically, macroeconomic and financial system-related 
components, such as economic activity (GDP growth); unemployment rate; interest rates and 
other variables likely to influence the debt service capacity of bank borrowers. Eventually, 
this would lead to a cyclical probability of default, dependent on the economic conditions of 
each scenario under examination. Granularity in the estimation of PD is obtained by 
differentiating several crucial key portfolios within total banks’ credit exposures. Particularly, 
a typical stress test framework may include the following portfolios: mortgage portfolio; 
exposures to real estate developer loans; loans to other non-financial firms and consumer 
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lending (Montes, Artigas, 2013). Let us consider for instance the PD of the mortgage 
portfolio. This specifically depends on interest rates, economic activity, which is usually 
expressed in GDP terms, and on the housing price index. Conversely, consumer lending 
strongly hinges on interest rates, economic activity and unemployment rate. To complete the 
credit risk assessment, other two parameters are required: the Loss Given Default (LGD) and 
the Exposure at Default (EAD). Both of them can be intended in macroeconomic terms as the 
probability of default. Considering the LGD, changes in loan-to-value ratios, real estate prices 
or interest rates, may directly affect the value of the LGD for modelling purposes. The 
common procedure for LGD, in particular, assumes an ad-hoc increase by a given percentage 
or defines some kind of interval of variation and utilizes it to compute the change in credit 
risk. For what concerns EAD, its estimation will move consistently with the estimates of 
credit growth, assumed by the specific macroeconomic scenario under consideration and, 
naturally, the values forecasted for the variables of interest. In principle, the EAD parameter 
should also depend on cyclical fluctuations in broad economic activity, affecting, as such, the 
total credit exposure of banks. Lastly, the maturity does not present any remarkable 
consideration, since it may be regarded as an arbitrary choice. Once all the stressed values of 
the risk parameters are known, the stressed expected losses connected with each scenario can 
be found immediately, which in turn, determines the amount of provisions to be arranged 
aside by banks to meet those expected losses and the consequent impact on the profit and loss 
account. 
In section two, when we presented the Liquidity Stress Tester model, it was clearly pointed 
out that the effects of a scenario analysis do not limit themselves to a sole first round. And the 
exact reasoning also applies for the general stress-testing framework. Banks’ solvency and 
financial equilibrium generally depends on a variety of risks that can be categorized as major 
economic shocks, contagion and corrections in market imbalances (sometimes referred as 
“bursting of bubbles”). While the initial stress-testing background may capture the economic 
shocks, the contagion effects are harder to deal with, as they do not manifest immediately. 
Nonetheless, neglecting these additional components could be deceptive because they may 
represent a relevant part of a stressed scenario framework. In fact, a complete exercise would 
also consider the second round effects, which, basically, depicts the system-wide impacts of 
the contagion risk. The importance of these second round effects is highlighted by the fact 
that they are regularly published as part of the assessment of resilience of financial institutions 
in the semi-annual ECB Financial Stability Review (Constâncio, 2015). In this successive 
phase, the original shock runs over the real sector (Montes, Artigas, 2013). The Financial 
Crisis undoubtedly highlighted that cross-border effects, or technically, spillovers, can be 
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extremely large and pervasive. Particularly, cross-border bank holding and sovereign markets 
turned out into powerful means of propagation during the crisis. A spillover can be regarded 
as the outcome of a shock in an economy, which is transmitted to another one through single 
or more channels. From both quantitative and qualitative perspectives, spillover effects hinge 
on different features (D’Auria et al., 2016): the transmission channels, the type of shock and 
the amplification or stabilization mechanism operating in the originating and receiving 
economies. The transmission channels are basically four: trade channels; financial 
connections; confidence channels and institutional and political linkages.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Spillover Effects Decomposition (Author’s Elaboration from D’Auria et al., 2016) 
 
The trade channels may determine two different effects: a demand effect and a 
competitiveness one. From the former point of view, any shock crafting a variation in income 
is likely to convert into changes in demand for imported goods and services, provoking 
spillover effects whose magnitude tends to augment with the deepness of the trade 
interconnections. The diameter of the demand effect depends on macroeconomic components, 
such as the monetary reaction to the demand shock, import propensity of a country and on the 
composition and value added embodied in trade partners’ exports. On the contrary, the 
competitiveness effect of a country are likely to trigger variations in the import and export 
flows. These reactions may derive from the endogenous answer of firms and the economy in 
its entirety to shifts in the economic framework. Interestingly, these effects can have different 
time of realization and can be mutually bolstering or go in opposite directions. As shown by 
the Figure 3.4 for the euro area, the trade flows were intense in the pre-crisis years, mirroring 
both global tendencies and incremented economic integration. In effect, the sum of total 
exports and imports balance of the euro region countries from 75% of their aggregate GDP in 
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2000 to a 84% in 2009, after shrinking during 2009-2012 and recovering afterwards. Similar 
considerations can be presented for intra-euro area trade, which grew from 31% of 2000 to a 
36% in 2008, though its relevance has been constantly decreasing since the crisis, declining to 
a 32% of GDP in 2013. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Export of Euro Area EA18 during 2006-2012 (World Bank and D’Auria et al., 2016) 
 
The financial channel works through changes in cross-border financial flows and balance 
sheet exposures. Several transmission mechanisms can be identified:  
 
1. Spillovers via financial prices. This is the most common channel through which 
financial shocks are diffused across borders, following the interest parity theory and via risk 
premia variations. Generally speaking, since financial markets are internationally integrated, 
variations to prices on any asset market are conveyed quickly into asset prices in other 
economies. In practice, investors rebalance their portfolio compositions on different markets 
(Tokat, Wicas, 2007). 
2. Spillovers via cross-border balance sheet exposures. The Financial Crisis increased the 
awareness on the importance of effects that go beyond the transmission of movements to asset 
prices and affect balance sheets in other economies. Let us consider the case of a household 
possessing cross border assets. In this case, any shift of the assets value may trigger deeper 
consequences. In fact, such “wealth” effects can affect consumption levels of the domestic 
household. For a corporation, balance sheet effects can affect the domestic demand via 
investment and wage levels, whereas banks, specifically, may be affected from a lending 
ability point of view. 
3. Information spillovers. The information spillovers follow the expectations that market 
participants anticipate for the economic fundamentals. These can be engendered by policy 
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announcements, although there might be a problem of credibility, as described in the Barro 
Gordon model (1983), amongst others. Information spillovers are essential for explaining 
contagion impacts, in particular concerning “wake up call” effects, which may arise when 
new information regarding a country conducts to a reassessment of the fragility of other 
countries. 
 
In general, financial flows are much more volatile than trade flows, implying rapid 
propagation and amplification of shocks through large changes or reversals. For this reason, 
financial spillovers are more complex to treat26.  
The confidence channel consists of transmitting changes in consumer and business sentiment 
in one country to confidence in another one. Given the strong correlation between confidence 
and economic activity, the confidence channel may play a pivotal role in assessing 
consumption and investment decisions, especially between countries with very close trade and 
financial links. 
The institutional interlinkages and political economy effects represent another way to transmit 
shocks. The expression comprehends shared institutions and common policy frameworks. 
This channel also involves peer effects, mutual learning from best practices or sharing of 
common institutions or resources. As one would imagine, the effects are tough to quantify but 
could play a significant role in the proliferation of shocks, especially in the context of a 
monetary union, where for instance, the member states adopt common fiscal policies and 
structural reforms. In the euro zone specifically, the single monetary policy, the common 
external exchange rate and the consequent absence of bilateral nominal exchange rates can 
empower negative spillover outcomes across the euro region states. Generally speaking, 
different typologies of shocks can have very different spillover effects. In addition, also 
various conditions related to market structures and policy regimes can either amplify or 
reduce contagion impacts. For example, a great degree of trade openness simplifies the 
propagation of shocks across well-integrated economies. Real and nominal rigidities, such as 
sticky wages, can play a crucial role in establishing the amplitude ad resistance of spillover 
effects too (Dao, 2008). As regards specific financial spillovers, their power may depend on 
different factors, including the degree of international portfolio diversification; the degree of 
risk aversion in the market; the size and activity of multinational banks; the level of financial 
market integration and the nature of markets’ regulations.  
                                                             
26 Hozba and Zeugner (2014) provide a clarifying illustration of the financial intermediation and how rapid 
capital flows may move. In particular, they described the central role played by France as buyer and seller 
during the Financial Crisis. 
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More specifically, cross-country financial spillovers and contagion have been the paramount 
topic in policy discussions since the very beginning of the Financial Crisis. As stated earlier, 
financial shocks transmit to other countries in many different ways. When dealing with 
financial shocks, many scholars and practitioners seem to confuse interdependence with 
contagion (D’Auria et al., 2016). While the former relates to the correlation across financial 
markets in normal conditions, the latter refers mainly to the side effects that go far beyond the 
normal state of equilibrium: spillovers during a contagion incorporate the negative effects of 
amplification channels. The empirical evidence in support of contagion during financial crises 
seems to back up this hypothesis. Forbes (2012), for instance, analyzes correlations in stock 
market returns since the 1980s to mid-2012 and concludes that interdependence increased 
notably over the period. Favero (2012) employs a Global Vector Autoregressive (GVaR) 
model to analyze the co-movement of bond spreads within the euro region. The paper finds a 
significant non-linear relationship between spreads and fiscal fundamentals as well as some 
consistent evidence of contagion effects during the financial crisis. Ludwig and Sobanski 
(2014) provide a complete review of the banking sector’s fragilities between euro area 
Member States over the period 2007-2010. Namely, they find out that spillover risks across 
national banking sectors increase tremendously during periods of financial instability and that 
the epicenter of risk in the period before the crisis was to be found in the periphery of the euro 
zone, and precisely in Portugal and Greece. As the crisis spread its wings, they noted that a 
variety of stability measures were introduced, which however, could not save the banking 
systems of core countries from increasingly becoming a continuous source of fragility 
spillover. 
Stress testing and, in particular, macro stress testing puts great emphasis on examining the 
outcomes of major macroeconomic shocks such as sharp drops in GDP and increases in 
unemployment. Supervisors and central banks have gained considerable modelling abilities to 
analyze risks of this nature. Regarding the specific analysis of contagion risk and how the 
initial impacts are propagated to other economies, regulators have begun to implement 
practical models that can be calibrated to real world data, which in turn might be useful to 
study macroeconomic implications deriving from stress tests. Nevertheless, a workhorse 
model has yet to be found (Anderson, 2016).  
Let us consider a trivial example to start to figure out how second round effects and especially 
contagion consequences are propagated in cross-border economies. Firstly, a scenario of zero 
growth is assumed. This will imply a cutback in credit quality of banks’ borrowers, 
represented by an increase in credit risk. Banks, in turn will react by reducing the amount of 
new lending, which will manifestly upset economic agents and their borrowing capacity. As a 
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consequence the initial economic background will aggravate and thus, the original shock will 
nothing but worsen, leading into a negative growth that obviously will affect obligors’ credit 
quality more harmfully than the initial situation. All the previous events may be described by 
an individual equation, leading, as a result to a multi-equation model able to bring the 
feedback process to an end and to determine the overall amount of the shock. Nonetheless, the 
relations occurring between the financial and the real sector are generally not easily captured 
by any equation: the estimates would always represent approximations. Another possible 
solution could lay in amplifying, to some extent, the initial amount of the shock deriving from 
the originally-set stressed scenario. Of course, the increase must be massive enough to capture 
the additional impact that feedback effects would trigger on the financial system. To recap, 
once a shock and its size have been determined, its impact on the financial condition of the 
system is estimated with the final goal of testing the system resilience. This is accomplished 
by determining the consequences on the different items on the profit and loss account as well 
as the impact on solvency. It is crucial to analyze the effect of shocks by pooling the profit 
figures for each year to end up with a cumulative figure for the last year of the time horizon. 
This aggregated value best illustrates the impact of the stress test on the system’s financial 
condition for each of the scenarios under review. Accordingly, the impact on profitability is 
regarded as the difference between the profits calculated under the baseline scenario and those 
for each of the specified scenarios. Analogously, the burden on solvency is determined by 
comparing the ratio of the baseline scenario with that of each of the stress scenarios taking the 
cumulative effect of that comparison on the capital ratio at the end of the selected time span. 
As an alternative, more sophisticated approaches that engage a deeper conceptual and 
methodological framework, could be put in place. For instance, a general equilibrium model 
can be adopted, which considers a three layer endogenous default, in the household, corporate 
and the banking sector, the so-called 3D model (Clerc et al., 2015). The macroeconomic-
feedback interaction has also been described by econometric models, which test banks’ 
response to capital shocks in a time-series context, such as GVaR (Gross et al., 2015) and 
FAVaR (Budnik et al., 2015). These methods can also be implemented for macroprudential 
policy cost-benefit analysis as well as to quantify cross-border effects. Furthermore, the 
GVaR approach could also be integrated with early warning models to account for the 
medium-term boom-bust cycles by rendering endogenous the predictor variables employed in 
the logistic early-warning model (Behn et al., 2015).  
For simplicity’s sake, we present herein another model, which notwithstanding its plainer 
theoretical assumptions, fares quite well at describing the amplification effects. Namely, the 
model in question is the Conditional Value at Risk or CoVaR model (Adrian and 
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Brunnermeier, 2008). The CoVaR approach describes direct and indirect connections at 
country level. This, obviously, may turn out to be extremely important from a macro financial 
stability and a sovereign risk management point of view. In effect, this may help to 
understand the systemic importance of individual economies. The CoVaR model in this 
context provide a good applicative framework, in the sense that this model tries to underline 
the bilateral linkages through co-risk measure, which may capture the increase in risk of one 
country when another country falls into insolvency or distress. Specifically, the CoVaR 
captures the degree of intensification of the risk, taking into consideration the non-linear 
properties of risk, as correlations and the risk measure may vary with the level of risk. We 
already introduced Value at Risk previously27. But nevertheless, the VaR introduced in the 
earlier chapter is a model that operates efficiently in an isolated economy, whereby the effects 
in other countries are basically neglected. Applying the CoVaR may be regarded as a clever 
way to include spillover effects that one state may exercise on another. Statistically, the 
CoVaR for one country is defined as the VaR of the economy conditional upon the VaR of 
another state’s economy. Let 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
be the 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖  of a state i conditioned upon the 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗
 of 
the country j. It can be shown that: 
                             𝑃𝑟(∆𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖|𝑗|∆𝑋𝑗 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗) = 𝑞                             (3.1) 
Wong and Fong (2010) propose a fascinating practical application of the CoVaR model in 
their analysis of the euro zone. Accordingly, they employ the CoVaR as a non-linear approach 
to estimate the conditional risk, making use of quintile regressions. These particular 
regressions allow practitioners to cut the distribution at the quintile of interest and obtain the 
corresponding cross-section of the conditional distribution. In this case, the quantile of 
interest will correspond to the level of VaR specified in the regression framework. Wong and 
Fong, notably, estimate the changes in the credit-default-swap spread of one euro-area 
Member State with another’s, employing quantile regressions: 
                      ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖 = 𝛼𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘,𝑞
𝑖|𝑗𝑁
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
                      (3.2) 
Where ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖is the variation of the CDS spread of the country I, expressed as a function of 
the CDS spread of country j, ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗, and a set of common risk factors 𝐹𝑘. The equation is 
computed at the 99th quantile, denoted by q. Note that the quantile level is an arbitrary choice. 
The estimated coefficients 𝛼𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
, 𝛽𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
and 𝛾𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
represent the measure of how credit risk of one 
country affects another at 99th quantile of the distribution. The independent variables are 
usually embodied by indicators that are commonly used in research and analysis of financial 
risk and market equilibrium: business cycle; liquidity condition, risk aversion; general 
                                                             
27 See section 2.2.1 for more details. 
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sovereign default risk; the risk premium; the default risk in the interbank market and so on. 
Once we derived the CDS spread at 99th percentile of country j, that is the VaR for country j, 
we may derive easily the CoVaR measure by substituting the VaRj into the equation: 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅99
𝑖|𝑗
= ?̂?99
𝑖|𝑗
+ ?̂?𝑞
𝑖|𝑗
∆𝑉𝑎𝑅99
𝑗
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑘,99
𝑖|𝑗
𝐹𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1   (3.3) 
Where the 99 means that the parameters are estimated by the 99th quantile regression and that 
the 99th percentile of the empirical distribution of the CDS spreads have been utilized. The 
analysis of the conditional credit risk represents a versatile monitoring tool, as it reveals 
which countries are perceived as to be more interconnected to each other. In turn, the 
conditional co-risk measures are more informative, since they provide a market assessment of 
the increase in a country’s credit risk induced from its linkages to another. Furthermore, it 
also captures the tail events (D’Auria et al., 2016), which is fundamentally important for 
policymakers and risk management strategies. It is no coincidence that in the example a 99th 
percentile was adopted: it could perfectly represent a period of distress or an economic 
recession. 
 
3.4 Supervisory Stress Testing: Historical Development and Criticism 
Prior to the last Financial Crisis, stress tests were largely conducted by banks for internal risk 
management scopes. Nonetheless, some regulatory authorities did indeed perform stress tests 
before the Financial Crisis but with practically no direct relevance on policy settings. A first 
explicit reference to banking stress test was introduced in 1996 with Basel I. Specifically, 
those bank-wide stress tests were addressed to banks that were using internal models to 
quantify market risk for regulatory purposes. However, a consistent step forward was reached 
only in 2004 with Basel II, whereby stress tests amplified their applicability horizons 
extending to credit risk too. In particular, the second Pillar clearly states the indispensability 
of stress testing for credit risk: both the advanced and foundation IRB approaches in fact shall 
require the utilization of stress testing programs in order to review the robustness of their 
internally-developed models and to evaluate the adequacy of the banking capital buffers. At 
the end of the Nineties, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank decided 
to implement the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) whose final goal was to 
provide a quantitative measure of the vulnerability of a country’s financial and economic 
system to different macroeconomic scenarios, reviewing, as a consequence, the regulatory 
risk management framework where necessary. The FSAP assessment encouraged national 
central banks to adopt stress-testing procedures, which ultimately would have paved the way 
to the present concurrent stress tests.  
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The Financial Crisis, as stated earlier, highlighted consistent deficiencies in risk measurement 
and management across the entire financial sector. In effect, the stress testing assumptions 
used until then turned out to be excessively benign and overoptimistic compared to the actual 
performance recorded by banks (BCBS, 2009). In addition to revealing many shortcomings of 
stress-testing approaches, the Financial Crisis has also the great merit of having radically 
changed the stress tests’ role within the regulatory framework. The interest in stress testing 
started to grow more pressingly, which eventually encouraged the Basel Committee to 
release, in 2009, the Principles of Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision (BCBS, 
2009). Furthermore, in that period, greater reliance on stress testing also could be heard from 
the banking industry itself. The Basel committee well-noted those complaints and in Basel III 
they decided to strengthen the use of some asset classes in Pillar 1 computations of regulatory 
capital and stress testing obtained augmented emphasis in the Pillar 2 review of a bank’s 
internal capital adequacy assessment process (ICAAP) (Anderson et al., 2016). Supervisory 
stress tests moved from being an isolated and marginal tool within the broader risk assessment 
programs, to large-scale, fully comprehensive risk-assessment procedures in their own right, 
conducting straightforwardly to policy interventions. The very first example of this new way 
to stress testing was surely the American Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) 
performed by the Federal Reserve at the beginning of 2009. The overall reaction to this event 
was generally highly positive (Anderson et al., 2016). Basically, the SCAP stress test 
evaluated whether the large US banks had sufficient funding resources to absorb losses and 
continue to be operationally efficient under a common stress scenario. In particular, the 
scenario was extremely severe compared to the expected path of the economy at the time 
(Bernanke, 2010). The results, differently from the past, were published on a bank-by-bank 
basis, with the low-performing financial institutions obliged to increase their capital resources 
within six months. Moreover, on that occasion, the US Treasury Department guaranteed a 
concrete backstop in the event that any bank were unable to accomplish so in private markets, 
though actually there was no need. The SCAP is undoubtedly deemed to have made a crucial 
contribution to stabilizing the US financial system and restoring the investors’ confidence, 
with the Treasury support acknowledged as the most important driver of its success 
(Schuermann, 2013). The SCAP was followed by the development of many frameworks for 
regular concurrent stress testing across central banks and supervisory authorities (Dent et al., 
2016).  
From an European perspective, stress testing procedures were analyzed in the “de Larosière 
Report”, which called for more severe scenarios (de Larosière Group, 2009). The first EU-
wide stress test was conducted in 2009 under the guide of the Committee of European 
71 
 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS). A similar test was again performed by the CEBS in 2010, but 
this time with the operational help of the European Central Bank (ECB). The test covered 91 
financial institutions from 20 EU member states, both inside and outside the Eurozone. On 
that occasion, only seven banks did not pass and the overall stress test results showed that, 
systemically, the required Tier 1 capital could be about 9.5% under the adverse scenario, that 
is, well above the 6% threshold envisaged for the stress exercise. The 2010 stress test was 
characterized by a detailed disclosure of the methodology and by the fact that for the first 
time, also sovereign risk was taken into account. Specifically, to deal with the latter, a series 
of haircuts to the banks’ sovereign debt holdings were applied. Nonetheless, the market agents 
deemed those scenarios as being too mild and following the publication of the results, the 
credit spreads on European periphery sovereign debt consistently widened (Andersen et al., 
2016). 
Starting from 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) started to exercise its own series 
of stress tests as a direct replacement of the CEBS. The peculiarity of the EBA lays in the fact 
that this supervisory body has more power to force national authorities to take specific 
actions. The results of test were released in July 2011 and eight banks did not perform well, 
since their capital fell below 5% of the Tier 1 equity capital (CET 1) hurdle considered in the 
exercise. Not surprisingly, the EBA specifically required these banks’ responsible national 
supervisors to take remedial actions, so as to align with the capital standards. Similarly to the 
previous stress test, also the EBA-conducted exercise provided the public with an extremely 
high degree of methodological details. The aim was obviously to boost the credibility of the 
European stress testing, though very soon, negative events would have conquered the 
spotlight. The worsening sovereign debt crisis, and namely, the failure in 2013 of DEXIA 
(Whitbeck, 2013), raised a lot of concerns regarding the reliability of the European stress 
tests, since the bank in question did successfully pass the preceding stress test. At this point, it 
was crystal clear that the European macro stress testing had not proved to be a relevant 
instrument that policymakers could avail of to build market confidence and end the financial 
crisis in Europe. Differently from the US, the EU stress tests were regarded to be “too little 
too late” (Anderson et al. 2016): even though the transparency and severity were augmented 
in each successive attempt of test, they continually fell short of being credible. As a result, no 
system-wide stress test was carried out, neither in 2012 nor in 2013, this time span was used 
to gather ideas and develop more solid and conclusive stress testing regime. Borio et al. 
(2012) critically reviewed the state of the art in macro stress testing and concluded that, from 
a regulatory point of view, stress tests failed to be as useful as they were supposed to. 
Accordingly, stress tests are indeed a useful device for crisis management and rescue, but are 
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unreliable as an early-warning means, especially, as it happens empirically during placid 
periods of time, when dangers and risks are calmly building up. 
The more comprehensive structure was put in place only after the EU established the single 
supervisory mechanism (SSM), in which the European Central Bank plays a direct role in the 
supervision of systemically significant banks within the Eurozone and, potentially, some other 
EU member states. To fully empower the SSM, a comprehensive assessment was agreed, 
which included both Eurozone banks and other outside the Eurozone banks that were not sure 
to be supervised by the SSM. Namely, this involved two parts: a first asset quality review 
(AQL), comprising a through and detailed audit of bank exposures and the adequacy of 
collateral and provisioning; and a stress test to examine, on a forward-looking perspective, the 
capacity of the bank to withstand macroeconomic shocks. Notably, the ECB was responsible 
for the overall 
quality assurance and for the asset quality review that provides the starting point of the stress 
test. On the other hand, the ESRB and the European Commission provided the underlying 
macroeconomic scenarios. The purpose, needless to say, was to dispel any doubt about the 
resilience of major European banks and, contemporaneously, to establish eventually the 
credibility of European stress testing. Before being subject to this comprehensive assessment, 
the European banks raised around €50 billion as core Tier 1 capital, in order to fare better 
during the supervisory examination. The AQR identified some €136 billion of incremental 
non-performing loans, requiring system-wide adjustments of €34 billion to participating 
banks’ balance sheets. Conversely, the 2014 stress test concerned 123 financial institutions, 
accounting for 70% of the European banking assets. The methodology was again 
meticulously explained, and results for individual banks were disclosed in detail. In the end, 
23 banks did not succeed to in meeting the required standard of 5.5% CET 1 under the stress 
scenario and were thus required to take remedial actions. The reaction of the international 
financial markets following the release of the results of the stress test in October 2014 entails 
that the test was regarded as informative (Georgescu, 2014). Stock prices and credit default 
swaps spread moved consistently, enhancing for banks that performed well and deteriorating 
for those that appeared unhealthy under the adverse scenario. Till then, there was a lot of 
radical skepticism about the European stress tests and still, after the 2014 exercise, part of that 
untrustworthy feeling has remained. Nevertheless, it represented a milestone, a substantial 
step-forward compared to the previous attempts. Moreover, the outcomes convinced 
policymakers to keep on employing the basic framework of the comprehensive assessment, 
including an AQR and stress test to be performed annually on an ongoing basis. But returning 
to the actual 2014 results, the aggregation of the AQR outcomes with the stress test results, 
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generated a combining capital impact of around €263 billion, more or less 27% of the capital 
held by the participating banks and a median 400 basis point hit to Eurozone banks’ phased 
core Tier 1 ratios. Nonetheless, the resulting shortfall against the 5.5% phased core Tier 1 
capital requirement was €25 billion, i.e. only 2.5% of the Eurozone banks’ capital base. 
Therefore, considering the capital already raised, the effective cumulative shortfall was only 
€9.5 billion, divided between only 13 banks. As one would easily imagine, the interest of the 
mass media was on the simple pass-fail outcomes, and in particular on three quoted banks, 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena (€ 2.1 billion shortfall), Banca Carige (€0.8 billion shortfall) and 
BCP (€1.15 billion shortfall). However, many banks were found short of a provisioning level, 
which the ECB considered as merely prudential. Additionally, Bisseker (2014) observed how 
the stress test was conducted against the sole phased core Tier 1, pointing out that investors’ 
focus should have been on “fully loaded” ratios28, that is taking into account full deductions 
for balance sheet items such as goodwill; holdings in other banks; internal ratings-based 
provisions shortfalls and deferred tax assets. Accordingly, on fully loaded basis, nine out of 
15 Italian banks would have failed to overcome the 5.5% hurdle imposed by the exercise. This 
is unquestionably important; especially for the investors, as the banking regulation is moving 
towards fully phased requirements in 2019, with all the capital adjustments that it may imply 
(see Barucci, Corsaro, 2014). In addition to all said so far, Acharya et al. (2016) criticize the 
excessive emphasis on regulatory capital ratios. Namely, this concentration on capital ratios 
can be misleading due to problems with both the denominator, (i.e. RWAs) and the numerator 
(i.e. the regulatory capital) of the ratio. Concerning the former, the main issue lays in the fact 
that the risk weighted assets are based on banks’ own internal models, which are rather 
blurred from the external market point of view, besides reflecting different national 
supervisory positions that may consistently vary within the EU. Further, the regulatory capital 
under Basel II envisaged the possibility for different supervisors to apply divergent criteria of 
what would qualify as Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital, and this absence of consistency has not been 
fully removed by Basel III’s attempt to emphasize CET 1. Because of these shortcomings, 
Archarya et al. (2012) tried to compare the results deriving from regulatory stress tests with 
the outcomes of an alternative measure of systemic risk based on publicly available 
information. The model, namely, is the so-called SRISK, which practically measures the 
amount of capital that a firm would need to raise in the event of a crisis. This amount is 
calculated as the expected shortfall of the market value of capital relative to the regulatory 
minimum level of capital conditional on the entire economy being subject to a crisis. 
Archarya and Steffin (2015) carried out an empirical application of the model using, as a 
                                                             
28 See Appendix I for more details. 
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sample, the financial data of 39 publicly listed banks out of the pool of 130 banks that were 
included in the 2014 EU Comprehensive Assessment. For simplicity’s sake, they define a 
crisis as a 40% fall in the stock market index. Based on this measure, they come to conflicting 
conclusions from those of the EU. Notably, they find a total shortfall under their stress 
scenario that is more than 20 times that of the capital shortfall calculated by the European 
authorities. The largest SRISK losses are in Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Belgium. In 
contrast, the included banks in the first three of these countries realized no shortfall 
whatsoever in the EU tests. Finally, there is a striking negative correlation between a bank’s 
SRISK measure and its expected shortfall in the EU test. These strong findings have raised 
criticisms not only on the EU’s Comprehensive Assessment program, but also implicitly on 
all the methods of regulatory stress tests. Once again, the argument of their position is easily 
understandable: from a macroprudential point of view, it is not always true that more details 
can generate more reliable estimates. The SRISK model relies in fact on the sole historical 
covariance between the market value of a bank’s equity and the value of the overall stock 
market. Naturally, this may be regarded as an extreme reduced-form model, which finds in the 
simplicity and resource savings its greatest advantage. Nonetheless, all that glitters is not 
gold. Until now, regulators have not decided to incorporate any reduced-form, market-based 
assessments in the supervisory procedures. Constâncio (2016) explains the underlying reasons 
behind this reluctance. First and foremost, by relying on the sole stock market index, these 
measures are parted away from any reflection of the broader macroeconomic framework. 
Second, the market-based systemic measures like SRISK are extremely sensitive to the choice 
of parameters: different parameter values can translate into extensively variegated estimates 
of the amount of capital required to withstand a shock. In addition, computed losses are 
highly volatile over time and are, by their nature, procyclical (Bologna, Segura, 2016). 
Accordingly, the shock severity should increase during economic expansions and shrink 
during recessions, so as to counterbalance the amplifying effects of the surrounding economic 
environment. 
As such, for instance, in 2009 when SCAP was employed to clarify the underlying valuations 
based on projected expected earnings under stressed conditions, utilizing a simple reduced-
form and market-based model instead of the actual regulatory stress test would have certainly 
frustrated the overall confidence of the market. 
In the first three stress tests of the European banking sector, the national supervisors retained 
the responsibility for performing the tests on individual banks and for any regulatory actions 
that was required as a result of the tests. At the very beginning, the role of the European 
Central Bank was to provide guidance on the setting of macro scenarios. This arrangement 
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changed radically with the introduction of the SSM, which basically has the task to support 
the ECB. Regarding this, Constâcio (2016) describes how the division of efforts of the ECB 
and the SSM are being coordinated and integrated. In particular, the SSM is responsible for 
the implementation of the stress tests for microprudential purposes, including accurate review 
of exposures and consequences of bank solvency ratios. Conversely, the accountability of the 
ECB is not limited to providing the framework for the development of consistent macro 
scenarios. In fact, it also has responsibility for determining the implications of the stress tests 
for macroeconomic policy, for example, examining stress test results for possible contagion 
effects using system-wide models.  
Generally speaking, the major regulatory focus on stress testing has helped to enhance banks’ 
own stress-testing capabilities and risk management procedures, developing sophisticated 
bank-wide stress test models. This is pivotal, especially for systemically important banks. 
Since the global recession has started to abate, the focus of regulators has shifted from 
immediate capital requirements to an ongoing assessment of the adequacy of financial 
entities’ resources, which, needless to say, is important from both a micro and 
macroprudential policy point of view.  
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3.5 Micro and Macroprudential Issues in Stress Testing 
The brief overview of the stress testing history in the US and EU highlights two fundamental 
issues: the transparency of the stress tests and the need for a credible backstop to handle 
capital shortfalls pinpointed by the results of the tests. Much of the media’s attention has 
focused on the transparency of such exercises, or, in some cases on the lack thereof. 
Nevertheless, this may be misleading, especially during the unfolding of financial crises, 
where the accomplishment of a stress test may not guarantee any restoration of financial 
stability. This is well-illustrated by Anderson (2016). Namely, he considers case of Cyprus. 
Namely, in 2011 because of a fear of contagion from the Greek fiscal crisis, confidence in the 
Cypriot banking system started to decline drastically, and as part of the negotiations with the 
EU and IMF, it was explicitly agreed that stress tests would be executed. The tests were 
finally performed in mid-2012, employing a famous fund management company. The 
outcomes reported a €5.8 billion loss, €4.5 billion of which derived from the application of a 
79% haircut of bank holding to the Greek government bonds held by the Cypriot banks at that 
time. The Greek bond write-down represented nearly 25% of the national GDP (Demetriades, 
2012). In other terms, it was crystal clear that there was no way to recapitalize the Cypriot 
banks, neither through international markets, nor with the public funds of the Cypriot 
government, which was already running a consistent primary deficit. Eventually, a bailout 
package of €5.8 billion was agreed with the supervisory authorities, in the guise of bail-in of 
Cypriot bank creditors, comprehending some insured depositors. Therefore, transparency is 
not enough. Regardless of the level of details given, the methodology disclosure or the 
individual results, a stress test has to express straightforwardly how banks would recapitalize 
if significant losses were found. Concerning European stress tests, in particular, this issue has 
laid at the heart of its weak credibility. It is no coincidence that the AQR of 2014 took place 
after the financial conditions had improved relative to the extent of the sovereign debt crisis. 
And the EU had taken measures to be able to manage large-scale solvency questions should 
they materialize in the future, notably through the European Recovery and Resolution 
Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Whether this will be sufficient to 
assure the credibility of future European stress tests is still uncertain. The dilemma may only 
have an answer once the SRM itself is tested with a large bank insolvency which it 
satisfactorily resolves. Moreover, another relevant theme is whether stress testing by public 
authorities is a tool of microprudential or macroprudential regulation. From our discussion, 
since the very beginning of supervisory stress testing, it is easily understood that these 
exercises serve both microprudential and macroprudential policy purposes. Furthermore, as 
stated earlier, these two functions complete each other, in the sense that carrying out both type 
77 
 
of tests may serve to double-check the results, so as to determine more reliable and precise 
values. Nonetheless, one should always bear in mind that the scopes are not identical, and the 
design of stress testing frameworks ought to be adapted to the specific roles that policymakers 
intend for the instrument. Banking supervision is the primary tool envisaged to implement 
microprudential regulation. This may involve the examination of a bank’s financial situation 
based on recent performance, with a particular focus on capital and other regulatory ratios. 
Supervision will also include a review of the bank’s internal processes, systems and models, 
including its use of stress testing. Historically, and in many cases still today, the outcomes of 
a bank’s supervisory revision are not made public. But the establishment of CCAR in the 
United States and the AQR in the EU has changed this supervisory process. For large banks 
under direct supervision of either of these authorities, the financial condition is examined on a 
forward-looking basis under stress scenarios set by the competent supervisor, their projected 
capital position under stress scenarios is compared to a capital standard set in the test, and any 
deficiency requires recovery actions under a plan approved by the regulator itself. Further, in 
some particular cases, stress test results of individual banks are revealed in details. This stress 
testing for microprudential purposes typically examines in detail different portions of a bank’s 
banking and trading books, which are valued under adverse conditions using techniques that 
are specific to those exposures. Conversely, in macroprudential regulation, the focus lays in 
the health of the financial system as a whole and the capacity of the banking system to support 
investment and economic activity generally on a continuous basis. Of course, this may be 
useful as an input in monetary and fiscal policies. Moreover, regulators may consider 
implementing specific macroprudential tools as well. A useful approach that has been use in a 
number of countries is to impose a cap on the loan-to-value LTV ratio on mortgage loans. 
Alternatively, in 2013 the Swiss authorities proposed a temporary increase in the regulatory 
capital charge applied to Swiss residential mortgage loans, so as not to directly evaluate the 
collateral for mortgage loans (Danthine, 2014). This may be regarded as an example of an 
instrument that is applied to consider a counter-cyclical element into capital regulation. In 
effect, this measure was generalized in Basel III, which requires a counter-cyclical capital 
buffer of between 0% and 2.5% of risk-weighted assets to be phased between 2016 and 2019. 
The activation of the buffer relates to the national authorities’ responsibility, who should 
assess the business conditions. Notwithstanding, the Basel Committee privileges the credit-to-
GDP ratios. Given the extreme versatility and flexibility, stress tests could be used in setting 
macroprudential regulation in many different ways. Adapting stress tests to macroprudential 
needs may require hypothetical specifications concerning scenarios settlement, models used to 
calculate stressed values and results-driven policy implications. Diverse scenarios can be 
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selected to explore system-wide vulnerabilities that can be either structural or cyclical. An 
example of structural risk factor may be the strong dependence of an economy and the related 
banking system upon the import of a single commodity, such as gold. Therefore, to capture a 
structural vulnerability, a stress test could consider a commodity price decline, with an even 
larger hypothesized downfall for those countries that show significantly more reliance on the 
importation of that specific commodity. On the contrary, cyclical risk factors might typically 
reflect a credit build-up based on a boom in collateral values, such as housing prices. As a 
result, this could be captured in the amplitude of a hypothetical deterioration of housing prices 
in the adverse scenario context. Policymakers may be interested to understand what the banks 
themselves believe may be their most important fragilities. For instance, as pointed out by 
Edge and Lehnert (2016), the CCAR recommends firms to evaluate their capital developments 
against their own stress scenario, as well as those specified by the regulators. By doing so, 
banks and supervisors may glean precious information, directly or indirectly relevant for the 
financial system as a whole. 
 
3.6 Limitations and Areas of Improvement  
One of the main limitations of stress tests is that the robustness of the results depend heavily 
on the data; assumptions and methodologies used. Therefore, in extreme cases, different stress 
tests may lead to incomparable results and even similar exercises may have a high degree of 
uncertainty. For this reason, so far, stress tests have been employed as just one of several 
inputs into the policymaking process when assessing the right level of bank capital. 
Dent et al., (2016) summarize the main points where regulators and policymakers may 
concentrate their focus, so as to further enhance stress testing’s usefulness for micro and 
macroprudential policy (Figure 3.5). 
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Figure 3.5. Areas of Regulatory Improvement. (Source: Dent et al., 2016) 
 
Improving the ability of stress tests to assess the resilience of individual banks. When 
microprudential regulators evaluate the impact of severe, yet plausible scenarios, they have 
the chance to gain awareness about the resilience of the regulated entities. At the present, the 
concurrent stress test frameworks run by many authorities are neglecting other important 
metrics, which may guarantee additional insight about the resilience of the individual banks. 
A major problem that concerns basically all stress test models is the fact that they can do little 
against financial bubbles and market anomalies in general, which are exceedingly tough to 
detect. A possible solution could be traced in the approach of the Bank of England (Brazier, 
2016). In particular, the new method by the English authorities envisages the use of 
“exploratory” scenarios, on the one hand and more traditional stressing scenarios on the other. 
This derives from the fact that, since UK banking system has emerged from the crisis, the 
brand new task of the UK stress testers has become to probe the economy, so as to discover 
points of fragility that could threaten financial stability in the future. In this sense, the UK 
approach could be also used to explore effects deriving from relevant market corrections. 
Nonetheless, given the resource costs that this approach would imply, its actual 
implementation has been quite restricted. The regulatory supervisors shall carefully evaluate 
whether the pros may be superior to the drawbacks that adopting such model would signify. 
Alternatively, Gallardo et al. (2015) back the approach developed by the US CCAR program, 
which requires testing not only under the scenario imposed by the supervisor but also against 
the banks’ own scenarios. This may have consistent advantages. In first instance, it may allow 
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the supervisory entity to learn about the capacity of an individual bank to test its own 
potential vulnerabilities in an independent way using its own risk management toolkit. This 
could help to rebalance a potentially harmful tendency towards risk “mono-culture”, which 
could establish if banks simply consider their stress testing as a mere compliance exercise 
wherein they need to prove that they meet a predefine number of routine health checks. 
Additionally, by analyzing the individual outcomes, the supervisors may learn something 
about the assortment of potential hazards incurred by the financial sector in its entirety. As 
such, they could adjust their own models and processes in order to have a more 
comprehensive approach to macroprudential policymaking.  
In addition to all explained so far, improving the ability to assess resilience of single entities 
may also regard all the insolvency procedures that insolvent banks may be required to comply 
with. Goodhart (2016) conceives stress tests as a fundamental supervisory tool outside of a 
crisis. Namely, he identifies in stress tests as an indispensable connector in the banking 
recovery and resolution framework. Warrick et al. (2016), clarify the role that the stress test 
should have in this context. Accordingly, it should assess the amount of capital and banking 
liquidity necessary to survive under stressed conditions. Conversely, the recovery planning 
needs to ensure that the institution holds appropriate level of contingencies to resist 
significant shocks while remaining a going concern entity. And lastly, the resolution plan 
should function as a roadmap, that allows the orderly resolution of a failed institution while 
generating enough liquidity and capital to preserve its critical functions and operations and, at 
the same time, avoiding any systemic impact. The two crucial issues in resolution have been 
the designation of authorities specifically charged with the resolution decision and the 
introduction of bail-in that is intended to accelerate resolution procedures and thereby avoid 
contagion, as well as shelter against bailouts by taxpayers. Nonetheless, the main unresolved 
topic in this architecture is still how to induce recovery in advance of the point of insolvency, 
when the going-concern value of the bank is worth preserving. Experience has shown that 
bank managers are reluctant to undertake recovery, because of their aversion to share dilution 
and a fear for their jobs if their actions were to admit the failure of previously chosen 
strategies. Supervisors, though, may be aware that the bankers are perhaps postponing 
recovery actions too long, but they have lacked concrete instruments to force responsible 
authorities to operate promptly. In fact, what they really need is a practical tool that would 
allow them to intervene. And Stress testing potentially can be the tool that provides a formal 
trigger for the resolution process. 
 
  
81 
 
3.7 Conclusions: The Future of Stress Testing 
Over the last two decades, stress tests have turned from being an isolated risk management 
instrument, mainly used by banks to determine the resilience of their trading portfolios, to 
become an indispensable part of the regulatory toolkit at worldwide level. Nonetheless, 
today’s stress tests are not flawless, since there are indeed various areas where further 
improvements could increase the overall usefulness for policymakers.  
Regulatory stress tests have focused primarily on banks’ capital positions, that is, whether 
financial institutions possess sufficient capital requirements compared to the set out specified 
by the supervisory framework. As a consequence, stress tests are not a substitute for a robust 
capital framework but a complement to it. Similarly, stress tests cannot stress testing exercises 
cannot replace any supervisory assessment that ensures banks have adequate and operating 
risk management governance processes.  
Two strongly-related metrics that may enhance stress tests frameworks are liquidity and 
funding resilience. The former deals with the bank’s capacity to meet its short-term 
obligations as they come to due and properly answer to sudden, unexpected increase in 
withdrawals by its depositors and other clients. In other words, it measures the ability to 
quickly satisfy such withdrawals. Funding resilience, in turn, assesses the sustainability of a 
bank’s funding profile. Especially during stressed times, a bank’s ability to roll over and raise 
capital funds may become excessively problematic such that it is unable to obtain sufficient 
funding, or can only accomplish so at a much onerous cost. Trying to include both funding 
and liquidity resilience in a more comprehensive way within concurrent stress-testing 
frameworks would give a more complete picture of banks’ resilience to the stress scenario. 
Although some authorities already operate liquidity and funding stress tests, they are 
generally less advanced (BCBS, 2013). Additionally, although they do perform liquidity, 
funding and solvency tests, these tend to operate independently. Of course, this does not work 
in practice. Let us consider for instance, a bank that is facing liquidity troubles and has not 
enough liquefiable assets or is not able to raise capital funds. This may oblige the institution 
to sell long-term assets at discounted prices to attain liquidity. As an extreme consequence, 
the accumulated losses could lead to the insolvency or even the bankruptcy of the bank.  
A radical solution is represented by the Stress Test Buffer (STB) proposed by Bologna and 
Segura (2016). The SBC is nothing else but an additional, bank-specific capital requirement, 
which shall be complement to the capital requirements envisaged in Pillar 1. Needless to say, 
this further imposition would have the ultimate scope to increase the individual bank’s ability 
to withstand, as a going concern entity, a severe macroeconomic scenario. Precisely, to 
compute the amount of STB, Bologna and Segura divide capital requirements of Basel III into 
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two classes, depending on whether the buffers can be eroded to absorb the eventual losses 
resulting from the exercise (usable buffer) or not (non-usable buffer). For instance, 
Countercyclical capital buffer may be regarded as an example of usable capital, which as 
such, may increase the banks’ loss-absorbing capabilities during adverse shocks. Conversely, 
the G-SII buffer and O-SII buffer, introduced to augment the resilience of institutions whose 
failure would be harmful for the entire financial system, should be deemed as non-usable 
buffers. Then, the stress test hurdle is defined as the sum of the hard minimum capital 
requirement and the bank-specific non-usable buffers. Ultimately, for each bank the losses 
deriving from the supervisory stress test (ST losses) are compared to its usable capital buffers. 
Naturally, in case the latter are higher than the former, the bank has adequate loss-absorbing 
ability to survive the adverse economic scenario and the consequent STB is set directly to 
zero. Otherwise, the STB is equal to the difference between the two, so that by construction 
the sum of the usable buffers and the STB is sufficient to absorb the ST losses should the 
adverse scenario materialize. Specifically: 
𝑆𝑇𝐵 = max {
𝑆𝑇 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
− (𝐶𝐶𝑜𝐵 + 𝐶𝐶𝑦𝐵), 0} 
Where CCoB stands for the Capital Conservation Buffer and CCyB represents the 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Defining the Stress Test Buffer (STB): a stylized example. (Bologna, Segura, 2016) 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates the operating mechanism of the STB capital requirements. In particular, 
bank A in the figure, shows after-test losses, which are inferior to the CCyB and CCoB capital 
amounts. For this reason, the resulting STB additional requirements is zero. A different story 
concerns Bank B. In this specific case, the computed losses are higher than the sum of CCyB 
and CCoB. As a consequence, the STB buffer would require a further capital increment, 
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corresponding to the amount calculated using the previous formula. Of course, if the bank 
happen to hold extra voluntary capital, this would be considered for STB purposes, therefore, 
not implying any additional provision. 
Currently, authorities are also likely to explore risks emanating from a wider range of 
resources. At the moment, regulatory stress test incorporate an individual or dual scenario 
approach. But since any single scenario is very unlikely to materialize, it may turn out to be 
convenient to increase the flexibility of stress test, by creating a greater number of scenarios 
that can be explored any year. A multiple scenario approach has the inestimable advantage of 
exploring new and emerging threats to financial stability, as well as testing the banking 
resilience against an ordinary set of risks. This more flexible approach could significantly 
increase the resource burden that stress tests may pose on both participating banks and 
supervisory authorities. Consequently, supervisors are striving towards more automated and 
systemic exercises, to make the accomplishment of multiple scenario approaches more 
feasible. On the contrary, this, as a drawback, might allow banks to predict more easily, which 
would eventually induce them not to dedicate the necessary effort and attention, besides 
discouraging the individual research in this field. But as Dent et al. (2016) noted, qualitative 
reviews of bank risk management practices, conducted by regulators in conjunction with their 
stress test exercises could indeed help to mitigate the potential downside deriving from 
enhanced automation.  
Another interesting point is integrating amplification and feedback mechanisms and 
incorporating behavioral responses into stress tests. This concerns the core design of stress 
tests. In an earlier paragraph, it was stated that feedback and amplification channels have 
proved to be essential in driving contagion effects and exacerbating the impact of a starting 
shock Constâncio (2016). For instance, during the global crisis, significant losses eroded 
banks’ loss-absorbing capital resources and shed some darkness on their ability to keep on 
meeting their regulatory capital requirements. As a result, market uncertainty over the 
solvency of many banks led to strains in bank funding markets, hitting banks’ capacity to 
raise funds. In such circumstances, the behavioral responses that banks themselves may 
implement turns out to be another crucial feedback channel. If, for example all banks respond 
to market funding constraints by looking to substitute wholesale funding for retail deposits, 
increased competition in retail deposit markets may likely drive up interest rates. This, then, is 
likely to have a negative impact on bank profitability. Understanding such feedback and 
amplification channels, and the role they play in driving contagion losses and contributing to 
systemic risk is a key issue for policymakers. This should be a key duty to be fulfilled on a 
continuous basis, since they possess a comparative advantage over individual institutions in 
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this specific area because of their ability to access projections across stress-test participants. 
As such, they are enabled to grasp the broader market conditions that might prevail during the 
stress, and evaluate the feasibility of individual banks’ proposed adjustments in light of this. 
Many different authorities have already made efforts to comprise behavioral answers into 
their stress-testing regimes, mainly through the usage of dynamic balance sheets and 
consideration of management actions. Still, an ample room of improvement related to the 
consistency of such actions is foreseeable. And the analysis of other feedback and 
amplification channels is also at a very early phase. 
The most challenging development that stress tests are required to carry out is represented by 
extending the scope of stress tests beyond the core banking sector. As the Financial Crisis 
pointed out, interconnections between different players of the financial system can represent a 
means through which stress effects originating in a particular market segment are propagated 
across the larger financial system, amplifying the effects of the initial shock. Investigating 
interconnections between banks and the wider financial and economic system implies the 
analysis of both direct links, such as financial transactions, and indirect links, like for 
instance, behavioral analysis of different financial institutions, that may have the conductivity 
to transmit and magnify shocks. Previously, we described how financial and behavioral 
spillovers could be transmitted at a system-wide level. Let us recall it briefly. Financial 
transactions can create direct links between both banks and non-bank institutions. For 
instance, repurchases agreements may be considered as an example of such transactions, and 
in times of stress, the haircuts demanded by the buyers has the tendency to rise, which, in turn 
may provoke further damages to the funding difficulties faced by other financial institutions. 
Even in the absence of direct links, the behavior of different institutions in a stress situation 
could propagate shocks to the entire financial and economic system. Deb et al. (2011) review 
the effects that assets price decrease had on the market during the Financial Crisis. Many 
assets were notched down and this forced various asset managers to sell. This caused sharp 
reduction in market prices and significant losses for other institutions holding these same 
assets. 
Despite the fact that macroprudential authorities are already performing analysis of possible 
interconnections between different players and entities of the financial system, no supervisor 
has yet undertaken a comprehensive system-level stress test. Such a global exercise would 
require the inclusion of other financial institutions, including central counterparties, hedge 
funds, insurers and money market funds, just to cite some. Thus, the correct form of a system-
wide stress test might well differ from bank stress tests. Nonetheless, it could contribute to an 
improved understanding of how shocks can be transmitted through the entire financial system, 
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giving rise to systemic risk, which might be reflected in banks’ losses as well. Extending the 
thresholds of stress testing beyond the core banking level could also prevent institutions from 
moving activities outside the core banking sector into the so-called “shadow banking sector”. 
Additionally it may help policymakers to ensure that financial institutions and other regulated 
entities are resilient to contagion risk originating from unregulated financial entities. To this 
scope, the Financial Stability Board recently has urged supervisory authorities to take into 
account a system-wide stress testing. And in such systemic context, stress testing is likely to 
retain and consolidate its primary role in banking regulation and supervision, should the 
participants in the process fully understand both how stress testing can contribute to 
promoting financial stability and what it takes, in terms of costs, to achieve those benefits.  
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4. Stress Test Results and Effects on Banks’ Performance:  
An Empirical Analysis of the European Market 
 
The disclosure of stress test results has always been a fascinating topic for scholars and 
financial experts. In fact, many of them successfully attempted to trace a potential relationship 
between abnormal returns and the release of the stress test outcomes. Although a multitude of 
different models and techniques have been employed to accomplish so, it seems quite clear 
that financial markets are not indifferent to the actual disclosure of stress test results. This 
unquiet reaction, in turn, can be interpreted in various ways. However, the most plausible one 
relates disclosure effects and lack of information. And as a consequence, strong adverse 
reactions may signify an inadequate level of information provided to the market, which, 
needless to say, must be addressed by the international regulatory authorities.  
 
4.1 Information Disclosure: Efficient Market and Bank Opacity  
4.1.1 Market efficiency: Price as reflection of fundamental value 
The scope herein is to assess whether the information provided has already reached a 
sufficient level of details or, conversely, if more insights are needed. As the market is (semi) 
strong efficient, this imply that prices reflect all the publicly-available information. Notably, 
Fama (1970) defines “efficient market” as the market wherein security prices reflect all the 
available information. Additionally, he argues three sufficient conditions for an efficient 
market: i) no transaction costs ii) all information is costlessly available and iii) all participants 
agree on the implications of current information. Nonetheless, he underlines how these 
conditions do not need to be met as long as there is a sufficient amount of investors who takes 
transaction costs into account and also have access to accurate information. 
Under this hypothesis, stock markets should react spontaneously and immediately to any new 
relevant information. A direct consequence of this assumption is that past prices have 
limitative predictive power for future prices once the current prices have been employed as 
explanatory variables: to put it in another way, changes in future prices should hinge only on 
disclosure of new information that was unexpected today, i.e. surprise information. Moreover, 
another relevant consequence of this hypothesis is that arbitrage opportunities are necessarily 
wiped out instantaneously. However, from an empirical point of view, many attempts failed to 
confirm the random-walk hypothesis of stock returns even with heteroscedasticity-robust 
models. In effect, different studies have found empirical regularities that are contrasting with 
the efficient market hypothesis. For instance, the monthly, weekly and daily returns on stocks 
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tend to show discernable patterns, such as seasonal effects, month of the year effect, day of 
the week or hourly affect and so on. The presence of patterns and seasonal trends can be 
interpreted in two opposite ways. On the one hand, predictable patterns and tendencies can be 
deemed as the outcomes of stock traders’ ability to forecast the direction of movements of 
individual stock prices over the medium and long-run. Nonetheless, the possibility to predict 
pattern in the medium term would indirectly signify that prices tend to adjust to new 
information only slowly, that is, security prices do not reflect fundamental values in the short 
term and consequently, stock markets are not efficient. But there is another possible 
explanation too, which basically is the reverse of the previous one. Accordingly, markets are 
indeed informationally efficient and adjust quickly and in full to any new piece of 
information, however the information arrives in a systematic pattern, hence the observed 
systematic pattern in stock returns. Obviously, the relative relevance varies in accordance 
with the kinds of information, since not all news items are equally important in the eyes of 
investors.  Additionally, some news may be already expected by the market therefore not 
making any impact on the market returns in case of efficient markets.  To be specific, the 
effect of news depends upon change in market valuation times and the probability of 
announcement:  
News Effect = ΔMV x (1-ProbAnnouncement)                               (4.1) 
To the extent the announcement is already anticipated the probability of surprise tends to zero 
and hence the consequence of news on the market tends to zero. This creates an attenuation 
bias in the test of market efficiency. For the purpose of this project, the market is assumed to 
be efficient and market participants, i.e. investors and stakeholders in general, to be fully 
informed and capable of pushing and maintaining security prices around their fundamental 
values. Though, generally speaking, the larger the firms, the harder it becomes for investors 
and analysts to assess a reasonable estimation about their fundamental values. In effect, 
organizational infrastructures, human resources, commercial products, just to cite a few, may 
considerably increase the level of complexity, posing as such many challenges for all external 
stakeholders. Banks are no exception. The risk exposure of banks is notoriously hard to judge 
for the public. And as for publicly traded companies, financial institutions are required to 
disclose significant amount of information, in particular concerning their investment behavior.   
 
4.1.2 Bank Opacity  
Bank opacity has been a huge topic among scholars and practitioners. The basic idea of a 
bank is that most of its investments are risky and the lion’s part of their liabilities is associated 
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with depositors (Bodie et al., 2011). The information asymmetry theory suggests that, in a 
transaction, one part may have better or more information than the other. Unfortunately, all 
firms suffer, to some extent of information asymmetry and most of the times they just rely on 
market mechanism to resolve this problem (Flannery et al., 2002). Greenspan (1996) 
highlights how this could be the main ground for opacity. Specifically, he notes that bank 
loans are customized products, which derive from privately negotiated agreements and as 
such, they may lack of transparency as far as outside investors are concerned. Thus, risk level 
of loans are rather hard to quantify and just for this reason, it could be a source of opacity. 
Peristian et al. (2010) two contrasting hypotheses can be traced with regards to bank opacity. 
On the one hand, there is the assertion that banks are completely opaque, like black boxes. 
Should be this the case, we would expect markets to react promptly to any relevant 
information disclosure. At the opposite extreme stands the hypothesis according to which 
banks are fully transparent to the market. In this case, we would expect market to react only to 
unexpected, surprising revelations. The core rationale for the banking regulation lays on the 
assumption that banks are intrinsically opaque, which implies that the market is unable to 
consistently assess the fundamental value of banks. Generally speaking, opacity prevents 
outside stakeholders from being able to distinguish between sound and unhealthy entities. On 
the contrary, as concerns transparent banks, the market seems to be able to punctually 
determine their true values (Haggard, Howe, 2007).  
 
4.1.3 Disclosure of stress tests: Between Opacity and Market Efficiency 
In particular, the Financial Crisis has clearly highlighted the scarcity of public information 
about the risk exposure of individual banks. As a consequence, regulators around the globe 
responded with a series of measures, among which the publication of bank stress test results. 
Disclosure of stress test results has become fundamental after the recent financial crisis. This 
information seems to be valuable as it has constantly provided new insights on an individual 
and system-wide level (Morgan et al., 2014 and Georgescu, 2016). Bernanke, former FED 
Chairman, even called the 2009 U.S. Stress Test one of the critical turning points in the 
Financial Crisis (Bernanke, 2013). Effectively, a huge part of the damages caused by the crisis 
can be attributed to bank opacity. Banks were blamed of having taken too much risk, which 
was not adequately disclosed so that such risks could not be correctly reflected into market 
prices. To this purpose, disclosing stress test results may inform outsiders, and specifically 
investors, about the overall soundness of banks and whether they hold sufficient proprietary 
capital to absorb the impacts of negative shocks, thereby improving the market discipline. 
This, in turn, could prevent managers from engaging in excessive risk taking transactions that 
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may endanger the stability of the bank, as it happened in the recent Financial Crisis. Greater 
transparency could have allowed supervisory regulators to better monitor the banks and 
allowed them to intervene promptly enough to take corrective measures for troublesome or 
insolvent banks. Unfortunately, this was not implemented until the crisis had already unfold 
its wings and the financial crisis collapsed. By disclosing stress test information, part of the 
investors’ confidence in the banking sector would be restored, which could ultimately 
positively impact on the real economy. The benefits of disclosing stress test results are quite 
evident, as they may provide unique insights to bank supervisors and market participants 
about the current market discipline and resilience conditions. However, information 
disclosure and the consequent transparency enhancement present indeed some relevant 
drawbacks. As Peristan et al. (2009) pointed out, banks operate in second-best environments, 
that is, environments that are subject to market and informational frictions and influenced by 
externalities, which most of the times are extremely hard to cope with. These environments 
are characterized by endogenous costs that regulators need to take into account in assessing 
the design of stress tests and how to manage the disclosure of the outcomes. This means that 
more disclosure cannot fully guarantee an increase in market discipline and market efficiency. 
Additionally, Jungherr (2016) argued that disclosure of results may in reality create more 
panic, thus lowering the confidence in the banking sector and affecting harmfully the real 
economy as well. A further negative aspect is that most of the times an increase in 
information requirements may affect individual banks negatively from a strategical point of 
view: banks and all firms in general are reluctant to provide detailed proprietary information 
to the public, as this may favor their direct competitors. Therefore, there is an evident trade-
off between bank opacity, on the one hand, which is costly for the entire society because it 
diminishes market discipline and encourages banks to take on too much risk and, in some 
cases, fraudulent behaviors as well. On the other, augmenting the information disclosure 
could provoke serious economic damages and notably, in terms of competitive advantages: 
direct rivals could well benefit from detailed information about, for instance, specific asset or 
equity investments. Jiang et al. (2014) found a positive empirical relationship between 
banking competition and transparency for the US. Accordingly, the removal of regulatory 
constraints to bank competition by individual American states has consistently improved the 
informational content of banks’ financial statements.  
The banking sector remains one of the most controlled and regulated due to its systemic 
relevance, as we saw previously, when dealing with spillover and propagation effects. For this 
reason, regulatory authorities have always tried to regulate this sector as much as they can, 
especially through balance sheets discipline requirements, since the latter may be regarded as 
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the pivotal means to reach transparency. But as we pointed out, the level of information needs 
to take into account the cost-benefit tradeoff deriving from the disclosure of more additional 
information. Of course, we indeed think that details concerning stress test results, and 
specifically, capital shortages and insolvency issues, are publically relevant, regardless of the 
costs that individual banks may be obliged to face. The ultimate aim of this work is to figure 
out whether financial institutions are providing enough critical information to the market, that 
is, to what extent we are removing banks’ opaqueness veil and boosting the overall market 
efficiency. 
 
4.2 Related literature 
The related literature on stress test disclosures and their implications is not as developed as 
other branches of banking topics but surely, it is catching more and more attention among 
practitioners and scholars, in particular, with regards to US stress testing framework. For 
instance, Jordan et al. (2000) analyze the impact on US bank stock returns to announcements 
of formal supervisory actions. The banks included in the sample were those that supervisors 
believed urged of remedial actions in order to avoid bankruptcy. They proved that the release 
of supervisory information provided significant new information to financial markets, with 
stock prices shrinking of about 5 percent around the announcements, underlining once again 
the opaqueness that may characterize the banking sector. Peristan et al. (2010) conduct an 
analysis of the informational value of stress test results concerning the 2009 stress test 
performed by the FED. Their findings showed that the stress exercise had indeed an 
informational impact on the market. Despite the fact that the market anticipated on its own 
which banks would have capital shortages before the actual stress outcomes were disclosed, 
banks with wider (compared to market expectations) capital gaps experienced higher negative 
abnormal returns. Flannery et al. (2016) find out concrete evidence that the Federal reserve 
stress tests produce indeed new information about stressed banks and the overall health of the 
banking industry. Notably, they discover that stress disclosures are related with higher 
absolute abnormal return, and higher abnormal trading volumes as well. In addition, they also 
prove that higher levered holding firms are likely to be more affected by stress information. 
One of the earliest papers is from Morris and Shin (2002). They showed that information 
disclosure must be sufficiently high; otherwise, market participants may overreact, which in 
turn may lead to coordination failures. In a similar fashion, Gick and Pausch (2012) present a 
game-theoretical framework that macro stress tests can be welfare-improving if the 
methodological framework and actual outcomes are effectively communicated to the market. 
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Nonetheless, they also find out that results disclosure cannot necessarily achieve the 
microprudential role of providing market discipline for individual banks. Petrella and Resti 
(2013) also use event study methods to analyze the 2011 EU-wide stress test. They find that 
stress tests produce relevant information for market participants, helping to mitigate bank 
opaqueness. Alvés et al. (2013) outlines a relevant impact of disclosure of the 2010 and 2011 
European stress test results on stock prices. In particular, the stocks of banks that clearly pass 
the exercise showed higher cumulative abnormal returns than other financial securities. 
Comparing American and European stress tests, Schuerman (2013) and similarly and 
Candelon and Amadou (2015) provide valuable insights on governance aspects, which 
according to them are fundamental to ensure the effectiveness of stress tests. Such are 
institutional framework; the scope and methodology; the scenario design; the granularity of 
disclosed information as well as the subsequent actions by the competent authorities. Their 
conclusions suggest that a reliable institutional, a credible backstop and an efficient 
communication campaign to the market participants are the indispensable features for an 
effective stress test, rather than the technical specifications of the stress test itself. The 
existing empirical evidence on stress tests suggests that the compulsory disclosure of stress 
test results are generally associated with the revelation of new information to the market. 
Another branch has studied the impact of disclosure on the credit market and especially on the 
CDS. In this field Hull et al. (2004) analyze potential post-announcement effects in the CDS 
market and conclude that the CDS market can be regarded as informationally efficient since 
no prost-announcement impact was identified. A similar analysis is also performed by Norden 
and Weber (2004) who come to pretty identical conclusions. Breckenfelder and Schwaab 
(2015) deal with the reaction of equity and CDS markets to the publication of 2014 stress test 
results, so as to determine the amount of the cross-border spillovers from changes in banks 
CDS and equity prices in stressed countries to the sovereign CDS in non-stressed countries. 
Alvés et al. (2015) detect a positive effect of disclosure of stress test results in both the CDS 
and stock markets. More recently, a similar review was carried out by Georgescu et al. Their 
analysis takes into account both the 2014 and 2016 stress tests carried out by the EBA and 
conclude that both exercises were significantly informative to the market. They also prove 
that the market price impact may differ across the banks when banks’ returns are measured 
according to how well they performed in the stress tests. So far, the empirical literature seems 
to be confirming the hypothesis that stress tests do provide new valuable information. This 
implies that the information disclosure requirements have not reached the market-efficient 
level yet: further and persistent regulatory interventions are therefore expected. 
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4.3 2016 EU Stress Test 
"The objective of the stress test is to provide supervisors, banks and other market participants with a common 
analytical framework to consistently compare and assess the resilience of large EU banks to adverse economic 
developments. Along with the results, the EBA is providing again substantial transparency of EU banks' balance 
sheets, with over 16,000 data points per bank, an essential step enhancing market discipline in the EU." 29 
 
(see EBA, "EBA publishes 2016 EU-wide stress test results", 29 July 2016) 
 
 
The results of the 2016 EU-wide stress test were released on 29th July 2016. In particular, the 
main objective of the exercise was to significantly assess the resilience of the European 
banking system and largest EU banks to hypothetical adverse economic scenarios. Unlike the 
2014 stress test, the 2016 stress test did not envisage a “pass-fail” CET 1 ratio threshold and 
as a consequence, the results did not automatically originate any mandatory capital increase. 
Nonetheless, individual banks’ performances were indeed crucial inputs for the supervisory 
review process. Namely, the European Banking Authority announced during the performing 
phase of the stress test that the outcomes would have been part of the supervisory guidance. 
Additionally, the ECB specified that the SSM significant institutions taking part in the 
exercise, the results would “…contribute in a non-mechanistic way as one of several input 
factors to determine Pillar 2 capital in the ECB’s overall Supervisory Review and Evaluation 
Process (SREP)" (ECB, 2016). Specifically, the ECB underlined that adverse scenario ratio 
for CET 1 should level at 5.5% or, in case of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), 
5.5% plus the G-SIB buffer. This statement was interpreted as the threshold by the market: 
the banks that fell below the limit were expected to carry out some form of recapitalization. In 
general, the adverse scenario led to a decline of 380 bps in the initial point CET 1 ratio, and 
13.2% by the end of the three-year forecast time span. The fully-loaded CET 1 ratio fell from 
12.6% to 9.2%, whereas the aggregate leverage ratio shrunk from 5.2% to 4.2% in the adverse 
scenario. 
The outcomes of the 2016 EBA stress test revealed consistent differences across European 
banks. In particular, the results of the 51 institutions that took part in the exercise suggest 
clearly that not economic growth but rather the exposures to non-performing loans (NPLs) 
and to governments and corporates seem to be the main drivers behind the impact of the 
adverse scenario (De Groen, 2016). To be specific, the worst performers were Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena and Allied Irish Banks, with only the former in tremendous need of new 
capital injection according to the European regulatory authorities (Durden, 2016). 
                                                             
29 https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-2016-eu-wide-stress-test-results  
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Specifically, in the stress test conducted by the EBA, banks would lose an average 3.4% of 
the fully-loaded common equity tier 1 in the three-year lag under the adverse scenario. 
However, the differences are extremely large. For instance, the Italian Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena would lose some 14.5% of its CET 1, which is equivalent to more than three times the 
regulatory minimum requirement of CET 1 (4.5%), though the negative performance had 
already been anticipated by the market with consistent advance, given its undeniable exposure 
to non-performing loans  (De Groen, 2016). On the contrary, the Scandinavian banks were 
undoubtedly among the top performs (Kinmonth, 2016). In particular, the Norwegian DNB 
would barely feel the effects of the adverse scenario, losing less than 0.1% of its CET 1. 
To fully comprehend the outcomes, it is necessary to take a look at the adverse scenario 
design and the different channels through which the shocking effects are propagated to profit 
and loss accounts and capital positions. Briefly, the adverse scenario includes a foreign and 
domestic demand shock as well as a financial downturn between the years 2016 and 2018. 
Moreover, the detrimental impacts foresee also residential and commercial real estate prices 
and foreign exchange rate shocks in Central and Eastern Europe. Notably, the shocks are 
assumed to lead to an average comprehensive drop in real GDP of 7.1% from the baseline 
scenario30. In practice, the 2016 stress test may be regarded as a large container, wherein 
many different shocks are mixed up together. For this reason, comparisons and valuations are 
not immediate. In addition to that, very few insights about the fundamental soundness of the 
European banking system are provided, although this was supposed to be one of the critical 
priorities of the stress test framework. Ayadi et al. (2016) criticize the fact that different 
European banking groups may respond in non-comparable ways to various kinds of risks, 
since they may be structured in diversified ways. To this extent, De Groen (2016) suggests 
that introducing a more intriguing test, with a longer time horizon and multiple scenarios 
would be heavily beneficial. 
 
4.4 Methodological Framework 
The ultimate aim of this empirical research is to determine whether the disclosure of stress 
test results can have a remarkable effect on stock prices of the tested institutions and, in 
affirmative case, to attempt to address that impact. Theoretically, no relevant consequence 
should be detected, as, on the one hand, the market is supposed to be efficient and banks are 
assumed to be transparent, on the other. Therefore, the information contained in the results 
disclosure are expected to be already reflected in current market prices. The general 
                                                             
30 This is an average percentage: GDP declines in fact may range from the 4.8% of Hungary to the 14.8% of Latvia. The 
difference between the largest EU countries, however, are fairly limited in both real and nominal terms: France (5.6%), 
Germany (6.6%), Italy (5.9%). 
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framework of this empirical research relies on the event study modelling and theoretical 
assumptions exhaustively presented by MacKinley (1997). For simplicity’s sake, we divide 
the methodological framework of the empirical research into steps. 
4.4.1 Event Definition 
First of all, we need to define the event of interest. In our case, the stress test results disclosure 
by the EBA on 29th July 2016. This date will be the t0 of our analysis. Thus, when we refer to 
T-1, the date of interest will be 28th July 2016 an so on. Furthermore, we define “event 
window” as the time interval comprehending the event of interest. Our analysis will focus on 
six particular time intervals: T-1 to T+1 , T-3 to T+3, T-3 to T-1, T-1 to T0 , T0 t to T+1 and 
another from T0 to T+5, as shown in the figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 Event Windows for the empirical analysis. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
4.4.2 Normal and Abnormal Returns 
We follow the approach recommended by MacKinley (1997) and implemented more recently 
by Alvés (2013), Neretina et al. (2015) and Georgescu et al. (2016). Notably, they implement 
market models to compute normal returns. These models envisage the estimation of market 
returns from which, subsequently, individual normal returns are derived. Such techniques are 
for instance the CAPM or the FAMA Three-Factor model. For the purpose of this work, we 
opted for a CAPM-based model, since it is well-established among practitioners and scholars. 
Specifically: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                            (4.1) 
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Where: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡represents the normal return of the i-th security at time t, 
 𝛼𝑖is a constant 
 𝑅𝑀𝑡is the market return at time t 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡is the residual term 
Let us focus on each single parameter. 𝑅𝑖𝑡is the return at time t of the specific security. In 
order to compute this value, we could use two simple methods. The first one is just to 
compute the percentage difference as follows: 
   𝑅𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1
) %                                 (4.2) 
Tough this may be a good approximation; we prefer to define stock returns in logarithmic 
terms. Namely: 
                                               𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1
) %                                        (4.3) 
  
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the log-return for the stock i at time t, 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the current closing price 
and 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1 is the beginning of the period closing price. We decided to employ 
continuously compounded returns so as to avoid issues with non-stationarity in the data. The 
econometric consequences of non-stationarity can turn out to be quite severe, leading to test 
statistics and predictors that are unreliable (Cardinali, Nordmark, 2011). Moreover, there is 
exhausting empirical evidence that stock returns become stationary when they are integrated 
of order 1, i.e. after taking the first ln-differential (Gujarati, 2003). 
The second element, 𝑅𝑀𝑡, represents the market return. Also in this case, there are different 
valuable solutions. For instance, one possible solution may be employing a country indexes, 
thus considering market return as nationally-bounded (Candelon, Amadou, 2015) 31  or, 
alternatively, adopting worldwide indexes, such as the MSCI World Index or the S&P 500. 
The choice between the two is not an issue at all, since, basically, they present very similar 
results and are highly correlated32. We decided to pick up the MSCI World Index as a proxy 
of market return in accordance with Peristan (2010) and Cardinali and Nordmark (2011). The 
underlying reason is quite intuitive: given that most of the banks in the sample conduct 
business at a worldwide level, it would be misleading to choose a national or even an 
                                                             
31 Candelon and Amadou (2015) employ a comprehensive CAPM model, using bank stock returns, country stock market 
indices, and a proxy for the risk-free rate (EONIA) 
32 The two indexes had a 95.8 percent correlation between 2000 and 2009 (Koller et al. 2015). 
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European index as a proxy of market returns, since it would reflect just a part of banks’ 
business territory. Therefore, normal returns are computed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (4.4) 
 
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑡is the zero mean disturbance term. In order to carry out a more solid estimate of the 
parameters 𝛼𝑖and 𝛽𝑖 , we must determine their values over a consistent estimation window. 
Regarding this issue, scholars and practitioners usually rely on the time horizon just before 
the event window. Nonetheless, there is still a wide debate concerning the length of the 
estimation window. For instance, Campbell et al. (1997) estimate the parameters of the 
normal return model over the 120 days prior to the event, Peristan et al. (2010) Cardinali and 
Nordmark (2011) use a year of daily returns. We decided to define the estimation period 
according to Peristan (2010), since a longer time horizon may allow us to obtain estimates 
that are more reliable on average. 
 
Figure 4.2 The estimation period. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
Once the normal returns are computed, the abnormal or excess returns are easily derived. 
Specifically, they are nothing but the difference between the actual ex-post returns of the 
security and the normal returns computed over the event window. In practice, normal returns 
are the returns that would be reasonably expected if the event (in this case, the stress test) did 
not take place. Mathematically: 
                                                     𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡)                                     (4.5) 
Or equivalently,  
                                                      𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡)                   (4.6) 
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Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 stands for the abnormal return of the i-th security at time t, while both 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) 33 and ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 stand for the normal returns. Note, once again, that the values 
for ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are derived from the regressions over estimation window.  
As pointed out by Cardinali and Nordmark (2011) single firm’s return data might not be very 
informative, since stock price movements are also triggered by information or circumstances 
unrelated to the event. Therefore, by averaging over a number of firms, our analysis may 
become more productive: given that the abnormal returns are centered around a particular 
event, the computed mean should mirror the effects of that event. In other terms, all irrelevant 
information, i.e. information not linked to the event, should cancel out on average (de Jong, 
2007). Namely, the unweighted cross-sectional average of abnormal returns is period t is: 
 
                                                             𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1                                      (4.7) 
Our analysis does not focus solely on the average abnormal returns, since it would be quite 
reductive and not informative at all. For this reason, we introduce the cumulative abnormal 
returns, CAR, and the cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR. The former are defined as 
the sum of all the abnormal returns in a specific window and the latter simply as the mean of 
the CAR. To be specific: 
                                  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇1,𝑇2 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1             (4.8) 
And  
                                                      𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑇1,𝑇2 =
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
𝑁
𝑖=1                               (4.9) 
 
Where T1 and T2 are the time span of the event window. 
4.4.3 Data  
We gathered and analyzed 84 financial institutions: 34 of them represent our treatment group 
(see Annex 1), that is, the banks that were subject to the stress test exercise on 29th July 2016. 
The remaining 50 institutions correspond to our control group (see Annex 2). Both the 
treatment and control group share two common features. First, they only include entities, 
which are either monitored by the European Banking Authority, or under the direction of the 
European Central Bank. In addition to that, all the analyzed financial institutions are publicly 
traded entities. Thus, following Candelon and Amadou (2015), we do not capture the effect of 
stress test on non-listed banks. Nevertheless, to argue in favour of this choice, we may claim 
that the analysis of listed banks only is coherent with our market efficiency hypothesis, as the 
                                                             
33 Xt is the conditioning information for the normal model. 
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latter envisages immediate reflection of new relevant information into security prices. And 
this would not be that straightforward with private companies. The two sample sizes are in 
line with the recent academic researches (see Georgescu et al., 2016).  The purpose of this 
empirical analysis is to find out possible relationships between arrival of pivotal information 
and excess returns. The short term and immediate effects of information can be only observed 
in daily data. We obtained the historical daily stock prices from reuters.com although we 
acknowledge the existence of many valid alternative platforms that provide historical data. 
The choice of daily returns derives from the fact that new information can affect the stock 
market on same day. Nevertheless, if markets are not informationally efficient, then the 
effects may appear after one, two or three days. This peculiar insight is impossible to obtain 
with monthly or weekly data.  In addition to that, employing longer horizon data may trigger 
difficulties in assessing excess returns.  It may be even undetectable when three or more days 
of excess returns are pooled together. As it were not enough, monthly data adjust persistently 
to the new information much easily as compared to the weekly and daily data, which needless 
to say, may lead to fooled results.  The academic literature seems to back up this position: Jun 
and Uppal (1994), for instance, pointed out that monthly data might create ambiguous 
conclusion about the efficiency of market due to adjustment of information.   
 
4.4.4 Testing Procedure 
Our testing procedure aims at understanding whether the abnormal returns are significantly 
different from zero in the event windows of interest. In particular, we will proceed per steps. 
In a first general analysis, we will test the significance of the AAR for each single day of our 
event window. Specifically, the test is performed for pooled data; for the control group and 
the treatment sample. The t-statistic is reported as G in the results tables. 
We want to test whether the daily average returns are significant. Obviously, the significance 
of this first analysis is fundamental for the rest of our project, since it would not make any 
sense to compute CAR or CAAR in case of statistically insignificant average abnormal 
returns. To be precise we want to test the following null hypothesis: 
 
                                                           𝐻0 : 𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) = 0                                              (4.10) 
 
Against the two-sided alternative hypothesis 
 
                                                           𝐻1 : 𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) ≠ 0                                               (4.11) 
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The most common test for this kind of null hypothesis is a simple t-test (Georgescu et al., 
2016). To perform this test, we assume that the individual 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  and the 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡  are 
independently and identically distributed (IID assumption). Additionally, they are assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 𝜎2. Given that 𝜎2is unknown, a 
consistent estimator of 𝜎  must be estimated. In our case, we employ the cross-sectional 
variance of the abnormal returns in period t:  
 
        𝑠𝑡 =  √
1
𝑁−1
∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡)2
𝑁
𝑖=1                                       (4.12) 
 
Which determines the this test statistic for the average abnormal returns: 
 
                                                         𝐺 =  √𝑁
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑠𝑡
 ~ 𝑡𝑁−1                                         (4.13) 
 
This statistic is reasonably assumed to follow a student-t distribution with N -1 degrees of 
freedom. Remarkably, for large numbers, G may follow a standard normal distribution (de 
Jong, 2007). 
The second stage takes place only in case we managed to prove the significance of average 
abnormal returns. Hereon, the focus will be on the CAAR for the event windows identified in 
figure 4.2. Similarly, also in this case we will perform the analysis for pooled data; control 
and treatment group. In particular, we are interested to test the following null hypothesis: 
                                              
                                                     𝐻0 : 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2) = 0                                            (4.14) 
 
Against the alternative, two-sided hypothesis: 
 
                                                          𝐻1: 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2) ≠ 0                                            (4.15) 
 
The variance of the cumulative average return is calculated as: 
                                      𝜎𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
2 = ?̅?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
2 =  
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝑖,(𝑇1,𝑇2)
2𝑁
𝑖=1                        (4.16) 
 
The relative t-statistic (J) is constructed as follows: 
                                                    𝐽 =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
√?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
2
 ≈ 𝑁(0,1)                                     (4.17) 
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The t-statistic is presented as J in the result tables.  
To increase the reliability of our results, we carry out a complementary analysis following 
Brown and Warner (1980). Namely, they introduce a cross sectional t-test, which is robust to 
event-induced variance. This test utilizes a daily cross-sectional standard deviation instead of 
sample time-series standard deviation. Thus, the test statistics for the day t in event time is 
given by: 
                                                          𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 =  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
?̂?𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)/√𝑁
                                          (4.18) 
 
Where 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
2 is defined as: 
𝜎𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2)
2 =
1
𝑁 − 1
∑ (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑇1,𝑇2) −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗,(𝑇1,𝑇2)
𝑁
𝑗=1
)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
1
𝑁 − 1
∑(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑇1,𝑇2) − 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑇1,𝑇2))
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
       (4.19) 
The relative t-statistic is presented as B in the results tables.  
In the last part, we will introduce a statistics to validate the results obtained for the stressed 
banks. The ultimate objective herein is to figure out whether the abnormal returns are 
effectively linked to the release of stress test. In fact, by introducing a generalized sign test we 
may compare the proportion of positive abnormal returns around the event window to the 
proportion with those of the estimation window. This test is a refined version of the sign test 
devised by Cowan (1992). Basically, the sign test it is a simple binomial test, which ascertains 
whether the frequency of positive abnormal returns are equal to 50% or not. In the generalized 
version, the fraction of positive abnormal returns in the event window is not assumed to be 
half of the total, but rather they are proportionately compared with those of the estimation 
window. 
In this way, the generalized sign test may take into account a possible asymmetric return 
distribution under the null hypothesis. Cowan (1992) demonstrated that the generalized sign 
test is proper for the event windows of one to eleven days. Additionally, he also argues that 
the test is consistently powerful and becomes relatively more reliable as the length of the CAR 
estimation window augments.  
                                                           ?̂? =
1
𝑁
∑
1
257
∑ 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝐸257
𝑡=𝐸1
𝑁
𝑗=1                               (4.20) 
 
Where: 
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                                                            𝑆𝑗𝑡 = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 > 0
0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                           (4.21) 
 
The test statistic uses the normal approximation to the binomial distribution with parameter ?̂?. 
We introduce w as the number of stocks in the event window for which the cumulative 
abnormal return 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗,(𝑇1,𝑇2)is positive. Therefore, the generalized sign test assumes the form 
of: 
                                                               𝑍𝐺 =  
𝑤−𝑛𝑝
[𝑛𝑝 ̂(1−𝑝)̂]
1/2                                           (4.22) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, there is no difference between the proportion of positive returns in 
the event window and in the estimation period. As a consequence, if rejected, the positive 
return frequency between the two time windows is relevantly different.  
The generalized sign test is extremely helpful in case of event-induced volatility increase. In 
our specific case, it may allow us to figure out whether the significance (or insignificance) of 
the outcomes has to be attributed to any potential volatility increase. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
In this paragraph, we present the results obtained from the empirical analysis. First of all, we 
will focus on the average abnormal returns, then we will move to the cumulative abnormal 
returns and to the sign test results. Overall, the results are consistent for the time interval 
comprehending the days just before and after the publication of the outcomes, whereas weak 
evidence is found for longer time intervals.  
In first instance, we decided to analyze the daily average abnormal returns. As clarified in the 
methodological framework, the significance of the AAR will serve as the basis upon which 
the empirical analysis has to be constructed. In effect, drawing conclusions on a single day 
basis might be misleading, since event-induced effects tend to act on a slightly larger time 
span. On the contrary, employing excessively long time intervals might blend many firm-
specific anomalies with the disclosure effect. The table 1 below presents the results for the 
pooled average abnormal returns. In general, the daily average abnormal returns are 
comfortably significant, implying that analyzing the cumulative abnormal returns does indeed 
make sense.   
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Table 4.1. AAR t-test pooled banks. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
As shown in the figure 4.33, average abnormal returns are quite volatile over the event 
window. This strengthens our conviction that analyzing data on a single day basis does not 
provide any deep insight about the real consequences of an event. Nevertheless, a very 
interesting pattern can be observed when looking at the reported average abnormal returns. 
Namely, the stressed banks seem to overreact or, in other terms, to exacerbate the market 
reaction: when the latter is showing a positive trend, the stressed bank respond with 
substantially higher peaks. The same holds for reverse tendencies. This suggests that the 
stressed institutions are consistently more volatile on average than the market. Specifically, on 
the day of the disclosure, most of the pooled banks showed positive abnormal returns. This is 
even more evident if we look at the sole tested banks, which basically replicate the strong 
significance of the pooled dataset (Table 4.2). On the contrary, a much feebler reaction is 
observed for the control group (Table 4.3).  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Average Abnormal Returns during the event window. (Author’s elaboration) 
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Interestingly, potential conclusions based on just AAR outcomes returns would suggest that 
the market reacted positively to the disclosure of stress test results, and thus, that the market 
has already reached a satisfactory level of transparency and efficiency. Not only, detecting an 
upward-sloping effect would signify that market participants were expecting worse results and 
reacted with relief to the actual outcomes. Nonetheless, as stated earlier, the daily average 
abnormal returns are statistically significant yet too unpredictable to be used as unique drivers 
of an event study.  
 
 Table 4.2 AAR t-test for stressed banks. (Author’s elaboration)  
 
 
Table 4.3 AAR t-test for control banks. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
Furthermore, as no effective pass-fail threshold was envisaged, or at least on the result release 
date, the market could have been simply fooled by the lack of this crucial detail, or just unable 
to properly interpret the information disclosed. Naturally, should this be the case, an issue of 
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communication effectiveness would necessarily arise: as correctly pointed out by Dent et al. 
(2016), it is fundamental for policymakers to convey the right message in the right way, so as 
to enable investors and all the stakeholders to form a fair opinion.   
Moving to cumulative average abnormal returns, CAARs, the results are somehow reversed 
compared to the AAR values, in the sense that almost the totality of the event intervals 
considered turn out to be statistically insignificant at 0.01 level, with the sole exception of the 
(-1 +1) event window (Table 4.4).  
                                                           
        
Table 4.4 CAAR t-test pooled banks. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
Specifically, both the normal t-test (J) and the cross sectional t-test (B) are solidly confirming  
the significance of the CAAR on that event time span. This is remarkably important, since the 
two statistics are based on different assumptions. Namely, the latter, t-test (B), accounts for a 
potential volatility increase during the event window, i.e. the so-called event-induced 
volatility and therefore, being able to capture also this feature may further enhance the 
reliability of our outcomes. Thus, we may deduce that during the interval from T-1 to T+1 the 
market was more turbulent than usual. In particular, we have a solid proof from the sample of 
stressed banks (Table 4.5). Both t-tests are statistically significant, although only the cross-
sectional one at a 0.01 level. As a consequence, supposing a general negative reaction from 
the market is not unrealistic, on the contrary, it seems the most plausible conclusion based on 
our outcomes.  
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Table 4.5 CAAR t-test for stressed banks. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
At this point, one may be trying to figure out a persuasive motivation to justify the adverse 
reaction of the market. Firstly, an intriguing explanation could be considering the negative 
CAAR as a sort of “dissatisfaction signal” from the market to the regulatory authorities: in 
other words, market participants either complained about the fact that results were much more 
difficult to decipher than expected, for instance, because no specific fail-threshold was 
contained, or more realistically, because they predicted superior performances initially. This, 
in turn, could have well persuaded investors to reassess downwardly their own expectations. 
In fact, comparing the outcomes for the stressed and non-stressed banks may further increase 
the last hypothesis (Table 4.6). To be precise, the CAAR for non-stressed banks is not 
significant at 0.01 level and the average market reaction is consistently lower than the one 
detected for the stressed sample, symptom that stressed banks were indeed catalyzing the 
attention of the market.  
 
Table 4.6 CAAR t-test for control banks. (Author’s elaboration) 
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The striking difference between the two samples further confirms that market participants did 
indeed possess an uneven level of insight. As it were not enough, our last test, the generalized 
sign test (Cowan, 1992) definitely allows us to conclude that stressed banks significantly 
underperformed compared to the fellow financial entities that did not take part to the exercise 
(table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7 CAAR t-test for control banks. (Author’s elaboration) 
 
Namely, this test underlines that during the event window of interest, the actual number of 
cumulative positive abnormal returns was unusually and meaningfully lower than during the 
estimation horizon. This is further validated by the fact that the generalized sign test controls 
for any possible event-induced volatility. Consequently, differences in abnormal returns 
cannot be attributed to volatility increases deriving from the release of the stress test results 
and this, consequently, implies that the publication of stress test results has clearly revealed 
new valuable information to the financial markets. Moreover, assuming realistically that the 
market is efficient, we may reasonably deem this mismatch as an issue of bank opacity, 
intended, basically, as insufficient amount of information disclosed. Jones et al. (2012) 
impute bank opacity as the main driver of inefficient transmission of information into security 
prices. In effect, had the stressed institutions provided an adequate level of informational 
details, they would have likely triggered a less impactful reaction in terms of abnormal 
returns, as it occurred for the control banks. 
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4.6 Conclusions: Moving to the Right Direction 
Bank opacity has always been a crucial topic among practitioners and scholars. As presented 
in the introductive paragraph, it is not as easy as it seems at first sight for supervisory 
authorities to regulate this issue. In fact, obliging financial institutions to disclose too many 
details may turn out to be extremely unproductive from a competitive advantage point of 
view. Thus, any regulatory framework has to be conceived taking into account all the pros and 
cons that may derive from increasing the information disclosure duties. The ultimate goal 
should always be to guarantee a high level of transparency, in particular concerning banking 
risk exposure. At the same time, banks should be allowed to keep their most delicate 
information safely under wrap, so as to protect their profitability. As a consequence, a 
comprehensive and efficient supervisory intervention must consider this trade off: the market 
should be given an adequate level of information disclosure to correctly judge banks’ 
performances, conversely, banks shall be protected from any unnecessary and harmful detail 
release. The empirical analysis suggested that this equilibrium level has yet to be reached: 
markets still need some additional insight. And this necessity seems to have been well noted 
by the supervisory authorities in the upcoming 2018 stress test framework. First of all, 
similarly to the 2016 stress test results, the outcomes of the next stress test will be used as an 
essential input for the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). The major change 
from the previous exercises will be the introduction of the IFRS 9 framework, which will 
represent a disruptive milestone in terms of data and parameters computation. In particular, 
the new regulation will concern primarily the credit risk. According to different surveys, the 
latter represented the largest effect on the CET 1 in the 2016 exercise.34 The shift to IFRS 9 
will have an additional impact on CET 1 compared to the current IAS 39, which will probably 
range between 180 and 300 basis points (Nawani, Shcheredin, 2017). Currently, several banks 
are still finalizing the adoption of the IFRS 9. Nevertheless, this may serve as a further 
connecting bridge between the financial and accounting worlds, involving more people and 
widening as such the possibility to enhance and promote testing models and techniques. In 
other words, the completion of the IFRS 9 and the development of the stress test will 
encourage the cooperation of different areas or teams within individual banks. It turns out to 
be essential for each specific financial entity to optimize the internal and external resources in 
order to automate and integrate as much as possible of the two projects. Therefore, it may also 
improve the quality and quantity of feedbacks across single institutions. This convergence 
could also be beneficial from stakeholders’ point of view, since, at least in the medium-long 
                                                             
34 A survey of Deloitte (Bujoc et al., 2016) demonstrated that the negative impact of credit losses accounted for the 57% 
of the total downward movement of CET 1. 
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term, a more standardized language could be adopted, thus permitting a potentially faster and 
deeper understanding of both the accounting and financial information.  
Should the benefits of the IFRS 9 be limited to the sole synergies within the internal project 
teams, it would not be as innovative as declared earlier. And surely, it would not bring any 
solution to the bank opacity problem. Fortunately, there is something more about IFRS 9, 
which may pose a real step forward in terms of informational value. Specifically, with the 
IFRS 9 we move from an incurred-loss perspective towards an expected-loss perspective, 
which, needless to say, will guarantee a greater reflection of current, or better, fair values. In 
fact, historical series are useful only in case we expect future performances to be quite 
analogous to the previous ones. However, this would rule out potential unexpected events and 
make any forecast of them excessively hard or even impractical. Thus, by abandoning the 
historically-based framework and implementing an approach that, starting from historical 
data, integrated with current and forward-looking information, may significantly enhance the 
reliability and consistency of the information, besides providing more uniformity in the 
treatment of financial instruments. Another interesting aspect concerns specifically the LGD 
parameter. Namely, if we compare the LGD for IFRS 9 purposes with the current regulatory 
(Advanced) Internal Rating-Based approach, we may clearly realize that the IFRS 9 loss given 
default will feature two drastic changes, which may support the additional informational 
requirement demanded by the market. First, no downturn correction is envisaged by the IFRS 
9 and this, may lead to estimates that are more realistic and closer to the actual market values. 
But most relevantly, the new principle substitutes the historical discount rate with an effective 
interest rate, which is undoubtedly more reflective of the current conditions35.  
Notwithstanding that the IFRS 9 will represent in general a positive introduction to the stress 
test framework, there may be some potential implementation drawbacks, at least during the 
first time adoption of the new accounting principle. For instance, it will be necessary for 
financial institutions to revisit their stress-testing capabilities and put attention to three crucial 
points. The first issue concerns scenario definition and calibration, whereby, unlike IAS 39, 
banks will have to define a pool of different scenario paths for each time point in the forecast 
horizon. Therefore, assuming a realistic five-year testing horizon, banks will have to elaborate 
a minimum of 15 to 20 additional scenarios under the base case and stress scenario 
respectively. Moreover, strictly related to the former point, a process of probability-weighting 
of scenarios will have to be accomplished alongside. Secondly, the forward-looking 
assessment of provisions poses another consistent challenge. Notably, IFRS 9 models might 
                                                             
35  The IFRS 9 LGD has basically other relevant differences compared with the regulatory Internal Rating-Based 
approach: the inclusion of the sole direct costs and of all guarantees, regardless of their eligibility for regulatory 
purposes. 
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complicate assumptions for transition criteria under stress scenarios, stressed lifetime 
probabilities of default and stressed behavioral assumptions, amongst others. Additionally, the 
three-stage procedure for estimating provisions may represent a further issue. The migration 
of assets between the three stages36 is in fact a function of quantitative risk measures and 
individual banks’ own policies as well, and thus, uncertain estimates can results from the 
definition of migration from stage one to stage two 37 . The last factor regards business 
assumptions. Specifically, the IFRS 9 provision stress testing will result from key business 
assumptions that back the financial and business strategy of the bank. These may comprehend 
hypotheses around portfolio movements, product mix, underwriting criteria; product maturity; 
fees and interest rates across the product mix and so on. All these issues will definitely 
increase the overall volatility of loan loss provisions under stress scenarios. Consequently this 
will complicate medium-term financial planning and threaten the capital adequacy of financial 
institutions and how all the higher volatility impacts on the CET 1. To sum up, herein we 
introduced just some of the numerous challenges connected to the adoption of the IFRS 9 
principle. Nonetheless, should those issues be addressed in the right way, the IFRS 9 will be 
definitely allowed to spread all its potentiality, at least in the medium-long run.  
The upcoming stress test will probably solve some of the problems that have characterized the 
previous exercises. But we are still far to get the job done. In the previous paragraph, we 
listed some of fields where major improvements are expected, although they will likely take 
place only after the conclusion of the 2018 regulatory exercise, since several adjustments may 
require longer time to be carried out. The 2018 stress test will probably serve as a “litmus 
test” for the European regulatory authorities to figure out, whether they are moving to the 
right direction or not. Moreover, it will serve as a feedback to the accounting supervisors, as 
far as the IFRS 9 is concerned. Therefore, we expect a lot of attention from the market to both 
the release of the stress test methodology and results. And we also expect further studies and 
empirical researches on those two events and on the banking opacity issue in general.  
 
  
                                                             
36 The three stages comprehend different provisions: Stage 1 point-in-time expected loss; Stage 2 lifetime expected loss       
and Stage 3: defaulted assets. 
37 A practical solution could be using the same classification cut-off of the internal rating-based approaches. 
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 Annex I  
 
BANK COUNTRY 
ABN AMRO GROUP N.V. THE NETHERLANDS   
ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC IRELAND 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA S.P.A. ITALY 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA S.A. SPAIN 
BANCO DE SABADELL S.A. SPAIN 
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL S.A. SPAIN 
BANCO SANTANDER S.A. SPAIN 
BANK OF IRELAND  IRELAND 
BARCLAYS PLC UNITED KINGDOM 
BNP PARIBAS FRANCE 
COMMERZBANK AG GERMANY 
CRÉDIT AGRICOLE GROUP FRANCE 
DANSKE BANK DANMARK 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG GERMANY 
DNB BANK GROUP NORWAY 
ERSTE GROUP BANK AG AUSTRIA 
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC UNITED KINGDOM 
ING GROEP N.V. THE NETHERLANDS   
INTESA SANPAOLO S.P.A. ITALY 
JYSKE BANK DANKMAR 
KBC GROUP NV BELGIUM 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC UNITED KINGDOM 
NORDEA BANK (GROUP) SWEDEN 
OTP BANK NYRT. UNGHERIA 
POWSZECHNA KASA OSZCZEDNOSCI BANK POLSKI SA POLAND 
RAIFFEISEN‐LANDESBANKEN‐HOLDING GMBH AUSTRIA 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN (GROUP) SWEDEN 
SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE FRANCE 
SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN (GROUP) SWEDEN 
SWEDBANK (GROUP) SWEDEN 
THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP PLC UNITED KINGDOM 
UNICREDIT S.P.A. ITALY 
UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE S.P.A. ITALY 
VOLKSWAGEN FINANCIAL SERVICES AG GERMANY 
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Annex II 
BANK COUNTRY 
AKTIA BANK ABP A FINNLAND 
ÅLANDSBANKEN  FINNLAND 
ALPHA BANK S.A.  GREECE 
AVANZA BANK HOLDING AB  SWEDEN 
BANCA CARIGE ITALY 
BANCA FINNAT ITALY 
BANCA MEDIOLANUM ITALY 
BANCA TRANSILVANIA ROMANIA 
BANCO BPI SA  PORTUGAL 
BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES SA PORTUGAL 
BANCO DESIO E BRIANZA ITALY 
BANCO POPOLARE DI SONDRIO ITALY 
BANK COOP AG SWEDEN 
BANK MILLENIUM  POLAND 
BANK OF CYPRUS CYPRUS 
BANK OF VALLETTA  CYPRUS 
BANCA PROFILO SPA ITALIA 
BANCO DI SARDEGNA SPA ITALIA 
BANKIA SA  SPAIN 
BANKINTER S.A. SPAIN 
BANQUE CANTONALE DE GENEVE SWITZERLAND 
BINCKBANK  THE NETHERLANDS 
BPER BANCA SPA ITALY 
CAIXA BANK SPAIN 
CREDIT SUISSE SWITZERLAND 
CREDITO EMILIANO SPA ITALY 
CREDITO VALTELLINESE SPA ITALY 
DEUTSCHE POST AG GERMANY 
DEXIA NV  BELGIUM 
EUROBANK ERGASIAS S.A.  GREECE 
FINECOBANK ITALY 
GETIN NOBLE BANK  POLAND 
GRAUBÜNDNER KANTONALBANK  SWITZERLANDD 
KOMERCNI BANKA CZECH EPURBLIC 
MEDIOBANCA - BANCA DI CREDITO FINANZIARIO S.P.A ITALY 
NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE S.A.  GREECE 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB A SWEDEN 
SPAR NORD BANK DANMARK 
SPAREBANK 1 NORD-NORGE NORWAY 
SPAREBANK 1 SR BANK NORWAY 
SPAREBANKEN MORE  NORWAY 
SPAREBANKEN VEST NORWAY 
SPAREKASSE  SJAELLAND DANMARK 
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK UNITED KINGDOM 
SYDBANK A/S  DANMARK 
UBS AG  SWITZERLAND 
UMWELT BANK GERMANY 
VAN LANSCHOT NV THE NETHERLANDS 
VESTJYSK BANK DANMARK 
ZAGREBACKA BANKA  CROATIA 
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APPENDIX I 
 
1.1A Overview of Regulatory Capital Requirements 
The new internationally agreed-upon standards, Basel III, are currently being applied 
with a phase-period, which will end in January 2019 for some requirements. Differently 
from Basel II, the new requirements envisage a consistent increase in the quantity and 
quality of hard minimum capital requirements that financial institutions shall satisfy at 
all times. This, needless to say, was established in order to enhance banks’ loss-
absorbing capabilities and to bolster creditors and customers’ confidence. Theoretically, 
these precautions should also decrease the intervention of regulatory authorities, as 
banks will have more capital to face potential threats. Moreover, Basel III introduced 
three additional capital buffers over and above the minimum capital requirements. Two 
of them, namely the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCoB) and the Countercyclical 
Buffer (CCyB), have a system-level dimension and can be used to absorb losses during 
stress periods (usable buffer). The time-variation feature of these buffers is meant to 
pursue the extensive macroprudential goals of enhancing systemic stability and 
smoothing the financial cycle. The third buffer, the G-SII buffer, is addressed to the 
banks judged by the Financial Stability Board to be globally systemic, i.e. to be 
essential from a system-wide point of view. This further buffer aims at guaranteeing a 
higher resilience standard for banks whose failure would be enormously disruptive to 
the financial system and no equity capital is required for the countercyclical buffer and 
the systemic risk buffer. 
 
1.2A Fully loaded equity 
Each bank has to define its individual equity target. This target should range between 
14.5% and 22% plus additional capital requirements shown in the cloud of the figure 
1A. Let us consider a bank with 14.5% buffer. Accordingly, an institution that must 
hold just this percentage is regarded as not being systematically important and no equity 
is required for the countercyclical buffer and the systemic risk buffer. Nonetheless, a 
bank like this may not exist in reality, since possibly at least one of the equity 
requirements in cloud may be triggered. Therefore, a more realistic picture would 
suggest a minimum of at least 16% for a non-systematically important bank and a 
higher percentage increase for systematically important institutions as well. 
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Figure 1A. Fully loaded equity Requirement. (ALM Forum, 2015) 
 
Most of the times, the equity requirement of banks is argued as a percent of risk 
weighted assets (RWA). This is a deficient consideration, since the equity requirement 
for risks in the trading book and for operational risks is absent. As a result, banks may 
have differing equity requirements even if their risk weighted assets are the same (CRR, 
2013). In Basel III, the total absolute equity requirement of banks was increased by a 
substantial change of the parameters in the RWA calculation and a substantial increase 
of the required equity for trading positions. As a consequence, 8% of the equity 
requirement before 2009 is not even closely comparable to 8% equity requirement in 
2015. 
Additionally, with Basel 4 the parameters for standardized approaches (credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk) are going to be more risk sensitive and will serve as a 
mandatory floor upon which more sophisticated approaches will be constructed (BCBS, 
2015). Notably, the standardized parameters will tend to the current IRB approaches, 
which will eventually boost the “parameter effect” of the required equity by further 30% 
compared to 2009. With Basel III, the most relevant changes regard, on the one hand, 
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the disappearance of Tier 3 category as eligible capital completely, while on the other 
hand, the introduction of precise criteria for the eligibility of Tier 1 and Tier 2. The 
system distinguishes also between so-called going-concern capital with the feature to 
offset losses incurred and assure the continuing existence of the institute. The going-
concern capital is further divided into common equity Tier 1 (core Tier 1 / CET1) and 
so-called additional core capital (additional Tier 1). In the CRR (Articles 26 to 31) we 
may find a description of what is actually included. Specifically, it comprehends only 
the ordinary shares issued by the bank, share premium, retained earnings, disclosed 
reserves and funds for general bank risks. Furthermore, 14 criteria are defined that have 
to be met without exception if additional equity qualities shall be created. 
In addition to common equity also additional core capital may be eligible as part of the 
core capital. In this case too there are 14 criteria defined by the CRR (CRR Articles 51 
to 55). 
The gone concern capital (supplementary capital / Tier 2) has the objective of 
compensating losses in case of bankruptcy. Again CRR defines 14 criteria for the 
eligibility of supplementary capital, including a minimum term of 5 years, the 
subordination to not-ranking creditors and the independence of dividend payments from 
the issuer‘s creditworthiness. The importance of supplementary capital is significantly 
reduced, because its ability to protect creditors in case of insolvency has proved to be 
rather limited. In principle, in the CRR a minimum capital requirement of 8% remains, 
the requirements for the composition, however, were considerably tightened. While 
under Basel 2 only 2% common equity was required, under Basel 3 at least 4.5% 
common equity must be available from 2015 onwards.. 
In addition to the minimum capital requirements, the CRR /CRD regulations provide for 
capital buffer requirements, which should be built especially in periods of excess credit 
growth and can be reduced in times of crisis. The additionally required various capital 
buffers have to be of CET 1 quality. The following buffers have to be available, whereas 
with regard to the level, transition periods are provided until the full extension in 2019: 
 Capital conservation buffer: 2.5 % mandatory for all institutions, step-by-step 
introduction as from 1.1.2016, full rate as from 1.1.2019. (Art. 129 CRD IV). 
 Counter-cyclical buffers: 2.5%, step-by-step introduction as from 1.1.2016 (CRD IV 
Article 130, 135-140).  
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 Buffer for systemic risks: Systemic risk buffer as from 1.1.2014 possible (CRD IV 
Article 133 and 134).  
 Capital buffer for global systemically important institutions (G-SII): 1–3.5 %, step-by-
step introduction as from 1.1.2016. (Article 131 and 132 CRD IV).  
 Capital buffer for other systemically important institutions: 0-2.0 %, possible as from 
1.1.2016; no looping-in necessary (Article 133 and 134 CRD IV).  
 Supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) (Article 22 and 123 as well as the 
annexes V and XI of Directive 2006/48/EG)  
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